Afghan Kremlin map

On May 28, at an informal CSTO summit in Bishkek, Vladimir Putin reminded the audience: in 2014, the international contingent is leaving Afghanistan, you need to be prepared for different scenarios. How is it?

Earlier, at a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on May 8, Putin announced Russia's readiness to intervene more actively in the "Afghan issue." And even then, some doubts arose about this intention.

Can the thesis that was voiced about “the Afghan army and police being unprepared to confront challenges and threats from the armed opposition and drug cartels” be considered news? Hardly. Is Moscow's promise to conduct "constant monitoring" of the situation in Afghanistan, "to provide the Kabul government with 'all-round assistance' in the fight against terrorism and the drug threat" new? Also somehow not very much. And the Kremlin's intentions to act in the Kabul direction are exclusively reactive, in "real time mode" - how is this to be understood? Not in the sense that the Russian authorities, unlike the leadership of the United States and NATO, are not going to model the situation in Afghanistan, but to adapt to it.

Well, if there is no news, then what is the whole Afghan agenda for right now?

There is a feeling that, emphasizing the Afghan threats, the Kremlin actually keeps in mind, first of all, the situation in Central Asia. By raising or lowering (which is less common) the information register in the Afghan score, the Kremlin sends signals to the Central Asian capitals: Russia is on the alert, it will not be possible to get out of control, follow the “general line”.

It is no coincidence that Putin's harsh theses about the inevitability of a deterioration in the situation in the IRA after 2014 were voiced immediately after the international forum on the Afghan problem in Astana, where President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev said literally the following: catastrophic forecasts for Afghanistan, to put it mildly, are greatly exaggerated. As you can see, Nazarbayev's perception of the Afghan situation differs sharply from Putin's.

Today, Moscow not only opposes Nazarbayev's "Afghan" line, but also sends a signal to Central Asian leaders on how exactly the regional political process should be perceived after 2014. More precisely, they should prepare for the strengthening of Russian influence in Central Asia, which will take place under the flag of countering the challenges and threats from Afghanistan.

Whose approach - Putin or Nazarbayev - to the assessment of the Afghan situation (and, consequently, to the prospects for strengthening Russian influence in the region) will be more attractive for Dushanbe, Bishkek, Tashkent and Ashgabat, apparently, the near future will show. But one way or another, a new geopolitical intrigue is evident.