
Not only the first persons have changed places: the process of transplanting the Belodomov officials to the Kremlin and vice versa is going on with might and main. Such a personnel policy breeds irreplaceable bureaucrats. And this negatively affects the effectiveness of the country's management, regardless of the effectiveness of the first persons.
With a shift of the first person and the rest of the bureaucratic system, sets in motion. Strictly speaking, the changes began before the elections - last December the new head of the presidential administration Sergey Ivanov was appointed. His deputy for politics was Vyacheslav Volodin - both moved from the Putin government.
Now, the apparatchiks of the second row begin to suffer from the change of the main ones - Ivan Demidov was dismissed from the administration of the Presidential Administration of the Presidential Administration. Demidov oversee public organizations in the AP. He owes his appointment to the former first deputy head of the presidential administration Vladislav Surkov and, after the transfer of Surkov, the line of Demidov came to the government.
According to the media, the deputy chief of the Putin’s campaign headquarters and the deputy head of the government press service Pavel Zenkovich was appointed to Demidov. Zenkovich is an undoubted prostate of the press secretary of Prime Minister Dmitry Peskov. Demidov will go to work for the former chef - Vladislav Surkov.
Like four years ago, a transplant from the Kremlin to the White House is carried out and vice versa.
In 2008, a number of influential Putinites went to the government with Vladimir Putin. The deputy prime ministers of the Putin government became immigrants from the presidential administration Igor Sechin and Igor Shuvalov, the head of the White House apparatus was appointed ex-head of the AP Sergey Sobyanin and so on. Now a reverse transplant is carried out - of course, with amendments. The same Sobyanin has not been threatening the mayor of Moscow for a year and a half for a year and a half. But Vladislav Surkov was already appointed to the Medvedev government; Arkady Dvorkovich’s assistant will be most likely to go there. The press service will also be updated-it is unlikely that President’s press secretary Natalya Timakova will remain with Putin. And the Putin spokeswoman Peskov will be quite likely to follow the current boss to the Kremlin.
Shortly after the “Tandem’s Catraining” at the Congress of United Russia, the head of the VGTRK Oleg Dobroduev during an interview with Dmitry Medvedev foamed on the irremovability of the team: he spoke about the same faces on the TV. Medvedev answered this that the update should be and goes permanently. However, when a specific personnel issue is being resolved, the “scattering” occurs again. Exactly as in the case of the President’s post, Putin on Medvedev, Medvedev in Putin. And followed by the managers of the rank lower.
Formally looks logical - the team of Dmitry Medvedev gives way to new/old people. However, it makes you think about the quality of Russian personnel policy in general. Undoubtedly over the past 12 years, a whole generation of apparatchiks has already grown in Russia, organically not related to either state security organs or the St. Petersburg mayor of the time of Sobchak. Thus, reproaches in complete inaccuracy of the mechanisms of updating elites are partly insolvent.
The highest link in the bureaucracy is replenished with new personnel - this is an obvious fact.
However, the quality of new managers can raise questions, because there are no formal and understandable procedures for “updating”, and the process itself is more likely to the field of probabilistic processes. Someone approached someone at the right time or worked with someone in neighboring offices-here you have a fresh minister.
Such a model of personnel policy has the right to life - in the end, the bureaucrat is completely not necessarily a specialist in the field that is designed to manage. He should not treat or teach people - he must distribute resources. However, the costs of random appointments are great. According to the new Russian or even the old Soviet tradition, once sitting on the position, the official is extremely reluctant to get away from it. And even if he is dismissed, then this rarely happens “to nowhere” - there are almost always positions of retirees.
Unprofitable officials are simply doomed to be not fully competent.
The lack of a sense of fear of losing their position and the need to be competent gives ineffective managers at the exit. And the process of manual tuning of the bureaucratic apparatus also breeds temporary workers and candid corrupt officials. Suppose that Putin has a brilliant personnel instinct and prime ministers are completely patriotic technocrats. But already on the second floor of the bureaucratic pyramid, a “worsening selection” will become inevitable. The update in such circumstances is not a good at all, it rather retains “average in the hospital” incompetence.