Autumn Patriarchate

Alexander Khramov recently very accurately noticed that Patriarch Kirill, contrasting the postmodern as if common to all of mankind, “retreated from the dogmas of Christianity in favor of the ideals of education”. Of course, we are not actually talking about religious dogmas, but about an intuitive Christian tradition. “Morality is the only foundation that our society is able to unite today, moreover, the human race. This is the only thing that can unite and reconcile the Russians with the Americans, Africans with Latin American, if any problems between them exist. If there is a moral consensus, then a general legislative system grows from it, including the protection of human rights, ”the Patriarch said at the round table“ Spirituality. Morality. Law ”at Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia on March 28 this year. “The norms of human morality are united for the whole human race,” he said more recently, on August 28. “Precisely because they are united, there is such a thing as justice.” It seems to be right, but somehow it hurts smoothly ...

Catch up and overtake Catholics

Any initiative religious tradition considers its substantiation of ethics the only logical and consistent, accessible only to adherents of this particular religion and in no case in general. The Patriarch, of course, perfectly understands this, however, fearing to remain only within the boundaries of the subculture, he is forced to talk about the general foundations of morality and its natural origin. This tragicomic incident is determined by the specific situation in which Orthodoxy turned out to be after the collapse of the USSR.

If Catholicism and Protestantism actively participated in social and political life throughout the time when the formation of democratic institutions took place in the West, having managed to find its place inside the generally hostile socio-political model, then Orthodoxy returned to active life in the late 1980s, when this model had already developed and there was no place in it. As a result of the ROC’s attempt to take part in the country's public life, in fact, become an invasion of someone else's political space, a violation of the prevailing order. The leaders of Poland or the United States can openly demonstrate their religiosity, and this does not bother anyone, because everyone understands: no matter how eagerly this or that Western president believes, not a single democratic institution will suffer from his faith.

In Russia, of course, of course, there can be no such confidence with its underdeveloped, but already affected by democratic institutions. If in Western countries, religion has already been “injured” to secular legislation (in Europe there are many parties calling itself Christian, in Denmark the Lutheran Church generally has the status of a state religion - at least call a pot, but they don’t touch democracy - and they don’t touch the Russian Orthodox Church, to fit “from scratch” in the legal field to combine warm and leading to the emergence Incredible legal paradoxes, as, for example, the one that the other day was simple -mindedly formulated by the already gaining world fame due to his struggle with the propaganda of homosexuality by the deputy of the St. Petersburg Zaks Vitaly Milonov: “ The protection of human rights is represented in Russia, and the protection of the rights of believers is not.”

In this situation, the Russian Orthodox Church is forced to either refrain from too active participation in public life, or put himself over modern law, crush him for herself. There are no other options in these historical conditions (although, theoretically, it is necessary to mention the Archpriest Sun. Chaplin option with the creation of an “Orthodox” or “Christian” party ). Just Alexy II adhered to the tactics of non -interference, and Cyril preferred another way. This choice of his completely predetermined further. To make the Russian Orthodox Church an active player on the political field, without entering into a clear conflict with the basics of the legal system, the Patriarch decided to take the fundamental and even “sacred” concept of universal values ​​for modern liberalism and declare Orthodoxy a guarantor of these values. It must be admitted that with all its ambiguity, this tactic is not devoid of grace. This is definitely a crafty, but most likely, many representatives of the Orthodox public, the so -called “missionaries”, are approved by a beautiful move, hoping that a slight retreat from dogmas will turn into a large gain in spirituality. However, here they are mistaken.

Post -Soviet values

The Russian state model has been developing too actively for the past twenty years and changes its appearance, and after the presidential election, the process of change has significantly accelerated. Very soon, new mechanisms and tools, new political niches may appear in it. The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, most likely, perfectly sees this and takes into account in its plans, ahead of time promoting its exclusive service of the keeper of state traditions in the political market. This service is frankly undemocratic, but right now, when Russia is experiencing a crisis of public administration, the Russian Orthodox Church has received a good chance to win a tender for a new state ideology.

However, there is a little difficulty: this new ideology will not, more precisely, cannot be completely Christian. The Russian Orthodox Church will have to very significantly move towards a public request (this is especially characteristic of Russia, where before the elections, all political parties, without exception, come up with socialist sloches in essence). This will lead (and already leads) to the next paradox. Of course, the Russian Orthodox Church claims to be a keeper of traditions, a traditional way of way and a traditional value system, however, the current Holy Priestiac of the Russian Orthodox Church, contrary to its institutional base, is, if not the main, then one of the leading destroyers of tradition.

Those traditional values ​​that have undertook to restore the Russian Orthodox Church under the current Patriarch are not Orthodox, but Soviet values ​​in their post -Soviet publication, a characteristic feature of which was the longing for the “former size”, “sense of security”, “order”, etc. Mythologems that spread as a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire (more precisely, half -life).

I will not condemn these mythologems, especially since it itself is not free from their effects, however, the opposite of these mythology can be said quite definitely. The concept of the “Russian world” promoted by the Patriarch, objectively directed, according to someone's true remark, to suppress all crops around the periphery of Central Russia and to revise the Belovezhsky agreements (namely the Pact of the Three Slavic States), is a political, not a religious task. Its connection with the post -Soviet revenge (no matter how anyone belongs to him) is impossible to deny.

The Soviet public agreement, based on the consent of the citizens tolerate a strict and sometimes inhuman authorities in exchange for a stable ration, and for consent to exchange self -esteem for a sense of superiority over the inhabitants of the imperial periphery, this is the basis of the morality that Cyril began to establish from the very beginning of its patriarchate. This is precisely what led him to the Union not just with Putin (it is difficult to demand opposition from the Church), but with Putinism as a political strategy. This is what became the reason for the Pussy Riot action.

“He decided that he should not spoil his blood with crochet written laws, and began to rule the country as God put on the soul, and became ubiquitous and unquestioned” - this course of the Marquez dictator accurately expresses the inner essence of what the Russian Orthodox Church now invites the country's leadership to sanctify with its authority. Now that the choice is made, the Russian Orthodox Church, unfortunately, will begin to quickly lose the space of the maneuver, lose the remnants of a professional resource and turn from the custodian of an ancient collective conscience recognized by everyone into a political player, the most important ally of the political regime, which successfully invested his symbolic capital. The demand for reactionary policy in today's Russia is quite large, so in this regard the Russian Orthodox Church has good prospects.

Recently, the Patriarch started an account on Facebook. Someone suggested that these are the remains of plans for “promotion in the media” and creating the image of the “media-patriarch”, characteristic of the Medvedev five-year plan and the activities of the retired press secretary of the patriarchy prot. Vladimir Vigilyansky. However, it seems that this is not a personal account. This is an account of the brand that has attached the action and awaiting the growth of capitalization.