The poll conducted by the Levada Center in September of last year, 2011, began literally a couple of days before the top officials informed Russians that they had already decided who they would and would not elect as the country's president. The poll could not reflect the feelings of disappointment, humiliation, and frustration that emerged later. The ratings were calm - 68% for the one who was prime minister and 62% for the one who was president.

The poll could not reflect the surge of indignation caused by the falsifications in the elections that took place later. But it did reflect the theme of protest, which became key two months later. Let us recall that at that time there was much debate about how those who did not want to simply express loyalty to the authorities should act in the elections – spoil the ballot, take it with them, etc. Russians were then asked how they could best “express protest against the current political system in the elections.” The advice that the electorate (not only the protest ones) gave to themselves then more often than any other: “don’t go to the polls.”

This was, as we now see, the advice of the weak to the weak. Our legislators made our electoral system indifferent to turnout in advance, so non-attendance is not a protest for them, but a game by their rules. But the concerned electorate did not just show up for the elections, they also began to check how they were being conducted. And, having discovered the disappearance of their own and the appearance of illegal foreign votes, they took to the streets. What followed was and is being discussed. In particular, the question was discussed of whether the protest against unfair elections, the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy and other things that agitated the "middle class" (i.e., not the "people") would merge with a mass protest that would be caused by reasons considered valid, such as a decline in the standard of living.

A survey conducted by the Levada Center in September 2012 showed that, according to formal indicators, public sentiment had returned to exactly the same state it had been in the previous year. The ratings of the top officials were exactly the same, even though the faces had swapped chairs. As for the prospects for protest, the public had previously expressed expectations that protest sentiment would grow. In September, 59% of citizens expressed confidence that “the tightening of legislation, persecution, and attempts to intimidate opposition leaders and people going out to protest” would remain at the current level or would intensify. At the same time, 50% called “the activities of the current Russian leadership in terms of maintaining internal order, fighting crime and corruption” unsatisfactory, 50% in the social sphere, and 47% in the economic sphere. 49% expressed dissatisfaction with the current education system and 61% with the healthcare system. When asked whether the country is moving in the right direction, 39% answered yes, 42% no.

All of the above is not a protest or its indicators. The protest is suppressed, the problems are not being solved. People do not approve of the way the government rules, but continue to give their approval to those in power.

Alexey Levinson: From September to September