In order for the country to deal with emergencies, it is necessary to completely change the system for building the careers of senior officials

They were waiting for a crisis, but a flood came in the south of the country, and they were not prepared for it. Regardless of the causes of the disaster, there are lessons to be learned from this story. First, we need a risk management system. Not only economic, but also, as in this case, natural, as well as technological, social, geopolitical, etc. It should include not only a system for responding to problems, but also their forecasting, prevention, damage reduction within the framework of preparatory work. Returning to the specific case, the Ministry of Emergency Situations should be engaged not only in “raking up” problems, but also in warning, evacuation, etc. The Ministry of Emergency Situations and other authorities should be interested in the serviceability of the infrastructure, so that later there would be no suspicion that the disaster was not of a natural nature, but was associated with the release of water from the reservoir.

Secondly, we need to understand why this approach has not worked until now. After all, every time we step on the same rake, whether with fires or floods. What is the reason: simple inability, or negligence, corruption, lack of incentives among the employees of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and local authorities, or the lack of a request from society, which is not so important about the reaction of the authorities to rare, unpredictable events?

The question of why the quality of government in countries with a medium and low level of development is worse than in countries with a high level of development has been of interest to economic science for at least 20–25 years. There are two opposing theories. Both were at one time put forward by groups of researchers led by the famous American economist of Russian origin Andrei Shleifer. The first is the quality of institutions, the lack of adequate incentives for authorities to pursue development policies, and widespread corruption. The second theory is the lack of education, skills and abilities, primarily managerial ones. Most likely, both theories are correct to one degree or another and there is a possibility of interaction between them. Poor management does not create the right incentives for subordinates and does not select employees based on their ability to achieve goals.

Since the problem is ambiguous, different directions need to be used to solve it. Recently, many young managers, often coming from business backgrounds, have begun to come into power in middle-level positions. Their level of education and skills is higher than that of the people with Soviet education who previously occupied these positions. But their effectiveness will depend on the incentives and performance criteria within which they operate.

In the late 1990s, it was fashionable to compare the Russian management system with the Chinese one, to say that the Chinese system creates better incentives for development. This concerned both economic and political incentives: successful provincial leaders could count on a career in the central government. A similar system, in a certain sense, exists in the United States: most presidents were governors. In the USSR, Brezhnev, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin were once regional leaders. In Russia, this issue has not been resolved either within the framework of the gubernatorial election system or the appointment system. Lately, the post of governor has become less like a stepping stone for active people moving up the career ladder, and more like a “retirement” for a federal official. This means that there are no conditions for intrasystem competition.

Meanwhile, sociological studies show that people have a growing demand for effective managers who have proven the ability to do something locally. This is, in particular, evidenced by the results of focus groups conducted as part of the CSR reports. Against the background of generational change and growing prosperity, Russian society is becoming more mature: it has long ceased to believe only in words. Official promises that are not backed up by results lead to growing mistrust. And no matter how much money is spent to help flood victims, it will not help increase confidence in the authorities. There is only one way out of this: create a working system for selecting effective leaders, based on a clear understanding of competitive career opportunities for those who are effective, and responsibility for ineffectiveness.

The author’s position may not coincide with the official position of the Russian Presidential Administration.

Civil service: unnatural selection