: Doctrine of authoritarianism protection

Foreign policy in Putin’s actual presentation looks to the pain of a friend - about the same was also said in Munich’s speech. There is a complaint about participation in all world problems on equal terms. But no, for example, a clear policy in the post -Soviet space. The Assad regime is as if more important to us than Ukraine or Armenia.

The cycle of election programs of Vladimir Putin ended with the publication of a large -scale (again under fifty thousand signs) of the text dedicated to the position of Russia in the modern world. Again Monday number of the federal daily newspaper is this time “Moscow News”.

A strange choice, by the way: at one time the newspaper was almost a “Medvedev project” (at least, the official account of the publication Medvedev added friends in his microblog). But the publishers of the Putin opus "Moscow Komsomolets" bypassed. There, of course, the tabloid, but, by Russian standards (not as an example of the same “Moscow news”) mass. And his editor -in -chief Pavel Gusev was at the meeting of Glavredov with Putin, where program articles were promised, and then he also became a confidant of candidate Putin. Again: in the direct competitor of the Gusev newspaper - in Komsomolskaya Pravda - the publication of the prime minister took place, and MK was deprived.

However, this is the topic of a highly specialized workshop: you never know what logic guided PRA PR, distributing publications. Most likely, they simply considered the number of weeks remaining before the elections and divided into the number of newspapers. For MK, the text simply did not have time to write, or maybe that after the elections they will already be published.

The problems of the most software text are much more global. As in any text of such a status and such volume in foreign policy, the placement of priorities is interesting in Putin’s article, and not specific theses. The theses are completely written in the Russian Foreign Ministry: we will protect Iran, we will not allow you to intervene in internal affairs, we will develop and strengthen everyone. Actually, the text, rather, about the role of the Foreign Ministry, and not Russia: the department as an actor appears in the article a dozen times - as a “Foreign Ministry”, as “Russian diplomacy”, as the sponsored structure of “Rossotrudnichestvo” and so on.

The helpless in the general text, no matter how much Western media and politicians react to it: anti-Western passages polically give nothing, and there is nothing more to say more. Everything that is said there was said by Russian officials many times and from other performances of the same Putin on the topic of foreign policy is slightly different.

The structure of the text in this sense is also indicative: it begins with a reasoning about who in the world “undermines trust” (NATO with relics of block thinking), followed by an excursion in the “Arab spring” - with an emphasis on the sovereignty of states without the consent of the UN Security Council (read - Russia) cannot be encroached on and generally propaganda against authoritarian regimes. The following is the “New Calls and Threats” blocks: the threats of Iran and the DPRK, as well as the situation in Afghanistan, are represented as such. Further, an extensive passage about the Chinese factor, which seems to be working for the good of Russia within the framework of all kinds of multi -fold abbreviations - BRICS, APEC, SCO, SB UN and G20.

Further, finally, the points on interaction with the European Union are going on consistently (we still don’t like the third energy package, but I like the idea of ​​economic integration) and the USA (here we are talking almost exclusively that Russia is against the Europrop system), as well as a small story about the consequences of Russia's accession to the WTO.

The text of the speech about the support of compatriots and the “Russian world” ends. Here, perhaps, in the Putin article, one of the most interesting theses is issued “for Russia there is an opportunity not only to preserve its culture, but also to use it as a powerful factor in promotion in global markets,” writes the most likely future president. But the topic of protection of their citizens abroad is poorly articulated - only in the form of a spell "the Foreign Ministry should work even before the hype in the media."

It is also characteristic that in other formats - in addition to the language and support of the Baltic Russian -speaking non -citizens - the theme of Russian foreign policy in the post -Soviet space does not rise.

Belarus and Kazakhstan in the text are mentioned only in the context of the WTO and the Customs Union, the word “Ukraine” is not in the text at all, if you do not understand it by the phrase “Europe will receive a reliable and flexible system of gas supply, which does not depend on someone’s political whims”.

Another agenda - in addition to the Russian language and culture - for Putin, as it were, for the post -Soviet space.

It turns out that Russia claims to be active in resolving the main conflicts and sets out its position on them, but clearly formulate foreign policy for the next few years in relation to the immediate neighbors - as it were, is not able to. Or has no desire to publish it.

It is unlikely that the Russian leadership believes that in the post -Soviet space, things are going wonderful with us - this is obviously not so, at whom no look. Integration with the same Ukraine has fallen. Relations with Georgia have been torn off since 2008, so the Georgian veto for joining the WTO was able to overcome only with the help of the State Department. The information war against the Belarusian leader Lukashenko was lost and had to put up. In Kyrgyzstan, still instability, threatening to blow up the entire Central Asian region. However, the region is already “cut off” - where there is no China, there is Kazakhstan, which is clearly playing its independent party, is not at all pro -Russian. In Transcaucasia, Türkiye will not intensify today or tomorrow.

First of all, we are worried about the “Arab Spring”, it turns out that Europe - the main foreign trade partner - is already in fifth place after China, and the immediate neighbors are not even considered for partners? The more important the “Libyan version” and the prevention of its distribution to Syria for Russia is more important than integration with Europe (which in the text is present only in the form of “it would be good to develop and cancel the visa regime)? The Western renegading about the “Arab Spring” is generally the most emotional and sharp part of Putin's text.

Here you want, you don’t want, but you think that the main meaning of such passages is only in the demonstration that "in Russia this option will not pass."

Indirect such a comparison of Putin's regime with Gaddafi and Assad regimes. If so, then the self -determination of Russia is unpleasant - we are an authoritarian regime, but we have something to stand up for ourselves.