Translated material
Visiting the riot police
On Sunday, June 3, a group of unidentified persons posted stickers with the text “Stop serving the mafia clan. The police are with the people?!”, as well as stickers listing the main opposition media (echo.msk.ru, novayagazeta.ru, tvrain.ru, etc.) directly in departmental residential buildings of the so-called. OMON town in Strogino, as well as in the vicinity of the nearby TsSN (OMON) base.
At the same time, two residents of Moscow were detained and spent the next few hours communicating with riot police officers and the Strogino District Department of Internal Affairs. Based on the results of fruitful communication with more than a dozen TsSN and Department of Internal Affairs employees of various ranks, certain conclusions were drawn:
Part 1. Initial data
Explanatory work
Police officers learned with interest about the existence of the “Police with the People” hotline , within which they can be provided with free legal assistance. But much more interest was generated by the information that a Fund to support secret service workers dismissed for failure to comply with illegal orderswas being created .
In general, we can say that the main problem for many police officers seems to be finding employment in the event of dismissal from the police.
Battle of Bolotnaya
No matter what anyone thinks, the fact remains a fact. The riot police have no illusions about the ruling regime and have little doubt about the active participation of pro-government provocateurs in the events of May 6th.
At the same time, they place significant blame for the start of the clashes on several dozen anarchists and representatives of ultra-left organizations who spoke at the march under red and black flags.
Leaders of the protest movement
The attitude of many riot police (as well as ordinary police officers) towards the ruling regime is sharply critical. To call TsSN employees supporters of V. Putin would be completely wrong.
At the same time, the attitude towards the leaders of the protest movement is also, to put it mildly, wary. The greatest hostility is caused by former high-ranking officials from the 90s; however, leaders of the new wave like Navalny or Udaltsov are not particularly popular. It is interesting that in relation to A. Navalny, what is most “straining” is the fact that N. Belykh works as an adviser to the governor of the Kirov region; from which the conclusion is erroneously drawn that Navalny also used to be part of the ruling clique, but was excluded from it.
Many police officers have a well-established idea that some of the leaders of the protest movement use mass protests (and people attending rallies) for their own personal purposes, receiving funding for this from somewhere. At the same time, they have no doubt that ordinary participants in the actions take part in them sincerely and completely free of charge.
The lack of clear support for the protest movement from the Duma opposition parties also does not benefit the image of the protest movement. By the way, it has been emphasized more than once that there are no people in the leadership of the protests who are well known and respected among police officers.
By the way, D. Rogozin is a very popular figure among special forces officers. Many hope that the current loyal behavior of the Deputy Prime Minister is a tactical ploy. But in fact, he is waiting for an opportune moment to realize his goals.
Goals of the protest movement
Riot policemen, just like ordinary citizens, are interested in questions about what awaits Russia after the overthrow of the existing regime, namely:
- Who will lead the country after Putin?
- What changes will happen in the country?
At the same time, fears have been repeatedly expressed that the political forces that have come to power, taking advantage of the confusion of the transition period, will either usurp power themselves, or will quickly sell off existing state property and leave for their “historical homeland.”
Part 2. What to do?
Explanatory work
- It is very important to further develop initiatives to provide legal assistance to police officers and, especially, to create and launch a fund (or funds) to assist former internal affairs officers. The creation of a kind of labor exchange or vacancy collection center for former police officers will also be an important step in the right direction. And, of course, information about civil initiatives should not only be posted in some opposition media, but also distributed among police officers both through social networks or professional forums, and by working offline.
- It is necessary to continue work to disseminate information among police officers about independent Internet resources containing objective information about the “exploits” of the “national leader” and his entourage, as well as about events taking place in the country.
Riot police and society
- It is necessary to try to reduce the level of hostility in the ranks of the protest movement towards employees of special police units. Slogans like “Garbage is a shame for Russia” and similar insults only harm the protest movement and, if you look at it, are beneficial only to the Kremlin.
- An important step is to neutralize provocateurs at public events. The presence at rallies/processions of a sufficient number of “vigilantes” from among activists of various political organizations (the same leftists and nationalists) will significantly complicate (if not make impossible) the destructive activities of both provocateurs and extremist groups of citizens. The more or less successful experience of the “team” in protest camps has shown its effectiveness.
Organizing Committee
With the recent official introduction of the leader of the largest nationalist organization, A. Belov, into the Organizing Committee, a situation has finally arisen in which the leaders of political organizations of non-systemic opposition from the entire political spectrum are represented on the Organizing Committee. This is a positive point, because many special police officers (especially those with experience of service in the Northern Caucasus) are moderate nationalists.
At the same time, it is necessary to continue work to include representatives of the largest systemic opposition party, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, in the Organizing Committee.
Also very effective in terms of working with the police will be the inclusion in the Organizing Committee of a high-ranking former military man or a former internal affairs officer who enjoys authority among police officers (and, of course, shares the goals and principles of the protest movement).
Russia after Putin
The question regarding who exactly will lead the country during the period of reforms in post-Putin Russia is the so-called The transition period is of interest not only to riot policemen or police officers, but also to the majority of our ordinary fellow citizens.
In the end, it is necessary, at least six months after the start of mass protests, to present to the population of the country a clear alternative to the existing regime - including the proposed personal composition of the government of the transition period (TPP).
It is also obvious that the PPP should not become the domain of any political force. Moreover, the PPP, being a coalition one, should be of a clearly technical nature.
In addition to the proposed composition of the PPP, it would be advisable to publish (and make available to the public) at least a brief program of actions during the transition period. At the same time, it will be absolutely logical if this program is primarily focused on the following points:
- guarantees that the situation of the Russian population will not worsen during the transition period;
- postponing any more or less significant reforms in the economic and social sphere until the completion of the political reform and the election of a new composition of the country's parliament (moratorium on cuts in the police, army, public sector, moratorium on the privatization of state property, etc.).
Conclusions:
The entire propaganda machine of the Kremlin has been denigrating the face of the opposition for more than 6 months.
In the absence of a social base, the only stronghold of the regime is precisely the special police units, which in today's Russia have become an instrument for maintaining power. Accordingly, the Kremlin pays special attention to the morale of special forces personnel.
At the same time, critical sentiments regarding the “achievements” of the “national leader” and his entourage are very widespread among police officers. And this must be used for the benefit of the future of the country.
Without a doubt, the protest movement must seek to bring to justice special police officers who commit unlawful acts against protesting citizens. However, it is necessary to try to change the attitude towards police officers within the protest movement itself. Blind hatred and bitterness must be replaced by a readiness for mutual understanding and constructive cooperation. It is necessary to continue explanatory work among personnel.
At the same time, the time has come to think about creating, within the framework of the protest movement, a certain public body responsible for conducting dialogue between protesters and the police.