Ghostly hopes

You can argue for a long time about each specific episode of more and more massive negative reactions to the actions of the country's leaders, but one thing seems to be certain: Teflon was erased. The installation of irritated distrust of the ruling group and almost any of its actions becomes clear.

However, this does not mean a stable trust in anyone else-from the inside of the country or because of its limits.

Analysis of the CSR

The statement and justification of this trend made a noticeable part of the content of the recent preliminary report of the Center for Strategic Development. This statement is also important due to the fact that the situation is significantly different from the usual for 2000 - 2010, and because it corresponds to the forecasts of the previous report of the Center.

Let's try to briefly state the main essence of the report (on the basis of what you heard on a round table in the CSR - the text of the report, unfortunately, is not yet available to us). According to the authors, a dual structure came to change the orientation to the populist majority characteristic of the Dotandem period, which made it possible to lean on a more diverse groups (and in this sense the tandem’s idea was quite successful). On September 24, messages about the castling of the tandem partly created a feeling of orphanage in more modernized groups of society.

At the same time, the CSR sees two poles on which dissatisfaction is growing-the actually mentioned groups and the left-popular segment.

The growth of discontent is such that the conformist part of the society, inclined to join those who create the impression of the majority, begins to join the dissatisfied.

Dissatisfaction is so strong that the prosperous passage of elections procedures will only tightly spent the indignation of the confident that the results have been stolen. In part, the release of a certain third candidate from the authorities (not together, but instead of them), who, as Putin in 1999, could neutralize the opposition “Power - its opponents” and re -consolidate the majority could be the emergence.

In a complex conjunction with this design, there is hope for the “middle class”, which forms the basis of modernized groups. There are a lot of “middle class” concepts - the authors work with the research of Natalia Tikhonova, since they find in touch between economic indicators and values.

So, the forecast for the growth of the middle class, partly extrapolating the experience of the last decade for the future, shows how large the share of people in society will be in society, which is characterized by attention to the values ​​of freedom, individualism, etc.

Directions of criticism

The report was perceived with obvious interest and comments. Nikolai Petrov could not understand why the “middle class” would suddenly be formed by Putin's stability to betray his patron. Alexander Kynev pointed out that the concept of representation by parties of the interests of classes or other stable social groups looks somewhat archaic. Kirill Rogov, having accepted a lot from the logic of the authors, asked whether he took into account the forecast of the middle class growth of the world's prospects, Peter Bizyukov called not to be dismissive of social movements, and Veronica Bizyukova shared the fears of something catastrophic in the near future. This discussion largely outlines the main problems with the proposed construction.

We will not cling to the concept of "middle class". In the end, Mikhail Dmitriev noticed that we can call this group as you like, but its values ​​are as follows: ... the trouble is that there is no data on how these values ​​will be manifested by this group and in these conditions in its political behavior.

But the main thing is not even that. If the second part of the report could do without the first, it would be possible to speculate with interest about the connection of values ​​and behavior, and about the difference in behavior of these groups in different types of societies, and the boundary conditions of the forecast for the number of “middle class”. But for some reason, the first part was needed-about the growth of distrust of the authorities, about the significant weakening of the stability of the political system?

Either these minor fluctuations, and the analysis of what is happening will not help us to build a long -term forecast, or the situation is so serious that it would be strange to expect the immutability of social processes.

Reconstruction

If you return to the description of the history of the political crisis, then, in our opinion, the situation looks a little different.

From the very beginning of 2000 to 2003, it was unambiguous, and in many ways - until the summer of 2007, the authorities tried to rely on all the main groups of the population, if possible, including the most “modernizing”. The launch of many reforms developed in the CSR of the guarantee. One of the key problems for the effective positioning of any opposition was that the entire ideological glade was actively mastered by power.

There was neither a social nor an ideological group that would not be made signals that it was her platform that is the main one for the ruling group.

Autumn 2007, with the radicalization of election rhetoric, briefly distance the part of the groups, but soon the nomination of Dmitry Medvedev followed, which was supposed to resume their loyalty in a new form.

Then there was a game for two teams. It is clear that there were those who were not satisfied with any of the members of the tandem - or the system as a whole, but it was for the time being unanimous phenomena.

Was this design successful? This can be judged only in conjunction with the question of leaving it.

In full accordance with the hopes of some supporters of the new design and warnings of some of its opponents,

Configurative polycentrism began to bear fruit. The system began to fragment, and power - to desacrate.

Then there was a fork with three main paths:

• The institutionalization of the split,
• the departure from the split through "modernization" monocentrism,
• Departure from a split through conservative monocentrism.

The first option is scared: the launch of real competition threatened to lead to too fast the dismantling of the system. The fear of the new perestroika was stronger than any other considerations.

For the second scenario, there were not enough resources for his supporters. The impossibility of the third in its purest form to the country's leadership was probably clear.

Something Mezheumnaya was chosen, trying to combine the features of the second and third option.

And then problems begin. The discussion of the positions “You are fooling your head - all this is not seriously” and “seriously or not seriously - you need to use the window of opportunities” on September 24, went into a new form. Now the main positions sound like this: “provocation” or “failure”. The third point of view - “If more people believed and turned on, the result could be different” - catastrophically lack conviction.

Moreover, the trend for deskalization will not automatically go anywhere.

The presidential chair is not much different from the river - from an attempt to try, both the saddle and the rider change.

This trend is actively fueled by the growing sensation of the stylistic inadequacy of the ruling group. And this problem is much deeper than any political disagreement.

This is not to say that the beginning was supposed to be on September 24. There was a lot of specific in Vladimir Putin and much earlier. But then it was possible to easily reconstruct a reference group on which the style was successfully oriented. But, say, since the launch of the Popular Front, an obvious slide into a joke does not stop.

The report of the CSR even noted the revival of this genre of modern folklore. In fairness, we note that jokes about Putin were recorded by specialists for a long time. But the comic can strengthen his object (this applies not only to the sacred parody, but also to a significant part of the late jokes about Stalin and early jokes about Putin), or, on the contrary, weaken. So, just the material for this type of jokes began to appear more and more often.

Dmitry Medvedev still continues to grope his style. And it is difficult to expect that a sharp change in the reference group will help this process end with a quick success.

Total

It is unlikely that the problem is precisely in the disappointment of many by the fact that no one else is in power in power. The power remains quite diverse.

The observation of Mikhail Dmitriev from the article in Vedomosti seems closer and more precisely: there is a growing irritation from the feeling of a dead end for the next 10 - 15 years.

The question is not in the persons of leaders, but in the deeply dangerous feeling that the best way to ensure confidence in the future is to inform that no one is going anywhere. Yes, the understanding of tomorrow from this becomes more clear - regardless of the attitude to the outlined perspective. Only the after -offshirt is now practically not predictable.

We will not guess whether this position of the tandem is really based on the illusion that it was precisely the renunciation of Nicholas II, as well as the unpreparedness of Mikhail Gorbachev to again fasten the Soviet Union with blood, turned out to be a trigger of catastrophic processes.

One way or another, the answer to the post -time “got” was clearly sounded: “You just have not yet understood your happiness. Nothing, hesitates - he will fall in love. ”

The Report of the CSR is a really important step in an attempt to comprehend what is happening right today and draw more long-term trends from it, but when it is finalized with a combination of the increased instability of the political system and the “inertial” forecast of social dynamics, it would be better to do something.

“The probability of the constitutional, non -violent resolution of numerous internal social and political contradictions in Russia is now very illusory,” Vladimir Pastukhov wrote shortly after September 24. True, in his opinion, "depending on the circumstances, Russia can hang in this" historical loop "for three, six, and twelve, and even eighteen years."

In our opinion, the mutual gearing of two trends - a) an increase in the non -perception of the ruling group and b) more and more irritating measures to maintain visible stability - can significantly force the process.

All less intelligibility in funds risks the risk of completing the process of depreciation of existing political institutions, which means to deprive them of the opportunity to even in the future become a platform for negotiations and coordination of interests.

There is no doubt that such sites will arise as necessary. Will someone wait for the representatives of the ruling group on them?

What in this regard remains for those who do not feel sympathy for either autocracy or revolutions? Probably traditional: to teach, treat, develop projects. Whatever happens further, the softening of morals and the best understanding will not be superfluous. Yes, and projects, as experience shows, can come up in a completely different historical era.

Otherwise, there is no need to hope for a miracle, there is no need to hope for a transition, but you can’t also leave attempts to enlighten the rulers and create conditions for the implementation of this miracle - despite the quality of the material. In the end,

The hope for the “velvet” nature of the revolutionary catastrophe looks no less ghostly.

And in the closest perspective-continuing to discuss how to correctly call what will happen in the coming months with the State Duma and the post of the President of the Russian Federation, as well as about whether at least someone’s real results of voting, just in case, will have to go and fill out the ballots-having shut up the nose and other senses that prevent this action.