The Kremlin begins perestroika

Recently, the Kremlin’s plan to restructure Russia’s political sphere has begun to emerge more and more clearly.

“Oppositionist” A. Kudrin and presidential candidate M. Prokhorov have repeatedly spoken out about plans to create a liberal party. In recent weeks, Deputy Prime Minister D. Rogozin has been working tirelessly in the field of involving representatives of nationalist organizations in the ONF. On February 20, President D. Medvedev plans to meet with the leaders of the non-systemic opposition. On February 28, the State Duma will consider a package of bills to improve the political system, one of which provides for a reduction in the minimum number of party members required for its registration. Today’s article “United Russia begins rebranding” in the “Izvestia” newspaper, “famous for its independence from the Kremlin,” provides answers to many missing questions.

Based on the above, the most likely scenario for further developments seems to be the following. "United Russia" will soon sink into oblivion. From its ruins, a people's party will arise on the basis of the All-Russian Popular Front, "defending the interests of working people." This party will be the largest in the Triad and will employ the majority of current United Russia members. A nationalist party will be created on the basis of the Congress of Russian Communities and the Volunteer Movement of the All-Russian Popular Front (DON) in support of the army, navy and military-industrial complex of D. Rogozin. Mr. Prokhorov and Mr. Kudrin will create a liberal party (the same “Right Cause” previously promised by the Kremlin to Mikhail Dmitrievich, but only from scratch), the electoral base of which will consist primarily of residents of large and medium-sized cities with above-average income levels.

Why create these parties? The answer is obvious: the Kremlin is going to hold early parliamentary elections. And not just carry them out, but win them on a grand scale, at the same time teaching a lesson to the Duma opposition, which has lost its obedience. Early elections will, apparently, be announced even before the presidential elections. M. Prokhorov will immediately announce the creation of a liberal party (and D. Rogozin - about the creation of a nationalist one), and some active public figures and media personalities will complete their mission in the ranks of the protest movement, declaring from the TV screens something like “All our demands have been met "Early elections have been announced. Let's get ready for the elections."

The Kremlin Triad, according to the Kremlin political strategists, will be able to enlist the support of a much larger number of voters than United Russia, which has completely discredited itself in the eyes of the public. Supporters of "United Russia" in friendly ranks will join the ranks of supporters of the people's party, and turners-deputies will allow the populists to claim part of the electorate of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and "SR". The nationalist party will be able to attract some of the LDPR voters, and will also receive the support of a certain part of Russian nationalists. “Advanced managers” and “office plankton” will vote for the effective manager M. Prokhorov and the intellectual A. Kudrin.

Some opposition parties will be registered, some will not. Given the existence of a 5 percent barrier (with a ban on the creation of electoral blocs), as well as the complete control of the media by the Kremlin, the chances of newly organized opposition parties entering the State Duma and forming a large faction there will be slim.

Thus, the State Duma is guaranteed to include the Kremlin Triad (populists, nationalists, liberals) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation . The LDPR and A Just Russia, even if they get into the State Duma, their number of mandates will sharply decrease. New opposition parties are unlikely to win a significant number of seats.

The goal of perestroika and early elections is, of course, not the democratization of political life in Russia, but a reduction in protest activity in the context of a protest movement that is gaining strength. Against the backdrop of “revolutionary transformations,” the Kremlin will try to fulfill its main task - to “pull” V. Putin into the presidency of Russia . If the protest movement really begins to decline, they may take a risk and limit themselves to just one round.

It is unlikely that the plans of the Kremlin political strategists will come true. Apparently, it's already too late. If political reform had been carried out after the first Bolotnaya Square, it would have been favorably received by the majority of the Russian population. But over the past months, Russia has changed. The retaliatory measures carried out by the Kremlin, such as the rally in Yekaterinburg or on Poklonnaya Hill, where tens of thousands of state employees and employees of state enterprises were herded, finally discredited V. Putin in the eyes of a significant part of the public. The Duma opposition began to turn into a real opposition; The protest movement, supported by many authoritative public figures, is gaining strength every day, having already taken on a clear anti-Putin character: one of the demands of the February 4 resolution is the holding of early presidential elections .