Translated material
Indifferent Obama
Around Russia
Indifferent Obama
April 30, 2013 Fedor Lukyanov
The dispute that the primary in foreign policy - values or interests belongs to the category of eternal. It is especially aggravated in transitional eras, when it is not clear which line of behavior in the international arena should be followed. None of the approaches in its pure form does not work, and a hot discussion begins about who betrayed the ideals, and who, on the contrary, missed the possibilities due to ideological blindness. It is clear that in the polemic enthusiasm, the positions are sharpened, and the point of view of the opponent is eagerly at a linear scheme. The latter is characteristic of many polemists, but to a greater extent to those who defend a value approach - awareness of moral correctness always gives strength. The reality, however, is such that just linear schemes today are least capable of explaining what is happening in a randomly and unpredictably developing world.
It is not clear why these basic concepts - values and interests - are contrasted. In genuine policy, they are inextricably linked, since the formulation of interests is not a kind of abstract exercise, but a comprehension of what is happening around, based on cultural and ideological representations inherent in this policy or group. In other words, value baggage just determines how interests are perceived.
I think that no one has doubts that no country pursues foreign policy based on altruistic considerations, only in order to expand the sphere of spread of any system of views. Exceptions are, but they are extremely rare and short -term and related to revolutionary periods when fanatical representatives of a particular ideology come to power. For example, the Bolsheviks at the very early stage of the existence of Soviet Russia or supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini immediately after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. But very soon, the ideological pathos in foreign policy is replaced by the persecution of pragmatic interests, even if the country continues to be guided by radical views inside.
From the United States, they always expect special attention to values, since both politics and American statehood itself, since its foundation, relies on a powerful ideological, value foundation. The United States is an ideological community that arose not on an ethnic basis, like most modern national states, but on the basis of certain ideas, which were obviously perceived as more progressive than the rest. This determines the missionary mood of the United States, their confidence that they have the right to evaluate the course of other peoples and states in the categories "correct - wrong." However, such an approach does not mean at all that in its actions on the world arena, America was guided only by value categories, on the contrary, the United States invariably pursues a pragmatic, “real” policy aimed at achieving the necessary results for national development.
Modern discussions about values and interests reflect the fact that very many are still under the charm of the Cold War - an extremely interesting and important period in the history of international relations. The constant desire to project the then approaches to today's situation are caused, first of all, by the fact that the confrontation of the 1940s and 1980s gave rise to a very simple and logical system of world interaction, which, being very dangerous and tough, did not require politicians of special intellectual stress. The rules and models of behavior were predetermined by the presence of a double confrontation-military-strategic (nuclear deterrence) and ideological (the struggle of the “socialist camp” against the “free world”). Compared to today's multilayer international situation, in which there are no clear rules, nor constant unions, nor ideological harmony, that era looks just a model of orderliness, which even causes a kind of nostalgia.
The uniqueness of the Cold War is that ideology and geopolitics are intertwined in the most closely, there were no contradictions between them. This has not been previous for several centuries (since the emergence of national states in Europe and the transformation of religious wars into interstate conflicts), and, most likely, there will be no. But the experience of the Cold War is so bright that many and now dream of reproducing it. This, however, is unrealistic. The organic coincidence of the military-political and value component was possible in a situation where ideologies were part of the global coordinate system, and ideological orientation merged with military and economic power into a single fist that opposes the rival fist from the same components.
With the end of the Cold War, ideology has ceased to serve as a criterion for the structure of the world, the previous constructed design began to creep in all directions. The claim to the versatility of certain values (liberal) came across a rapidly increasing diversification of global policy, the emancipation of states, which were previously connected by block discipline - formal or informal. And the widespread dissemination of democratic procedures showed that in societies of another culture or level of development, their filling can be completely different. And the attempts of their power imposition, which were taken at the beginning of the Cix, led to the wrong result that they counted on the basis of the experience of the Cold War and the victory over communism.
Barack Obama is accused of that, carried away by “reboots” with the Kremlin, he abandoned the value approach and seeks to conclude transactions, turning a blind eye to the state of democracy and human rights in Russia. In this, some see weakness, others - stupidity and naivety. However, if you try to impartly assess the attitude of the current White House to Moscow, it is easy to conclude that its main component is indifference. Slightly exaggerating, we can say that Obama is the same as happening in Russia. Being realists, he and his comrades -in -arms understand that Russia will never be able to carry the threat that the Neval Union to be carried again - it is multiplying, and the tendency is reducing. At the same time, Russia is too great and peculiar that Washington has a realistic hope to transform it in a western benefit for the West. If Moscow once comes to the conclusion about the need for strategic rapprochement with the West, then only under the influence of objective economic and geopolitical circumstances, but not as a result of pressure from Washington or Brussels. At the same time, Russia in the present and in the future, even if its significant strengthening does not occur, will retain - at least due to its geographical position and remaining levers - the ability to influence processes and territories representing life interest for the United States.
Purely instrumental tactics follow from this. Russia is needed in order for America to solve some very specific problems. In fact, the agenda was reduced to interaction over local conflicts - Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, possibly the DPRK. All this is a classic diplomatic work of the type, as a hundred, fifty years ago will always be conducted. And all. Today's Washington has no other plans for Russia and, I risk saying, cannot be. America is now not in the state to engage in grandiose searchlights of the world reorganization or even individual states - the disappointing results of recent attempts can be seen throughout the Middle East. And if it is only about achieving a limited number of specific results - the American tradition of cooperation with regimes that is infinitely far from the system of values of the United States is more than rich.
For some reason, critics of Obama proceed from the fact that America should do something to change the situation in Russia. Such an assumption would have any reason if Russia, as the USSR, was perceived as a source of a very large threat. But since this is not and will not, the Freedom for the sake of freedom will not become a torchlorer, there is simply no need. In the Cold War, values were one of the elements of the arsenal of an acute confrontation, but when it stopped, it is no longer necessary to use them as a weapon.
There is one scenario in which value self -identification can again serve as the basis for the consolidation of the political West on a new basis. It is quite obvious that the main field of confrontation inxxi will be the economy, and not the field of military battle. Over the past couple of years, Washington has nominated two initiatives, which, if successful, can change the global landscape. This is the idea of a transistochean partnership (free trade zone of the United States and its partners in Asia) and the transatlantic free trade zone (North America Plus the European Union). It is clear that the main "addressee" is China, the growth of which is concerned for everyone. Such a megobivision may well dictate the PRC of the rules of conduct in the markets, namely the ability to impose economic rules of the game is today the key to dominance.
So, Western values can again become the ideological basis of such a project as a specific marker of belonging to the club. Then, Russia will faced a truly difficult question-how to behave and which of the new “poles” to join, because in order to maneuver with benefit for themselves against the backdrop of a similar confrontation between giants, Moscow simply cannot have enough weight and resources. But these are objective economic processes that will take place regardless of whether the US administration will stigmatize Russia's rolling to authoritarianism or not.