Why Russia is not Israel

The cretinous joy of the Palestinian residents, to whom the truce with Israel for some unclear reason seemed like a victory, still has a sound basis: the advent of peace after the war cannot but rejoice. But even this, fortunately short war - in a region where any armed conflict can actually pull the trigger of a real apocalypse - suggests the fragility of peace and security in a situation where one culture tries to fence itself off from another with the help of walls and various cunning defensive systems.

To some extent this is about Russia. And exactly about whether there will be enough to feed the Caucasus. This is like a fairly clear illustration of what will happen if the Caucasus stops feeding and is forever separated from the rest of the country, as it should be done with colonies.

Almost any dialogue about the Caucasian future (if the Caucasians themselves do not participate in it) is conducted approximately according to the following logic: - Stop feeding the Caucasus! - What should you do with it if you don’t feed it? - And separate. OK. What next? Does anyone's imagination extend beyond this word - "separate"? Can you imagine what it will look like?

And this will be just such an improvised Palestine. Behind the Iron Curtain. Rather, it will be such a cracking hybrid of Palestine, Afghanistan and Somalia. No standard of living. Without institutions. With hatred for the neighbors who separated themselves from them with a fence. With experience of war and with connections to the whole greater Middle East, burning with the thirst for jihad.

Is this really what you want to see on the border of your country? Taking into account the fact that in the modern world not a single minefield will stop the penetration of people from the fenced-off area into your cities. And taking into account the fact that Russia is not Israel, and it has neither a particularly attractive economic model nor high-tech security forces - the two main components that allow Israel not only to stay afloat, but also to remain almost the main character of this very greater Middle East.

Now in the Caucasus, about nine out of ten people, hearing about secession, twist their finger at their temple: “Have you gone crazy?” Yes, there is no longer an economy in the Caucasus, in some places he already lives somewhere outside the framework of Russian law, he already feels this fence between himself and the rest of the country, although physically it has not yet been built. They kill, steal and lie there, probably more intensely than in the rest of Russia.

And yet, probably, nowhere in Russia the unity of this country is valued as much as it is valued in the Caucasus. Because no normal people would ever want a hybrid of Palestine, Afghanistan and Somalia to happen right in their backyard. And so they clutch at this unity as the only straw that could pull them out of this emerging quagmire - but unity slips away. Russia has experienced self-determination of all peoples. Now Russians are defining themselves in it, and unity seems to be no longer particularly interesting to them.

The problem is that even without a fence on the border with the North Caucasus, Russia has neither an attractive economic model (attractive to everyone, and not to those who cut out a piece for themselves and now protects it), nor high-tech security forces (capable of really reliably ensuring security of the civilian population, and not just receive Runet awards). But Russia has its own local Hamas, which is not behind the fence, but, as it were, inside it. Hamas exists and expands precisely because Russia lacks an attractive economic model and high-tech security forces. And the further we go, the more hopeless the choice becomes - Somalia behind the fence or one big Somalia.