How to increase the competitiveness of the opposition?

By the beginning of 2013, the structure of the opposition acquired clearer outlines:

- non-systemic opposition led by the Coordination Council;

— the Yabloko party, which sometimes takes part in general civil street actions, but continues a hidden dialogue with the Kremlin;

- part of the system liberals led by M. Prokhorov’s “Civic Platform” and A. Kudrin’s “Committee of Civil Initiatives”, closely associated with the Kremlin, but already openly opposing the power of the security forces.

These opposition forces are supported by the “creative class” - part of the creative intelligentsia; small business; managers and employees; skilled workers; democratically minded part of the power elite.

The 2012 presidential elections showed that about half of citizens remain on the side of the current government, which promotes the traditional values ​​of the former Soviet Union - a strong centralized state led by the leader of the nation, dirigisme in the economy, a powerful army and anti-Western policies. The authorities appeal, first of all, to the military, employees of the military-industrial complex, state-owned enterprises and budgetary institutions.

Monopolized by the state represented by a group of security officials, DH channels skillfully create among the people the illusion of social priority in the activities of the authorities. Large oligarchic businesses and the conformist-minded part of the creative “intelligentsia” play a huge role in supporting the authoritarian regime. We remember well many of the names of V.V.’s 500 trusted representatives. Putin, who “sold” their honor and conscience for the opportunity to have their own theaters, concert halls, advertising on central heating, and other tangible and intangible assets.

The concocted criminal cases of 2012 against participants of the May 6 rally, girls from Pussy Riot, Razvozzhaev, Navalny and others indicate the beginning of the incorporation of elements of dictatorship into the authoritarian regime of V.V. Putin. Under the conditions of a “soft” dictatorship, democratic institutions are preserved only formally, the content is emasculated.

To build on the success of resistance to the authoritarian regime and stop the slide of power towards dictatorship, it is necessary to significantly increase the competitiveness of the opposition. To do this, it is advisable to determine the key factors of political success and the competitive advantages of the opposition.

Currently, the key factors for the success of political forces, in my opinion, are the following:

1. Strength of administrative, financial, media resources;
2. Strength of party organizations;
3. The effectiveness of political activity;
4. Loyalty of the civically active majority of society.

The balance of forces between the authorities and the opposition now, in my opinion, is as follows: for the first and second factors: 8-2 in favor of the authorities; on the third and fourth factors: 6-4 in favor of the authorities.

The effectiveness of the political activities of the opposition refers to the quality of their political and economic programs; social activity and its results.

Thus, the rating assessment of political competitors shows that the strength of the opposition is 30%, the power - 70%.

To determine the competitive advantages of the opposition, we apply SWOT analysis.

Let us first evaluate the group of security forces led by V.V. Putin.

1. Strengths:

1.1. Powerful administrative, financial and media resources;

1.2. A strong and popular leader with a high level of popular support.

1.3. Well-managed party system: United Russia with satellite parties - LDPR, A Just Russia, Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

2. Weaknesses:

2.1. The fallacy of an economic strategy characterized by:

— reliance on centrally managed large private and state-owned companies;

— militarization of the economy and a relative reduction in social spending;

— ignoring institutional reforms, improving the investment climate, large-scale development of small and medium-sized businesses, and attracting foreign direct investment as drivers of economic growth.

2.2. The alliance between the security forces and system liberals has naturally cracked. Some of the “system liberals” are already openly opposing the security forces group in power.

2.3. Deterioration of the public management system. Ridiculous reforms of the police, healthcare, education; large-scale corruption.

3. Features:

3.1. Carrying out small, gradual and long-term reforms. "Feeding" with promises.

3.2. Suppression of opposition through repression and bribery.

3.3. Mobilizing your electorate through aggressive propaganda on central television channels.

4. Threats:

4.1. Slowdown of economic growth, stagnation and “decay” of the economy due to increased corruption, outflow of financial and intellectual capital, deterioration of industry management systems, primarily the social block.

4.2. Deterioration of macroeconomic indicators, budget deficit, failure to fulfill social obligations, due to a sharp drop in oil prices to the level of 60 dollars per barrel.

4.3. Changes in mood and “moral climate” in society, due to growing social contradictions and growing social tension in the context of a tightening authoritarian regime.

Resume:

1. Under an authoritarian regime, socio-economic problems will naturally increase, and a socio-political crisis is inevitable. It's a matter of time.

2. The speed at which the socio-political crisis approaches depends on: the level of oil prices; balance and structure of the budget; the threshold of tolerance of the population to a decrease in volumes, deterioration in quality, and rising prices for social services provided; level of efficiency of public administration; effectiveness of opposition actions and civil activity of the population.

Opposition.

1. Strengths:

1.1. The growth of the social base of the opposition - a layer of the population called “angry citizens” who understand the need for democratic changes and are ready to actively defend their civil rights and democratic values.

1.2. The growing popularity and moral authority of the “new” opposition leaders: A. Navalny, S. Udaltsov. D. Bykov, V. Mirzoev, B. Akunin and others gained great popularity among “angry citizens” with their civic position. G. Yavlinsky and G. Kasparov maintain steady respect among the intelligentsia.

1.3. The opposition has sufficient financial, administrative and media resources thanks to its “reformist” wing, their overt and hidden supporters in government and big business.

2. Weaknesses:

2.1. Fragmentation, acute conflicts between “revolutionaries” and “reformists”.

2.2. Weakness and low level of management of party organizations.

2.3. The low reputation of the “old” leaders: B. Nemtsov, M. Kasyanov, M. Prokhorov, etc.

3. Features:

3.1. Creation of a broad coalition of opposition parties and public organizations: RPR-Parnas, Yabloko, People's Alliance, United Front, Civic Platform, Committee of Civil Initiatives.

3.2. Increasing the efficiency of party management.

3.3. Attracting new supporters from among the creative intelligentsia, big business, managers, workers and employees.

4. Threats:

4.1. Failure of negotiations to create a broad coalition;

4.2. The defeat of the opposition by Putin and his team through the “imprisonment” of the most prominent “revolutionaries” and the “purchase” of “reformist” leaders.

4.3. Further rise in oil prices.

Resume:

Key factors for increasing the competitiveness of the opposition:

— cohesion and coherence of actions of the main opposition forces;

— improvement of party management;

— attracting new supporters and increasing their civic activity.

Conclusions:

1. Subject to the creation of a broad coalition and serious party building, the opposition will be able to align its competitive positions with the authorities in terms of the strength of party organizations. “Reformists” and “revolutionaries” are obliged to do their job, to follow their own path, but they are also obliged to meet each other halfway and find a compromise.

2. The deterioration of the economic situation and the decrease in the level of efficiency of public administration predicted by experts will allow the opposition to equalize its competitive positions with the authorities in terms of the efficiency of political activity.

3. Strengthening the opposition while the economic situation worsens will inevitably lead to an increase in the population's loyalty to the opposition. Under these conditions, there is a high probability that the sympathies of the majority will shift to the opposition, and the superiority of the authorities in control over administrative, financial, and media resources will be minimal.

4. Thus, the likely competitive strength of the opposition by 2018 can be estimated at 20 points out of 40 or 50%, that is, the strength of the opposition will be equal to the strength of the authorities.

5. It is clear that the protesting citizens do not like V.V.’s team. Putin, nor the motley opposition represented by “old” and “new” leaders, but citizens will still have to choose the lesser of two evils. Let's hope that the opposition will be able to nominate new leaders who can unite both “reformists” and “revolutionaries” and attract more ordinary people to their side.