Time is accelerating exponentially. In just 20 years, the country faces a regime change almost comparable to the revolution of the early 1990s. And the same risk.

Then Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar put the newborn democracy at risk. Passion and responsibility failed them. Yeltsin seized power, apparently not really realizing what kind of legacy he was accepting. Gaidar immediately began to do what he could not help but do. The abscess burst under him and besmirched him. A part of the population, not inclined to analysis and reflection, had a convulsive instinct: the one who hurt is to blame, and not those who had infected and condemned to pain earlier. This complicated the life of democracy, forcing it at a tender age to confront the turbid but strong emotions of a disoriented mass. And we must give it its due: people succumbed to these emotions in measured doses, forgave a lot and did not betray the fledgling freedom as a whole. Almost did not betray. It could have been worse.

But there was another scenario. It was possible not to seize power. Then there would have been a collapse (under the CPSU, no one would have dared to let prices go, and there was no other way out). It would have ended in an even more severe crisis. It would have been much worse for the country and for the people – but not for democracy. The shadow of disaster would have fallen on the outgoing regime, and the image of the saviors would have been passed on to the new government less tarnished – even in the eyes of people with simplified ideas and straightforward, poorly controlled reactions. In politics, we would have received an analogue of what is called growth from a low base in economics. And it would now be much less convenient for the current government to be so vulgarly and ungratefully rude about the “dashing 90s”. Putin did not save anything: he took advantage of what had been achieved, even tried to develop the right trends, but quickly broke down and confidently led the country to a situation close to the end of the 80s. History wants to repeat itself here too, and it would be good if we now found ourselves participants and spectators of a farce, and not a tragedy. There is still a chance.

But now the main chronopolitical collision of that period is repeating itself. Of course, in the near future there will be no crisis like the one under Gorbachev. But the country, the people, and especially the authorities who took the helm in this dangerous time will still get it.

For example, like this: the worsening economic situation will be the cost of patching up holes with overheated expectations, plus compensation for the gigantic expenses for the "victory" on March 4, financial and moral. Here we have the opposition that is gaining strength, and the monstrous, practically unprecedented anti-rating among the "best" (Vladislav Surkov) part of society, which already treats the regime as a hated laughing stock. An attempt to tighten the screws in such conditions is even less likely than Gennady Yanayev's in 1991. This will be perceived by society as another putsch, this time a sluggish one, with all the consequences that entails.

There are two options. First: if by some magical means (thanks to the cautiously oriented Churov) power is suddenly transferred to a new team, then it will have to clean up everything that Putin has cooked up, including ensuring "victory", himself, his friends, and taking into account the entire model of the Great All-Russian Parasite. Or Putin "wins", and then prepares a retreat and leaves himself, beautifully, theatrically, and most importantly - on time. And then he will have every reason to say: look, everything was under me, it should have been even better, but... The new government will again have a reputation as destroyers who took on the task of saving the country without knowledge and experience, without historical responsibility and state thinking.

Second: Putin "wins" (as you like), starts to sort it all out himself, sooner or later, but inevitably runs into problems that push the country into a cascade of bifurcations, and leaves not on good terms, if not unhealthily. And an oppositionist comes to take his place in a more difficult socio-economic situation, but more comfortable politically - at least not before the lowest point of the fall, not even at its beginning.

The first option is better for the country and for Putin himself. The second option is simpler and more convenient for the new government, but is fraught with danger for the country. And not even with immediate consequences, but first of all with an irreversible loss of time in the conditions of a catastrophically late, almost disrupted modernization. It is not clear whether it is still possible to launch a renewal and abandon the resource model. But it is already obvious that another six years of such stability will finally turn the country into an appendage of little use to anyone.

And again, passion and responsibility are hanging in the balance. The opposition must understand what it may face. But even understanding this, it may again sacrificially agree to harsh reforms, preparing itself for undeserved curses. Is anyone in this country ready to become another Gaidar? If not, then why press? Let us destroy the economy and deprive the country of a science-intensive and high-tech future, but at least once in history we will clear the way for the triumph of genuine democracy and freedom.

The good years are passing. Others are coming after them, and they will also be difficult. In these conditions, only very courageous or not very far-sighted people can fight for power. Or desperate people.

Alexander Rubtsov: A Springboard Over the Abyss