The results of the year. Internal threat

Throughout 2012, the authorities consistently and, I must say, quite successfully developed an attack on civil society. In parallel, equally successfully, she played out glasses lost in September-December of the year 2011. The stages of this triumphal procession: the presidential election - new repressive laws - “Pussy Riot case”.
During the election campaign, having still involved a huge administrative-propaganda resource, Putin managed to solve the problem of consolidating the conservative, dependent majority.
As the ideological basis of this consolidation, the motives of fear of any changes and rude anti-Americanism were used than ever. The whole campaign was carried out straightforwardly, even oakfully, but extremely assertively. This feature identified the transition to the new style of power, which is no longer a passion for aesthetic-thin wiring, but with an exposure to a non-uncomplicated, direct power pressure.
This stylistic coup reflects, of course, personnel changes in the Kremlin team and, above all, the individual differences between Vladislav Surkov and Vyacheslav Volodin. But first of all, it is a consequence of such a fundamental factor as the categorical unpreparedness of the authorities not only to enter into a dialogue with society, but even for the sake of considerations of decency to imitate this dialogue. The main thing here is the character and personal resentment of the first person. But there are also rational considerations: the victory was provided to us by the stable support of the majority. This is their own - the majority should be held, and on the rest, strangers - how many are there? - There is nothing to spend gunpowder.
In accordance with this strategic installation, after the presidential election campaign, the 2012 summer campaign was carried out. All the initiatives - about NPOs, about rallies, about slander and about the Stateizer - went to the “Hurray” and beat at one point. The main effect of all this package is the narrowing of the civic freedom space. And you can reason as much as you like that it will be “sleeping” norms. Even “sleeping”, they hang over society with a Damoclam sword. And from time to time, as necessary, nothing will prevent them from “waking”.
The case of “blasphemy” in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, which seemed to accidentally arose and standing apart, was actually also very pragmatically used by the Kremlin. Again - for the consolidation of "its" electorate and pressure on society. And what is especially important - the designation of the image of the enemy. As a result, competently, professionally carried out using all the state capacities of the fundamentalist hysteria, the essential component of which was the process over the three “witches”, the authorities managed to expose himself to the defender of traditional values ​​in the eyes of the most orthodox and quantitatively quite significant part of citizens. And to protect these values ​​- Orthodoxy, the spirituality of the ETC - naturally, from the historical enemy of Russia - the rotten West and its Russian hires - the pro -Western, liberal fifth column.
From the presidential campaign and the Pussy Riot case, Putin came out of the jealousy of faith and the Orthodox Secretary General with a pronounced social support on the paternalistic, material and mentally dependent layers, and an increasingly specific political support on the consistently anti-Western, nationalist-stalinist forces.
Accordingly, the atmosphere in the country also changed in the direction of a kind of mixed cleric, and gabish obscurantism. Apparently, it was precisely such an atmosphere that was meant when, during the appeal to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the president spoke of “spiritual scraps”.
At the same time, the personal rating of Vladimir Putin, like the rating of power as a whole, demonstrates a stable tendency to reduce. Protest moods not only did not disappear, but as a reaction to everything that was discussed above, strengthened. However, their political expression as street activity has practically naught. The last inconsistent action at the Solovetsky stone, which gathered no more than two or three thousand, actually lifted the line under the stage of civil protests, which began so violently and with such a drive in December 2011.
On this mixed background, the final and most phantasmagoric chord of the outgoing year took place - Russia's response to the Act of Magnitsky.
The decision to make Russian orphans extreme in a very muddy, very conjunctural corruption-political history is subject to completely unambiguous moral assessments, but is difficult to rational analysis.
The idea was: on the one hand, to depict a firm rebuff to the States, block anti -native sentiments with anti -wested and extract populist dividends.
It didn't work out.
On the other hand, to take the next step towards Autarchy, towards the distance from the West - political, cultural, civilizational.
This, to some extent, turned out.
In general, we can talk about a serious mistake of the supreme power. The degree of public and elite support of all anti -Western and anti -American. This degree is really high, but too painful emotionally children's theme and too weak, official argument is stretched.
It was not an artificial, a sucked so-called spiritual factor, as in a farce business about dancing in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, and the real, truly serious and at the same time simple and clear moral factor, intervened. Few, except for true enthusiasts, is seduced by the reputation of the children of children.
The direct, direct result of the administrative rape of the deputy corps and hasty, with the uninvited risks of the adopted “anti -Sirot” act was the fragmentation of the elites. She put it in a deaf, crushed by grunt in the Duma, and in an unprecedented, disclosed disagreement of several members of the Cabinet at once. This weakens the position of the power group and at the same time pushes it in the direction of further radicalization at the rhetorical, political and law enforcement levels. Which, in turn, according to the law of a vicious circle, deepens fermentation at the top.
Not from the outside, not from the side of the radical opposition, a few, ideologically incompatible and temporarily united only by Putin’s personal rejection, but inside, in increasing the groove and discontent of the seemingly dedicated elites, the main potential threat is hidden.
And the less adequate the behavior of the authorities, the stronger the mood of distrust, internal opposition and exit searches will be.