The result of "United Russia" in the Duma elections looks brilliant for any European party, but not for Russian conditions. In the West, there is no such thing as a "party of power", in modern Russia, power is power, opposition is opposition and they cannot change places. Any significant decrease in the authority of power is a dangerous sign of its desacralization. Therefore, the decrease in the result of the party of power by 14 points compared to the previous elections is a failure - especially since at the final stage of the election campaign, Vladimir Putin again became the "face" of "United Russia". So if we can talk about a victory, then it is very conditional.

As a result of the elections, the party retained its majority in the Duma, although not a qualified one, as before. But a simple majority will be enough to pass almost all bills, excluding a few federal constitutional laws. As for the latter, situational coalitions of United Russia, Zhirinovsky and Socialist Revolutionaries can be built to pass them. Moreover, joint voting with United Russia on issues that do not particularly concern their voters does not promise any image problems for the latter two factions.

But there are three problems whose solution does not seem obvious.

The first problem is the inability of United Russia (and, more broadly, the federal government as a whole) to compromise. The last serious compromises within parliament took place in the third Duma, in which the government did not have a stable majority. The political concessions to the opposition made in 2010 can hardly be called compromises - the government itself determined which decisions were completely safe for it. And if it experiences even the slightest discomfort, it chooses a tough scenario. Even in the case of the small Russian protectorate of South Ossetia, Moscow began to vigorously impose its candidate, who, despite all the efforts made, was unable to win (even though Alla Dzhioeva is not a politician disloyal to Russia). We can also recall the story of Mikhail Prokhorov, whose political career quickly ended. The art of compromise is inextricably linked with practice, and there is almost no time to develop it. Moreover, the partners will be less convenient than before.

The second problem is related to this – the growth of the opposition’s ambitions. Back in 2009, it was fighting for political survival, and its departure from the Duma after the next regional elections looked like an act of despair. Now the opposition is on the rise, and it will no longer be satisfied with the simple opportunity to remain in the political system. It will want more – and not only at the federal level, but also at the regional level. At the same time, it may be not so much a question of dividing up seats in the future parliament, but also of ensuring that representatives of local elites who decide to join the “official opposition” are not persecuted by the authorities when their victories turn into Pyrrhic ones. As happened, for example, with the Socialist Revolutionaries in 2007 in Stavropol Krai.

The third problem is the upcoming unpopular decisions that need to be made soon after the presidential elections. For example, about cutting social budget items or raising the retirement age. And here comes the most difficult part. The most dynamic electorate left United Russia in the recent elections – the middle class, who after the economic crisis became much more sensitive to such topics as corruption, ineffective management, and a lack of vertical mobility. But there remained paternalistic voters who will demand a completely different socio-economic course than the one that has been taking shape since 2012. A natural question arises – has the government received a mandate to implement painful reforms (as happened this year in Spain and Portugal, where the politicians who won the elections informed citizens in advance what awaited them). And another one: will United Russia maintain strict factional discipline in these conditions – and in a situation where the position of a dozen and a half deputies can play a decisive role, this question becomes especially important.

In this regard, the authorities (and, of course, the ruling party) cannot help but want to share responsibility for the decisions made with the opposition. Perhaps, the statements about the possibility of coalition building are partly connected with this. But it will not be easy to do. The CPRF and A Just Russia are parties of varying degrees of leftism, for which social slogans are key. Of course, it is possible to come to an agreement with the LDPR, but Zhirinovsky will clearly try not to sell himself short in the possible bargaining. And here the issue of the absence of a right-liberal party in the Duma that could take on some of the responsibility arises – as the Union of Right Forces did in 2000-2003. But for this legislature, this is a missed opportunity.

Alexey Makarkin: Conditional Winners