Overcome the Lilliputian complex

Former Polish oppositionist shares experience of the protest movement

Former Polish opposition leader and current President of the Board of the Stefan Batory Foundation Oleksandr Smolyar shares his experience of the protest movement...

Alexander Smolyar. photo by V. Gadomsky

Alexander Smolyar knows everything about the Polish opposition. He participated in the student unrest of March 1968, although by that time he had graduated from Warsaw University for four years - he worked at the Faculty of Political Economy. He served almost a year. In 1971 he was forced to emigrate. In the West, he founded the political magazine Aneks, which was clandestinely distributed in Poland. For many years he was its chief editor. After the emergence of the Committee for the Protection of Workers (KOR), he served as its representative in the West. And after the transformation of the KOR into the Committee of Public Self-Defense (KOS-KOR), he represented it in the West. Participated in the preparation of the round table in 1989. Then he was a political adviser to the first post-communist prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and then to prime minister Hanna Suchocka. Now he is the President of the Board of the Stefan Batory Foundation. His opinion on how the opposition should act in order to succeed is worth a lot.

What conditions are needed to start a practical dialogue between the government and the opposition on a peaceful change in the existing system?

- I think there are few conditions that can be said to be mandatory and universal. It would be easier for me to talk about what factors in Poland facilitated the convening and holding of the round table.

A very important factor was the crisis of power. Which, by the way, began in Poland with the Poznan unrest of 1956, after which a series of riots and uprisings followed. Over more than 20 years - from 1956 to the creation of Solidarity in 1980 - a situation gradually developed that Lenin once defined as "the bottom does not want, but the top can no longer." The authorities realized that they must receive some kind of public support, especially in the face of the deepest economic crisis.

On the other hand, on the part of society, there was a maturation of the movement, which began in 1956 and which from the very beginning contained a serious working component. True, in 1956 there was also a broad intellectual movement: against dependence on the Soviet Union, for democratization and liberalization. Later, in 1970, we had to deal with the uprising of the workers in Gdansk and other cities along the coast, who had no support, who were left alone. Then there were workers' unrest in Ursus and Radom in 1976. In parallel, the intellectual movement continued to develop (in particular, the events of March 1968, the main participants of which were students and the intelligentsia).

And in 1980 there was a "meeting" and consolidation of various protest groups and public interests. And this is a fundamentally important point. Because the authoritarian government will never seek an agreement with the protesters, as long as it is possible to oppose one social group to another, as long as it is possible to play on the difference in their interests .

A very important factor for Poland, which is underestimated by many, is that, as a result of a chain of tragic events, in recent history it has turned into an almost homogeneous country - in terms of ethnicity and religion. This was the result of the extermination of Jews by the Nazis during World War II, the post-war expulsion of Germans from Polish territory, territorial changes in the east (the transition of territories belonging to Poland before the war to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania). The transformation of Poland into a nationally and religiously monolithic country meant the impossibility of turning some groups of Polish citizens against others with the help of nationalist and religious slogans.

By the 1980s, the Polish opposition elite was mature not only intellectually, but also politically. There were many people among her who knew what politics was, who were ready to make political decisions, who knew how to mobilize people for their implementation.

In Poland, people who opposed the government called themselves the "democratic opposition." Although this movement had deep historical roots, it took organizational shape after the events of 1976 in Ursus and Radom, when the police brutally suppressed the protest actions of the workers. A KOR arose (Committee for the Protection of Workers. - Ed. ). It was the most authoritative and strong structure, which had the greatest influence on subsequent Polish history. In particular, the KOR contributed to the creation of working committees, on the basis of which Solidarity was then created. And Solidarity was already such a force that the authorities could not ignore.

And another important factor that contributed to the success of the round table. This is the naivety and delusion of power. If the government understood how it would all end, it would not agree to an agreement on subsequent elections, nor to negotiations with the opposition. They were sure that they would win these elections, but they lost them miserably.

— How do you see the situation in Russia? Is something like a Polish round table possible here?

- Russia is a very complex society in terms of ethnic, religious, cultural, social, in terms of the development of public consciousness, etc. This is a society with a tragic experience of the period of Stalinism, in which the descendants of victims and executioners live nearby. In such a situation, a conservative reaction, fear of unknown changes is a natural and understandable thing.

For most Poles, the factor integrating society was the belief that evil comes from outside: communism came from the east, war came from Nazi Germany. In Russia, it is impossible to say that something is imposed on it from the outside. And then there is the problem of immense imperial size.

— The Polish opposition was made up of people with different political views and ideas about the future structure of post-communist Poland. How did you manage to agree on a common strategy?

There were several very important factors. The first is that at that time in Poland all these differences of opinion seemed to be of minor importance. Problems like: a strong state or a minimum of a state is needed, a market or dirigisme, nationalism or globalism - all this looked like sky-high dreams. The main common task initially looked much simpler - it was not even the overthrow, but the restriction of undemocratic power.

"Solidarity" by and large did not have slogans to remove the then team from power. It was about the need for a rule of law state, about the fact that the government that exists, which was elected the way it was elected, respected the law and recognized the independent Solidarity trade union.

In today's Russia, the situation is quite different. You can say a lot of bad things about it, but it is a pluralistic country with a deeply corrupt, but still market economy. And therefore, it has a much more complex configuration of society. Political contradictions, which were blocked in Poland at that time because of the need for a broader common program, are more pronounced in modern Russia.

Another significant factor is the positive role of the Polish Catholic Church in that period. It united the vast majority of the Polish population and was really independent of the communist government. Up to the point that opposition meetings and discussions were held within the walls of the churches, in which both believers and atheists participated.

Another important factor is the maturation of political culture. Thanks to the long period of relative liberalization of Poland in the 1960s and 1970s, thanks to the vigorous activity of such publications as Kultura, published in Paris by Polish intellectuals, a phenomenon arose in Poland that I would call "teaching realism."

For example, even after the shock of the imposition of martial law in December 1981, no one shouted that a revolution was needed, and the “reds” should be hung from lanterns. It was clear to most that there was a need to negotiate, and this, in turn, created a more favorable atmosphere. The representatives of the power elite saw that they were opposed by civilized people who could be trusted.

There should not necessarily be a detailed agreement on a joint platform between different opposition forces. It is enough to understand the differences, create a kind of "protocol" of these differences and formulate common values ​​and goals. At the same time, the most important thing is to learn how to talk with society. Convince him that there is no need to be afraid of the future. What do I need to get rid of the "Lilliput complex": they say, what can I do?

And further. We must learn to talk to those people from the authorities who are in the "border zone". That is, with those whose views do not differ much from the views of people belonging to the opposition, but who work in power or with power, because they are just good professionals and they have no inclination to self-sacrifice. They should not be alienated and isolated, on the contrary, they should be talked to and negotiated with gratitude for everything, even the smallest, that they are ready to do for a free Russia.