Translated material
: Moscow does not believe in Putin's tears
Polls indicate that Muscovites do not like the authorities and do not trust them. It seems that the silent majority in Moscow is not at all the “passive support of Putin”, but conscious escapists and potential “anarchists”. So far, however, with low political culture and rather infantile protest moods.
The level of citizens' confidence in power is interesting not only in terms of electoral prospects of proceeding candidates in the elections or the chances of the opposition. It is also interesting for the following issue: does citizens have their own agenda and a program that is different from the agenda and program of the authorities? A low level of trust seems to demonstrate that at least a request for such a summons is formed in society, a high, on the contrary, tells about the reluctance to change anything. Well, another adjacent question: what are the expectations of citizens about the policy of the current government?
In this sense, both the results of the polls and the results of the latest federal elections (with well-known and many times repeated reservations) seem to indicate that the Russian population for the most part, if it does not support the authorities unconditionally, is not striving to change something too much, believing more significant risks of changes.
However, this trend on the electoral map of Russia has one significant exception - Moscow. Only here, of all the Russian regions, Vladimir Putin did not reach 50 percent in the presidential election. And only here there were mass protests against falsifications in the Duma elections and subsequent mass protests (Muscovites, by the way, relate with sympathy - see Moscow to the authorities).
It is clear that in this regard the phenomenon of Moscow is interested in sociologists and they conduct regular measurements of the opinions of Muscovites, individuals about the authorities. And these data should very much disturb. According to the latest measurement of the Levada Center, for example, Putin’s anti-rating exceeded his rating. As Vedomosti write, referring to the survey data, 31 percent of the Muscovites are poorly related to Putin’s activities, only 27 respond approvingly about it. 36 more estimate Putin's activities “average”. In relation to the mid-2000s, thus, the popularity of Vladimir Putin personally fell one and a half times among Muscovites. It is logical, because the Muscovites just went massively to anti -Putin stocks, there were much fewer on promotions in support of Putin.
The activities of the metropolitan authorities and the mayor of Sobyanin personally also appeal to the conflicting feelings of the townspeople. According to the results of the June survey, in 27 percent it is generally a good impression, 18 generally negative. The relative majority (46 percent), however, evaluates its attitude to the work of the mayor as “average”, the share of extreme assessments is at the level of status. This generally corresponds to Putin’s data, adjusted that the metropolitan mayor is not at all inclined to particularly sharp political statements and defiantly shunes “pure policy”.
It is interesting a large number of "medium" assessments of both Putin and Sobyanin. It is likely that here we are not talking about frankly frank with half stones or about the general satisfaction with the policy of power, but about some internal emigration of a significant part of the capital's citizens. About their unwillingness to have something in common with the authorities and unwillingness to even follow what she “there” creates. Such escapism does not mean that there are no wishes for power, but it accurately indicates that this power is not very interesting to citizens. Or not even really needed.
More specific questions cause a much more specific and even painful reaction. The fresh survey of the Levada Center (here the data leads the Kommersant) revealed that Muscovites support the idea of the withdrawal of federal authorities for the Moscow Ring Road. 64 percent of the Muscovites for sending officials from the capital, only 24 against the capital. At the same time, the very idea of expanding the borders of Moscow does not cause an unequivocal approval among Muscovites, rather the opposite: 45 opposes the “Big Moscow”, and 40 for (they “unequivocally support” the initiative of only 10 percent).
Sociologists themselves associate such a reaction with the problem of the capital's traffic jams, but this is not interesting. It is interesting that in the desire to remove bureaucracy, two -thirds of the inhabitants of the capital are united.
Another thing is that the same conflicting reaction to “Big Moscow” demonstrates only a negative attitude to power initiatives of the authorities in general, but does not say anything about the presence of a substantial agenda in citizens themselves. So far, civilian initiatives demonstrate a construct where any fool understands what to do - extinguish fires or help rake blockages after a flood.
We do not need officials here, but Moscow does not need an expansion, the respondents say, not understanding that this is a package proposal and without one will not be the second. The corruption and budget components of both moving, and expansion, it seems, is generally few of citizens are reflected.
Or say, the same thesis about traffic jams created by officials. The conviction is controversial, if we recall that the officials of the central devices are 300-400 thousand from the force, and the number of cars registered in the capital is about four million. And this is not counting those who travel from the Moscow Region. If we take into account that not every middle and lower link has the opportunity to purchase a car, the motivation becomes quite ephemeral: in reality, the transfer of all officials for the 101st kilometer will not solve any problem, since they do not create it. But Muscovites believe that this will help, and this, with all infantilism, is indicative.
It is difficult to say how the state is perceived there in the North Caucasus or the Far East, but Muscovites confidently and most votes say that such power (at least federal, and maybe power in general) they do not need too much in their immediate life.
The challenge for the authorities is very serious.
And if we hope that the Tagil+Caucasus will forever give the majority in the elections, it is easy to get already to the next electoral cycle of the riots of the angry townspeople of this scale that neither the police with a riot police, nor the controlled courts armed with millions of fines against the “troublemakers” will not be able to do anything.
True, in order for such a protest to cease to be “Shrovetide round dance” and funny tourist camps, two conditions are needed: the complete incapacity of the authorities and its deafness to any initiatives of civil society (so far in stock) and political growing up, political formation of active citizens (which is not - that is not). One Navalny with Udaltsov, calling for "take the storm of the Kremlin", can not do here. Unless, of course, do not want to come to power to the power of completely strange and “revolutionary” young scumbags.