There are too many interest groups in Russian society, government and business to be satisfied with the same foreign policy.

What is the essence of Putin's foreign policy? It is reactive, that is, it almost exclusively responds to external impulses, rather than generating its own. Mostly cautious, although liberally peppered with tough statements. The central concept is prestige - its strengthening is valuable in itself. Putin's Russia values free reign and tries to avoid binding alliances, constantly maneuvering between West and East. Predominantly anti-Western rhetoric is combined with a desire to work mainly with Western partners. Russians appreciate the fact that Putin has restored national self-confidence after the humiliations and failures of the 1990s.

However, the foundation of consensus may begin to erode. The universal course towards “revival in general” and strengthening prestige does not meet the entire spectrum of interests, and soon a demand for a targeted and prudent foreign policy focused on achieving specific goals will begin to emerge. But the formulation of these goals will most likely no longer lead to as strong a unity of views as before. The surge in political activity showed that society is becoming more mature and that following the general party line does not suit it. The changes will likely affect foreign policy as well.

Are, for example, Russian Muslims, residents of the Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan satisfied with the course pursued by Moscow in relation to the “Arab Spring” and especially Syria? Russia supports the regime of Bashar al-Assad, which brutally suppresses the pro-Islamic opposition, and this causes different reactions among Russian adherents of Islam. Moreover, Moscow’s policy runs counter to the actions of most Arab countries. This is a new situation, because traditionally the Kremlin has stood in solidarity with Arab capitals that are anti-Western, but now the West and the Arab public are on one side, and Russia is on the other.

To what extent does the Russian Orthodox Church, whose activity is increasing and its role in society is growing, agree with the priorities of foreign policy? Or it would be close to the course of increasing ties with Orthodox peoples, especially since the belts tying some of them, for example Greece and Serbia, to the European Union are weakening - due to the crisis there and the decline in these countries themselves. An example of a special position was the reluctance of the Russian Orthodox Church to take the churches of Abkhazia and South Ossetia under its jurisdiction, when Russia recognized these territories as independent states. The Church, which itself is fighting against the expansion of other faiths, is sensitive to the concept of “canonical territory.” And it does not want to create a precedent by encroaching on the prerogatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church, although the state was not afraid to overstep the principle of territorial integrity.

What are the views of Russian nationalists? Their role in the political process grows as we move away from the collapse of the USSR and the attenuation of imperial instincts, which are replaced by a xenophobic syndrome. And they are hardly inspired by Putin’s intention to create the Eurasian Union, because they insist that free entry into Russia should be closed to residents of almost all Eurasian states.

A compact and influential group is the military-industrial complex. On the one hand, the military-industrial complex is upset by Moscow’s desire to be a partner of the West in its policy towards “problem” countries, such as Iran or North Korea. Medvedev and even Putin are criticized for following the American line. The military industry would like to expand markets by trading weapons with all those who, for some reason, are outside the Western orbit. But there is also the opposite logic - “rogue regimes” are disappearing anyway, less problematic markets are needed, and in addition, maintaining competitiveness requires cooperation with manufacturers of high-tech equipment. For example, with Israel. Moreover, the Russian Armed Forces have overcome the Soviet taboo and are beginning to purchase military equipment produced in NATO countries. It constitutes real competition for Russian manufacturers already in the domestic market.

What is the real interest of large innovative businesses - in-depth integration with leading countries or protectionist policies? Finally, what do its citizens living abroad really want from Russia: money, political support, pressure on their countries of residence, or vice versa?

Not all of these interests, of course, are balanced, and not all of them will turn into a real factor influencing foreign policy, but some certainly will. The time of consensus and general agreement on foreign policy issues is coming to an end. And the Russian leadership will have to take into account many more opinions. In general, as Russia democratizes, its foreign policy will become more complicated and the predictability of its actions will decrease.

Cast in paper

Evergreen thoughts from Forbes columnists

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Yaroslav Kuzminov, Rector of the Higher School of Economics. May, 2004

“The pain with which the change of the first person occurs is characteristic of authoritarian regimes. With the departure of the first person who maintained the balance through fear or authority, a revision of agreements and rights is inevitable, and this stops growth and throws the country back.”

Vadim Volkov, professor at the European University of St. Petersburg. October, 2007

“The crisis does not help. If things are bad throughout the industry - and this is exactly the picture we see in the retail or development business - then competitors will have no time for acquisitions... Assets will go to ineffective owners.”

Sergey Guriev, rector of the National Academy of Sciences. October, 2008

“It is still not easy to privatize Gazprom and separate it from the state... If it is important for Russia to maintain a monopoly on foreign trade, it is possible to create a company independent from producers and transport workers, engaged only in trading on foreign markets and purchasing gas from producers...”

Sergey Vakulenko, HIS CERA consultant. March, 2010

There is no universal policy