February 20, 2012, 00:28 / Opinions

Igor Bunin: Russian communitas

The political events currently taking place in Russia can be compared to communitas - a state of society that arises during a transition period as a result of the breakdown of a stable structure. The term “communitas” was coined by British anthropologist Victor Turner, who studied the borderline states of communities and came to the conclusion that communitas (open structure) and rigid (closed) structure are eternal companions of each other. Communitas is characterized by such features as spontaneity and carnivalism. We have obvious signs of carnivalism: the appearance of Kudrin, Sobchak, Thor and Navalny on the same podium is possible only at a political carnival. Anthropologists claim that the stronger the communitas, the more rigid the new structure becomes - as was the case in Russia in 1917. And on the contrary, a too rigid structure accelerates the emergence of communitas. The last time the state of “communitas” in Russian conditions occurred two decades ago and ended with the collapse of the USSR.

The structure, which has now undergone, if not breakdown, then serious erosion, was born from the authoritarian demand of the second half of the 1990s. Then both society as a whole and various political forces dreamed of a regime of a strong hand that would restore order and lift Russia from its knees. The candidates were named very different - from the heroic Alexander Lebed to the economic Yuri Luzhkov. The communists dreamed that Albert Makashov would come along with Gennady Zyuganov. Even some liberals dreamed of a “Russian Pinochet” who would carry out market reforms with an iron hand. The value of democratic procedures for the majority of Russian society was devalued. Vladimir Putin, who started with “urinating in the toilet” of terrorists and continued with an anti-oligarchic campaign, ideally answered this request. Moreover, he did not fully use the carte blanche that society was ready to give him, which did not object to a more active imprisonment of oligarchs, and not just Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Now the authoritarian request has been exhausted for a number of reasons. Firstly, the existing model has reached the limit of its effectiveness, as the crisis has clearly shown. And the peculiarity of authoritarian power, even soft, in which “power is power, opposition is opposition, and they cannot change places” (under hard authoritarianism, the opposition is either in the kitchen, or in prison, or in exile), is that it You constantly have to prove your effectiveness. The government in a democratic system can fail and resign, giving way to the opposition, which is immediately ready to form a new government without changing the system (at least with its “fine tuning”). An authoritarian regime is significantly less flexible.

Secondly, the Russians demanded a strong hand not on a permanent basis, but as a temporary phenomenon, a kind of anti-crisis management, relevant after the turbulent 1990s. Any government, even the most popular, undergoes obsolescence. In modern Russia, the crisis of 2008–2009 only accelerated the demand for change that would inevitably follow in the medium term. If before the crisis, Russians were ready to put up with corruption and insufficient managerial efficiency, based on the principle “they steal, but they also let us live,” now the situation has fundamentally changed. Even voters who remain loyal to the government are not inclined to give its representatives carte blanche for any actions or statements. It is characteristic that after the rally on Sakharov Avenue, Putin abandoned invective against the protest participants - they were negatively received not only by his opponents, but also by his supporters. At the same time, the oppositionists, in conditions where they do not receive a response from the authorities, are becoming more and more rigid - the “laughing” emotion (characteristic of communitas) quickly passed from Churov to Putin.

Thirdly, the obvious achievement of the system was the formation of a middle class, which, however, is ready to put up with restrictions on its political opportunities only for a certain time. The unspoken contract, under which the middle class could earn and consume in exchange for loyalty, could not last forever, and the authorities were unable to offer them attractive alternatives. Even a completely moderate Prokhorov project was scrapped with a big scandal. Moreover, the Russian middle class (like any other class, for that matter) attributes its successes only to its talents, and associates its failures with the incompetence of the authorities. You shouldn’t be offended by this - it’s a “medical fact.”

Fourthly, the anti-authoritarian request of a variety of social forces that were either pushed to the deep periphery of the political system (parliamentary opposition) or thrown beyond its borders (most of the extra-parliamentary opposition, which was not even allowed to create their own parties) is important. Many fans of a strong hand found no use for their strengths in a system that recognized only 100% loyalty. Hence the disappointment characteristic of liberals, leftists, and even the extreme right, who tried for the longest time to come to an agreement with the authorities. It is characteristic that not only the majority of opposition leaders, but also ordinary people from Bolotnaya are very cautious about the possible emergence of new cults - the situation is fundamentally different from the late 1980s, when Russians were waiting to get rid of a hero, be it Yeltsin or Gdlyan.

How long the transition period from communitas to the new structure will last and what the nature of this structure will be depends largely on whether the government and the opposition can understand each other. People from Bolotnaya Square do not want a revolution, and the loyalists, in turn, are not in the mood for counter-revolution (except, of course, for the group of people who spoke at Poklonnaya, to whom their own audience was indifferent). Both of them support fair elections. The middle class will not give up protest, which can take various forms: it seems that the demand for early Duma elections may become increasingly urgent. At the same time, the authorities do not have a mandate to suppress protests by force, even from their adherents.

Thus, there are opportunities for dialogue. Moreover, it should be initiated by the more resourceful side - that is, power. She currently has the opportunity to initiate the creation of a new structure that would suit the majority of society - both more dynamic and inertial forces. To do this, it needs to lead the process of transformation and pluralization of the regime, and not react to emerging irritants, and with a clear delay. However, we must take into account that there is less and less time left to make decisions.