An interesting detail: only two of the 13 candidates, Amr Musa and Abu al-Fattuh, were invited to participate in the televised debates on the eve of the elections. Television producers, accustomed to counting every minute (and a penny), did not waste time on trifles: here you are, citizens, gentlemen-voters, two favorites, two alternatives for the country - this, they say, has already been calculated and calculated.
However, I don't believe the sociological polls predicting 40% support for Amr Musa, the "secular" candidate, in the first round. First of all, because in Egypt such surveys are conducted by telephone. The Islamist electorate is not Cairo and Alexandria, where Musa is sure to win. This is primarily the Egyptian hinterland. There they are not “friendly” with telephones, and the mood of the electorate is determined by the local mullah. “Go and vote with your heart,” he will say to the faithful during prayer. And they will go, knowing for sure who their heart is for. Amr Musa could be helped by 10 million secular Egyptians living abroad. But the trouble is that only 600,000 of them are registered as voters.
The second reason why I do not believe in the success of Amr Musa is his almost complete lack of charisma. This is a classic official of the Mubarak call - before heading the Arab League, he led the Egyptian Foreign Ministry for almost ten years. For many, he is still strongly associated with the overthrown regime. But his main rival is a charismatic, personality, not a chameleon. Even under Sadat, he participated in televised debates with the late president, while still a student, and now he is the head of the Union of Arab Doctors. The irony is that al-Fattuh, who a quarter of a century ago opposed the Camp David deal, like all the Muslim Brotherhood, will have no choice but to continue the policy started by Sadat even if he wins the elections. . The Egyptian economy rests on three pillars that provide a stable guaranteed income to the treasury: sovereignty over the Suez Canal (which Sadat returned to Egypt), the Saudi oil pipeline that transits the Sinai, and tourism. There is very little oil in Egypt - it cannot afford, like Iran, fundamentalist frills and threats such as "wipe Israel off the face of the earth." A sharp complication of the geopolitical situation, not to mention an open conflict with a neighbor - Israel, and three pillars will be knocked down. I emphasize: three at once.
Al-Fattuh cannot fail to understand this. Therefore, when he becomes president, which, from my point of view, is inevitable, he will pursue a moderate policy. No, of course, he will not maintain the previous Mubarak level of relations with Israel, when even the special services of the two countries cooperated - he will begin to be friends with Israel "in Turkish" - emphatically restrained, with periodic outbursts of indignation, reaching threats, but nothing more . Al-Fattuh is doomed to be a pragmatist.
And then Egypt, probably, is waiting for very interesting times, when the presidential power in the country will gradually begin to erode. The parliament, which is under the control of former associates of al-Fattuh, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamists, will begin to finalize the new constitution, aiming to transfer full executive power to the prime minister, who will be approved by the ruling party. Thus, Egypt in a couple of years is likely to become a moderately Islamist parliamentary republic with Turkish features. And the Egyptian army, a stronghold of anti-Islamism (as, indeed, in all other Arab countries), accustomed to controlling everything and everything, will be forced, again, as in Turkey, to swallow this pill as well.