
The publication of the article by Mikhail Solomatin, we continue the Dispertsendal discussion for the right in Russia for today.
Recently, the question of whether the legal model will remain in Russia has become very relevant, although a couple of months ago the very possibility of its production would be perceived in bewilderment. As it was already in the 70s of the XIX century, the authorities realized that the judicial system ceased to serve as a reliable support of the existing system.
The laws on rallies, the Internet, “foreign agents” and slander have already identified the essence of the new legal model adopted by the State Duma, while the constitution and codes so far “hold” the contour of the old.While this circuit is intact - the model will not change, but it is difficult to predict how long it can resist the pressure.
Five years ago, when the issue with the third term of Putin was discussed, the probability of making significant changes to the Constitution looked quite real (for this, S. Mironov, A.-Kh. Sultygov, acted in one form or another, and the proposals continued to act despite the repeatedly sounding refusals of the president, which greatly resembled the events of the beginning of 27 years BC in Rome, when Octavian announced its emergency authority).
Now, the content of the Russian legal corps is no longer in accordance with the Constitution, and this discrepancy will increase until it is decided to formally issue it.In fact, we should expect a break with modern Western law (the frequent statements that new Russian legislative initiatives supposedly have analogues in the law of Western countries, indicate that the legislators themselves are acutely felt by a growing discrepancy between two legal systems). The probability of such a development of events should not embarrass us: the modern legal system began to take shape in Russia a little more than twenty years ago and simply did not have time to take root.
Two alternatives between which the Russian legal system makes the choice can be described by the example of two well -known works of world literature: the novel "Michael Kolhaas" Henry von Kleist and the "Iron Will" Leskova. The horse lady Kolhaas begins a real peasant war due to the fact that the corrupt courts refused to satisfy his small and, frankly, a poorly-specific lawsuit. The rebel goes to completely phantasmagoric measures to restore justice. The principle of Fiat Justitia, Pereat Mundus (may justice be done, even if the world perishes!) It develops here to Fiat Justitia, Pereat Justitia, but it does not look absurd. Thomas Mann believed that the short story of Kleist was directed against the "outference of indifference." One of the great German lawyers of the 19th century, Rudolf von Iering noted that the crimes committed by Kolhaas "double and triple gravity falls on the prince, his officials and judges who encountered him from a path of lawlessness." “The victim of corrupt and preferential justice becomes the Avenger,” writes Jering, and he exercises his right with his own hands and often grabbing further Its closest goal is made by a sworn enemy of society, a criminal, and carrying a punishment for this, a martyr of his sense of law. ”
This irrational attachment to the right, which so delights the Germans von Jerring and Mann, mixes Leskov. The very idea of the reduction of the diversity of life to some kind of formal scheme, and with this approach, no legislatively introduced rule can be considered final. Before us are two opposite legal systems: one is built on the primacy of the law over momentary considerations, the other makes the law dependent on them. Moreover, from the point of view of a person of Russian culture, this alternative is not even visible, it completely obscures the conviction of the severity of the law and its complete unsuitability for an ordinary person. The contrast of the formal law by the natural sense of justice, reflected in the famous Dura Lex Sed Lex formula, is understood in Russia as a conflict between a free personality and an irrational fatum. Contrasting the soulless and formal law of freedom and justice, Russian culture, of course, is alien to the very idea of using the judicial system to protect them. If the moment of the execution of Kolhaas becomes a joint triumph of the law and justice, then Hugo Pectorlis from the "iron will" has to make sure of his own skin the severity, callousness and stupidity of the law, the absolute unsuitability of judicial regulation to resolve conflicts.
The polarity of assessments that German and Russian culture give the same legal behavior is associated not only with the difference in the perception of law, but also with the difference in ideas about the ratio of personality and society. If German culture is struck by the majestic seriousness of Kolhaas, the vastness of the victims that he is ready to bring to restore his straightforward law, then Leskov, who has entered the rights of his rights, resembles a frog depicting the will.
In the scrupulous attention of Kolhaas to their right, the Germans see the greatness of the human spirit (so Israel with its recent exchange of prisoner Gida Shalit with hundreds of Palestinian terrorists showed how the country of any of its citizens appreciates highly), while the Russian culture, which initially condemns the principle of “about the small 'ml”, in principle, denies the possibility of addressing the question of the question of the question of the question of Primate of the interests of the individual before the interests of any community.
Human rights, which in modern legal states constitute the core of constitutional law, do not have roots in Russian history, are not related to Russian mentality and still remain the subject of "international legal imports" for the country.Basically, this import is along the OSCE line, and here it is impossible not to note the intention of the State Duma to answer the “Magnitsky resolution” adopted on July 8 to the development of a law introducing liability for the OSCE for providing incorrect information about a particular country (i.e. Russia will try to prohibit Europe "about the small 'of the great' mlvytiy). However, I do not see the need to go into details, since for forecasts there are quite more general and obvious considerations. All modern constitutional law is a product of European humanism, and the processes occurring in Russia are increasingly characterizing the word "dehumanization". This circumstance suggests that in the coming years, the conflict of Russia with the Western constitutional law will receive this or that official registration.