Around Russia

In defense of a strategic approach to Russia

April 4, 2013 Committee of protest actions

Over the past few months, Freedom House President David Kreeper and the leading employee of the Moscow Center of Carnegie Lilia Shevtsov wrote a series of articles who harshly criticize both the Obama administration in relation to Russia and non -governmental experts, defending the “strategic” approach to this country, as opposed to the “normative”, supporters of which are authors. Recently, their last message was published on The American Interest.

Criticism comes down to the following: whenever the relations between the United States and Russia worsen, the “strategists” beg the American administration to avoid those that irritate the Kremlin, and strive to cooperate in “large” issues. They urge the United States to change the policy, but they do not make similar requirements to Russia, implying that Washington is to blame for the deterioration. “Strategists” recognize the authoritarian, corruption regime in Russia and weaken the Russian support for a more open, democratic system. In return, Kremer and Shevtsov are called to the “normative” approach, under construction on principles and values. This approach avoids connivance against authoritarian Russian leaders and seems to contribute to Russian society in its desire for a more democratic structure.

This critical review is a caricature of a real strategic approach. The authors did not realize the severity and complexity of this approach, as well as the strict and consistent commitment of the “strategists” of America's interests.

What is the actual approach of “strategists” to the formation of a policy in relation to Russia?

To begin with, the “strategist” clearly formulates the long -term state interests of America, due to which he realizes how limits he can form a policy. He wonders how important the role of Russia is in satisfying each of our interests (necessary, important or insignificant) - from the point of view or contribution that Russia can make, or the obstacles that it can create. The “strategist” is trying to understand how Russia defines its own interests and priorities and why. Given the degree of importance of Russia and its interests, he then considers that the United States could make the reasons to provide the grounds in order to help America to achieve its goals or minimize threats to achieve them. Obviously, his greatest efforts are aimed at ensuring cooperation with Russia in those areas where our welfare depends on this. Most of all, he thinks about what we can do to help Russia achieve its main goals, provided that this will not at risk the realization of our strategic tasks. In cases where it is impossible to achieve cooperation with Russia, it is looking for effective ways to circumvent obstacles.

In contrast to what Kremer and Shevtsov hint at, the ultimate goal of “strategists” is not cooperation in the name of cooperation, but the creation of such a balance between cooperation, competition and indifference, which would make the most facilitating American interests. There is no original reason for the balance to shift towards cooperation. It is likely that sometimes the interests of America will most of all correspond to relations in the field of competition. Of course, this was the case during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was our main strategic adversary. This can happen in the current period of universal turbulence, although this seems not too likely. The nature of the challenges that we encounter in an increasingly globalizing and multipolar world is the preservation of strategic stability, the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the fight against international terrorism, regulation (or resolution) of regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East and Asia, ensuring energy security, confrontation of piracy in the open Sea, and the deterrence of pandemic diseases and so on - suggests that cooperation with Russia, given its location, nuclear arsenal, natural resources and human capital, can bring more benefits than competition. These two factors - the tasks facing us, and the potential of Russia - are also the reason why we cannot ignore Russia, although the degree of involvement in general and in specific matters may vary depending on the circumstances.

The balance that we set in relations with Russia will be formed from a complex set of compromises, as well as motives and deterrence within the framework of the tasks to which we are involved in Russia. Either when we ourselves want this, or when, due to events in the world or thanks to Russia itself, these issues are on the agenda. No matter how Washington would solve each problem individually, “in isolation from the rest” - and in the American administration they often believe that they act just like that - in reality all problems are interconnected, especially from the point of view of the Russian leadership. “Relations” is an integral element of American-Russian relations. It should not be open, and, of course, it does not imply gross compensation by the principle of Quid Pro Quo (for example, America sacrifices Georgia in response to the US position to Russia in the Iranian issue). Rather, this is the basis for creating an atmosphere and the formation of expectations that could convince Russia to act in such a way as to promote the interests of America.

Many in Washington intuitively negatively react to the idea of ​​a compromise, claiming that this is an unjustified rejection of principles or connivance to bad personalities. They approve of cooperation only when our interests coincide (in this case, apparently, compromises are not required), and a thorough analysis of the issues in which we disagree. (The Bush administration used more warlike circulation to designate such a policy - “to cooperate when we can, pure, when we have to.”) However, the “strategist” should be discussed about common interests as the basis of cooperation with skepticism. For the analysis of the so -called common interests shows the existence of serious differences in understanding problems and national interests, which creates obstacles to successful cooperation.

Take the Iranian problem. Both states - both the United States and Russia - want to prevent Iran in the development of nuclear weapons. However, the fact that for the United States is a priority is evaluated in Russia much lower. Moreover, each of the parties has its own Iran. The United States see the Iran that destabilizes the situation in the Middle East, supports international terrorism and brutally suppresses its own population, while Russia sees in Iran a state that respects Russian interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and also provides a market for Russian nuclear equipment used for peaceful purposes and ordinary weapons. As a result, the United States is trying to resort to sanctions, which should damage the enemy, and Russia seeks to avoid confrontation with an important and friendly neighbor. As each round of debate about sanctions at the UN, the United States is forced to go to significant compromises or concessions in order to achieve cooperation from Russia in the issue where both countries supposedly have common interest.

Iran is hardly an exception. Similar problems arise in connection with any supposedly common interest, whether it is stability in Afghanistan, energy security, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the fight against terrorism or anything else. Thus, the search for the correct balance in the field of compromises, motives and deterrence is an integral element in ensuring cooperation even in those areas where the interests of the two countries, as expected, coincide.

Finally, the “strategist” understands that politics requires constant control. He is not afraid of adjustments, sometimes radical, if real events detect flaws in assumptions, or if the assessments or circumstances change. He understands that in the current era of global turbulence there will be more unpredictable events and unexpected consequences. The only thing that the "strategist" remains unchanged is the commitment to the strategic interests of America.

At the same time, American values ​​are not indifferent to him. He not only understands that American foreign policy should have a normative measurement. He welcomes him. The promotion of our democratic values ​​lies in the very basis of our national identity, it is among our strategic interests. The only question is that this is arguing about this since the founding of our republic is how to best spread these values. The ethics of a “strategist” is based on a sense of responsibility for the decisions made and their consequences, and not a declaration and noble anger. For this reason, when it comes to supporting democratic reforms in other countries, he demonstrates restraint. The words of George Kennan said sixty years ago: “The ways with which the peoples reach a worthy and enlightened state system are the deepest and most intimate processes of national life. For foreigners, these paths are often incomprehensible, and foreign interference in these processes can do nothing but harm. ” All this is especially true in relation to Russia - this country is too large and complex so that foreigners can successfully reform it. The erroneous and unsuccessful efforts of America to promote democracy in Russia in the 1990s can serve as a monument to Kennan's wisdom.

No matter how we want to see the indistinguishable progress on the path to democracy in Russia, the “strategist” understands that the democratic development of the country is a long and winding path, since the Russians themselves create institutions and processes in accordance with their own circumstances and expel their specific demons that have been born throughout a long and restless history. Instead of trying to put pressure on the government with the aim of democratizing it, the “strategist” seeks to show our ways and values ​​to the Russians with the help of exchange programs, contacts in the field of business and other initiatives within the framework of relations between the peoples, being confident that Russians can choose the best and apply it to their conditions, since our society looks like successful and cope with various tasks, demonstrating wisdom and will. It follows that one of the most important steps that we could now take to promote democracy in Russia is to put our own house in order.

In addition, the “strategist” isware of optimistic rhetoric and noble anger, the positive impact of which on Russia (if it took place at all) was small, at least throughout the life of the last generation. He disapprovingly looks at the measures taken to support the marginal forces in Russia, whose representatives declare themselves as democrats, but for some reason do not cause much enthusiasm in the Russian demos , but they are at the head of them are figures who had a chance to become leaders in the 1990s and early 2000s, but they-the Kasyanovs, Nemtsov and the Kasparovs-missed him. The “strategist” is more concerned about the preservation of space for the growing number of those Russians, especially among young people who want a more open, pluralistic society and more accountable to the government of the government, but, in an understandable way, do not want them to be considered American agents, or to be associated with the marginal forces and victims of the leaders. If we want to support these people, we must make it clear that we refrain from active intervention in the internal affairs of Russia and refuse public criticism, with the exception of cases of glaring violation of human rights.

Given these considerations, the “strategist” will not support the “Act of Magnitsky”, no matter how much he agrees that the Russian government should conduct an honest and impartial investigation of the death of Magnitsky in prison and attract those responsible to the court. In the hype on the eve of the adoption of this act, his supporters and Congress did not pay due attention to possible unplanned consequences. Firstly, although the US leadership has the right to refuse visas to Russian officials, the idea to freeze their accounts on suspicion of guilt, it seems, contradicts our own principle to always conduct proper legal procedures and is a false signal of the rule of law for Russians. Secondly, the Russians will try to use this act to gain advantages over their commercial competitors (any large business in Russia has their own people in the government), and the US leadership will be forced to make a decision in connection with competition on the basis of far from complete information. Finally, the Kremlin’s reaction to this act only narrows the space for democratic reforms in Russia - in fact, it has already happened. It can be argued that we are not responsible for such a reaction and that it only emphasizes the predisposition of Putin's Russia to authoritarianism. But such a reaction, in general, was completely predictable (or even in the privileges), and, of course, those who adopted the “Act of Magnitsky” bear a certain moral responsibility for the predictable reaction that followed this. Speaking briefly, it is completely not obvious that the “Magnitsky Law” ensured the promotion of the case of democracy in Russia, despite the statements and hopes of its supporters.

Relations between the two countries deteriorated sharply after the adoption of the "Law of Magnitsky", but it is unlikely to have a cause of the general decline, which began at least on September 2011, when Putin announced the decision to return to the Kremlin. And what can the “strategist” offer today?

The fundamental problem is that the American-Russian relations do not have a new agenda. The last action under the “rebooting” was the completion of negotiations on the accession of Russia to the World Trade Organization at the end of 2011. Since then, acute disagreements are relevant about the settlement of unrest in the Middle East, especially in Syria, the problem of the pro. There is a feeling that cooperation between countries in the field of sanctions against Iran has come to an end, and irritation is growing about what is happening in the domestic policy of Russia. The fact that countries may continue to continue less noticeable cooperation on a number of secondary issues, slightly changes the picture of the general state of relations between them.

None of the parties have a clear idea of ​​how to move forward, although both in a clear way do not want the current deterioration of relations to lead to a frank confrontation. Russia especially realizes that it still needs American investment, technology and know-how to build a rather competitive economy to maintain hopes for the status of a great power. In the best case, one can hope, on the one hand, for a decrease in anti -American rhetoric, emanating from Moscow, and, on the other hand, for some restraint of attempts to arrange Russia, which Congress from time to time takes. This would ensure a more calm discussion on those issues where the positions of the two countries are still opposite. Even in this case, the competitive aspects in the relationship will prevail for some time during the second presidential term of Obama. The grounds for extensive cooperation on noticeable issues in this context are hardly obvious.

While cooperation is driven into framework, this is not a tragedy. But Moscow and Washington should use the current moment of shift in relations to see if they can develop a general strategic basis for relations. The current time, when a whirlpool occurs in world politics, may become suitable for both countries to overestimate the problems that are in the way of promoting their national interests.

The technology for this could serve as a strategic dialogue at the highest level that would allow us to determine whether America and Russia have reliable grounds for long -term cooperation. At the initial stage, the dialogue can focus on three broad questions: a) moving mechanisms and trends that will form the external environment over the next 10-15 years, and plausible scenarios for the development of global events; b) the significance of these trends and scenarios for the national interests of both countries; c) the study of intersections based on the first two points in the field of strategic tasks that each of the two countries faces. Если пересечения значительны, то следующим шагом станет попытка определить, могут ли Россия и Соединенные Штаты объединить свои интересы так, чтобы каждая страна приблизилась к решению собственных стратегических задач. Конечным результатом станет создание стратегического основания, которое поможет руководству стран принимать решения по конкретным поводам и укажет, какую политику следует развивать и запускать сейчас для достижения стратегического сотрудничества.

Разумеется, возможно, что стратегический диалог выявит непреодолимые различия во взглядах, в понимании грядущих задач и в области национальных интересов. Он может показать, что конкуренция, а не сотрудничество неминуемо станет определяющим элементом в американо-российских отношениях. Ни один «стратег» не станет это отрицать. Но мы должны по крайней мере добросовестным образом предпринять усилия для того, чтобы определить, есть ли основание для стратегического сотрудничества, прежде чем смириться с тем, что отношения будут иметь характер соперничества. Такой результат не станет трагедией, если только неудача помогает продвинуть американские интересы.

Автор – в 2004-2007 годах специальный помощник
президента США по делам России, в настоящее
время – старший директор в Kissinger & Associates

Original text

Photo by ITAR-TASS/ Vladimir Smirnov