Translated material
The response of a realist is an idealist
Around Russia
The response of a realist is an idealist
April 5, 2013 Lilia Shevtsova
I am glad that our attempts to draw attention to Russia and the US policy against Russia are heard by our opponents with David Kramer. It is nice to get a response from Thomas Graham (further TG), whom I consider to be one of the thinnest Western analysts observing Russian processes. No matter how it seems to be paradoxical, the article of TG with the answer to us, as well as its other thoughts about Russia provide additional arguments in favor of our point of view .
In fact, TG wrote a kind of manifesto of “American strategists”. The ideas of “strategists” defined Washington’s policy against Russia during the first presidency of Obama and have every chance to determine its continuation. Moreover, the inventory of their views is also important because they reflect the ideas about the foreign policy of a considerable part of the American establishment.
I’ll start with the main thesis of TG and the “strategists” represented by it: the US policy in relation to Russia should first work for the “implementation of American interests”. One cannot disagree with this - Russia's policy regarding America should also work on the consistent “implementation of Russian interests”. I am not going to argue with how TG understands American interests. This is not the case of a citizen of Russia. But the thing is that TG for some reason forgot to formulate American interests in relation to the world around him, obviously believing that they are already clear. But they are unclear. It is not clear to me to which America is focused on preserving the global order, which was built as a result of World War II, and in which America is ready to support the reform of this order. It would be interesting for me to know the opinion of TG about whether America was ready to protect the current model of liberal democracy, or the point of view of those Western analysts who speak of the crisis of this model and the need to reform it prevailed. TG does not affect this topic at all. He immediately begins to explain to us the mechanism of relations between America and Russia: “The ultimate goal of strategists ... is the creation of a balance between cooperation, competition and indifference, which would make it easier for American interests.” But, as I said above, what American interests are, remains unclear. What if they are so contrary to Russian interests that they exclude the successful cooperation of countries?
True, further TG reflects on the "challenges" that America is faced in the world. We are talking about challenges of stability and security. TG does not mention the need for changes and rethinking of world politics. Consequently, we can conclude that the author believes the main thing for America is to preserve the global status quo and the current model of liberal democracy. And if so, then America cannot have complaints about world leadership - after all, leadership involves updating and progress, and not protecting the dilapidated order.
The next thesis of TG confirms his very pragmatic approach to the American agenda. The author talks about the "relationship", which is an "integral element of American-Russian relations." See how he explains what this “relationship” is. This is not Quid Pro Quo, which could mean that "America sacrifices Georgia in response to Russia to support its position in the Iranian issue." But then what? It turns out that we are talking about "the formation of expectations that could convince Russia to act in such a way as to promote the interests of America." In short, America is not at all necessary, say, to give Georgia in Russia - Washington needs to pretend that America gives Georgia, and let Moscow believe and in response to support America in Iran!
Well, politics is politics and in it, unfortunately, Machiavellism is inevitable. But you need to be aware that Moscow will look for its version of the “formation of expectations”. And, as the reboot and the presidency of Medvedev shows, which gave rise to many hopes in Washington, the Kremlin is much more sophisticated in the expectations and disorientation of their partners than the White House.
The reader will surely say: the strategic agenda cannot be based on the air and playing “tricks” (who will inflate whom)-something more significant is needed. That's right: you need at least a partial coincidence of the interests of both states. And what does TG think about this? In his report “The Rising Russia and the Tasks of the United States” (2009), TG convinced us that American-Russian cooperation “should be built on the common interests and common threats”. Today, TG is radically changing his position, now he believes that “a strategist ... should treat talk about common interests as a basis for cooperation with skepticism. For the analysis of the so -called common interests shows the existence of serious differences in understanding problems and national interests (America and Russia), which creates obstacles for successful cooperation. ” Further, TG with specific examples shows how much the interests of Washington and Moscow diverge in those areas that are commonly called areas of “common interests”.
In connection with this recognition of TG, the question arises: what then does he propose to build his strategic dialogue? Maybe he proposes to continue the policy of mutual transactions, which Obama spent and to which TG himself called for a report already mentioned?
It is possible that until recently, TG really believed in the possibility of transactions policy. For in early 2012 in his interviews (ITAR-TASS, Business-gazeta.ru and “Voice of America”) he spoke of the “very positive evolution” of the Russian political system, about the “dialogue between the Russian government and the opposition”. He argued that "it will be the evolution of the system towards greater openness, greater pluralism, greater efficiency." Based on this understanding of “evolution”, TG believed that “there are no insurmountable obstacles” for “general strategic understanding, a common goal” (between Washington and Moscow). But in March-April 2012, on the pages of The American Interest, TG was forced to admit that “Putin’s return would put an end to transactions in American-Russian relations ... The problem is that all possible transactions between us have already been concluded ... compromises are becoming increasingly ghostly, especially in a situation of confidence, and Putin’s return will undermine the rest of the confidence, which is confident In recent years, it was possible to restore. ”
I will quote another conclusion of TG: “Putin’s return will only complicate the situation, for he symbolizes frank differences in the values, interests and views of the world that share Russia and the United States.”
How are American “strategists”, admitting that there are neither “common interests” nor a chance of transactions, can hope for successful strategic cooperation with the Kremlin?
I understand the fears of TG and its other American like -minded people associated with another approach - the inclusion of normative measurement in the foreign policy. “Strategists” proceed from the fact that Russia is difficult to understand and you cannot try to help reform what is difficult to understand. “Strategists” recall the unsuccessful experience of promoting the West of Democracy in Russia in the 90s. But I remind you: in the 90s. America and the West did not “promote” democracy in Russia - they supported Yeltsin and his rule, which had nothing to do with democracy. It turns out that to justify their neglect of the value measurement, “strategists” are trying to rewrite history.
TG loves to recall George Kennan with his warning that the "intimate processes of national life" are often incomprehensible to foreigners, "and foreign to these processes can do nothing but harm." To be honest: the very fact that 60 years after Kennan spoke these words, American experts cannot understand Russia, but at the same time they are trying to conduct a “strategic dialogue” with it, cannot but cause confusion.
If we are talking about the warning of Kennan “not to intervene”, then here I agree with Kennan - I agree. I believe that the old formula for “promoting democracy” by the West has long outlived itself and became counterproductive. When I am talking about a value measurement, I mean the need for the West to comply with the norms that the West itself preaches. Of course, it would be desirable for Russian society if the West thought about creating a foreign policy context that would be favorable for Russia's movement to freedom. Well, if the West is not ready for the latter, then we - Russian liberals - expect one from the West and America: do not bother us and do not legitimize the corruption Russian regime!
“Strategists” urge the West to return to the old mechanism of influence through exchange programs and contacts between business. Who is against it? Of course, you need to develop this exchange. Although the model of this “exchange” itself is very reminiscent of Soviet times. Let me quote the same George Kennan, whom our opponent loves. Thinking about the “cultural cooperation” between America and the USSR, Kennan warned: “Soviet politics in this area will be limited by rigidly controlled official visits with a predominance of vodka and nothing important speeches.” Trying to gradually isolate Russian society from the external world and, above all from America, the Kremlin returns to the formula of the “exchange” described by Kennan.
Let's think about two more things: why didn’t the exchange that TG calls for, prevented the increase in anti -Americanism in Russian society and why did the Obama policy, which included all the recommendations of the “strategists”, did not prevent the sharp cooling of relations between our countries? But the American administration conscientiously followed all TG advice with Kennan!
A few more reasoning that deserve attention, for other Western analysts are found. Here is the Council of TG “Strategists” to avoid supporting the Russian opposition, which is “marginal”. In response, I will say: I am sure that the Russian opposition does not need support for American "strategists" who are busy with their games with the Kremlin.
As for the concern of TG in that in Russia the number of people who “do not want them to be considered American agents or to be associated with marginal forces and victims of leaders”, then the situation is more complicated here. On the one hand, TG is right - the number of such people in Russia is significant. But the concern of TG as a leading American expert should also cause another phenomenon - the growth of the part of the population that is dissatisfied with the Russian power and which critically refers to the West and, above all, to America, believing that the West has become part of the corruption machine created by the Kremlin. TG should have been worried about the fact that Russian Westerners began to critically relate to America.
As for the “Act of Magnitsky”, the arguments that TG puts forward against this act coincide with the arguments of the Kremlin propagandists. The act is not at all “is a false signal for the rule of law for Russians,” as TG believes. Quite the contrary, those Russians who know about this act believe that America finally showed that the principle of the rule of law is not entirely indifferent to her. As for the argument that “the Russians will try to use this act to gain advantages over their commercial competitors,” I think, I think, if I say that we are more concerned about in Russia - how Russian and American companies use their proximity to the Kremlin to promote their interests. We are outraged by how Rosneft and Eksson Mobile (not without the help of influential intermediaries) legitimized the theft of Rosneft of assets in Khodorkovsky. But I say that TG probably knows better than me.
But in general, the “Act of Magnitsky”, against which TG is opposed, aims at the reorganization of American society and the creation of barriers to the Kremlin export of corruption. I repeat: this act is more needed in America - and not for us in Russia!
TG finally calls for a “strategic dialogue at the highest level in order to determine whether America and Russia have reliable grounds for“ long -term cooperation ”. But do you really need additional efforts to make the obvious clear: this dialogue will end the same as the previous ones. Maybe the new Potemkin village is needed so that experts and politicians in both countries, which, in addition to creating imitation, do not know how to do anything else, retain their work and receive new grants?
No, we do not urge Washington not to cooperate with Moscow. We prove that the tactical dialogue on issues in which both states are interested cannot be called what it is not.
We understand that the conversation about values will complicate Washington’s relationship with the Kremlin. However, these relationships will be uncomfortable. But in the case of turning to normative measurement, America will win in one - it will return the trust and respect for itself as the pro -Western part of Russian society. And it is not necessary to assume that suicides are sitting in the Kremlin, who, if the West refuses political massage and connivance, will certainly return to the Cold War. There are still pragmatists in the Kremlin who are not ready to turn Russia into North Korea - what then will become with their property in Miami?
“Strategic dialogue” may end with defeat, admits at the end of TG. But at the same time, it calms the American audience: "Such a result will not become a tragedy if the failure helps to promote American interests."
You can thank TG for sincerity, which is better than deceptive rhetoric. It is unlikely, however, the Kremlin will like the role of the conductor in the implementation of American interests. And certainly Russian Westerners will not like this role. It can be expected that they will do everything so as not to become an instrument in the implementation of Washington's interests.
And the last: why are American experts are still not ready to reflect on foreign policy, which would simultaneously take into account American interests and was built on a deeper sense of Russian realities, on a delicate attitude to Russian society, which is so painfully looking for its way from a historical impasse? After all, the Kremlin Russia, with which they want to build their “strategic dialogue”, is not all of Russia yet.