The growth of the Russian economy has practically stopped. What can be done in this situation?

Here's an oil painting for those who don't look at macroeconomic statistics too often. GDP growth slowed from 3-4% in 2011-2012 to 1.6%. Industry, which added 4.7% back in 2011, has stopped growing altogether. Industrial production fell in May, but has been stagnating for six months now.

also does not rise above zero The dynamics of investment activity .

It could have been worse: companies finance more than half of their investments at their own expense, and profits in the first quarter fell by 29.1%.

Growth in construction has also stopped, and the decline is accelerating. Rail freight transportation (a good indicator of the state of the industry) in January-April was 4.1% lower than a year earlier. The decline in exports that began last spring accelerated to 4.2%.

By inertia, only growth in the consumer segment remains: retail trade added 3.9%, household income - 5.9%. And in housing construction, growth doubled compared to last year: to 11.2%. But Rosstat does not monitor current construction, but the commissioning of houses. This indicator characterizes the optimism of developers in the past.

Although the economy is currently stagnating, by the end of the year its growth may be about 2%. This is a statistical phenomenon: at the beginning of 2012, the dynamics were quite good, but towards the end they slowed down. Therefore, comparing indicators with last year’s in the second half of the year will “automatically” give higher figures than now. But this is no reason to rejoice. An increase of 2-2.5% can satisfy developed countries where a comfortable infrastructure for living has already been built. We don't have it.

Causes . External sabotage was not needed to stop the Russian economy. The two most important conditions for our development - the price of raw materials and credit resources - have not undergone radical changes recently.

Yes, prices for key Russian export goods are falling and demand is falling. But the decline is very smooth, and not a landslide, as in 2008-2009. Since the beginning of the year, oil has been about 7% cheaper than a year earlier; the situation with metals is slightly worse. The slow decline in world commodity prices began in the summer of 2011, after rapid growth in 2009 – early 2011, which helped our economy quickly emerge from the crisis.

Yes, the US Federal Reserve is going to end the stage of stimulating the economy with soft monetary policy. There will be less liquidity, credit will become more expensive, and commodities will become cheaper. But all this has not happened yet. The Fed's exit from the quantitative easing program is scheduled to begin in the fall.

A slight decline in demand and world prices for raw materials was enough to stop Russian economic growth.

The Russian authorities did everything else with their own hands. The words about the exhaustion of the old growth model, repeated for a long time by the economists who prepared the “Strategy 2020” and fairly tired of politicians, have become an undeniable, tangible reality.

Problem . But is it worth worrying? The current global economic crisis, which has been going on for almost 6 years, is gradually “beginning to end.” Maybe a new round of global economic growth will lead to a rise in commodity prices, as was the case in the fat 2000s? Oil and gas fortune has smiled at Putin so many times, why not give him another smile: oil at $120-150 per barrel?

Of course, this would revive our economy. But we can’t count on such a scenario in the near future. Indeed, this time the long economic crisis was not accompanied by a protracted decline in prices for raw materials. Most commodity prices (except, perhaps, ferrous metals, nickel and sugar) are now very high. Further, the post-crisis recovery begins in the homeland of the crisis - the United States, where oil and gas production has sharply increased in recent years . This will curb price increases in the long term.

Russian authorities are aware of the problem. The economic stimulus program has been discussed for several months and may be announced in the coming weeks. But of the several measures discussed, only one is useful. This is what is being discussed.

1. Devaluation . Finance Minister Anton Siluanov's careless statement that a weakening ruble would help the economy has already caused anxiety in the markets. Over the past 3 weeks, the euro has risen in price against the ruble by 2 rubles, and the dollar by 60 kopecks. Verbal interventions by officials and increased purchases of foreign currency by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance could easily weaken the ruble exchange rate by 5%. This depreciation is what Siluanov had in mind . It will give little to the economy: it will slightly increase the profits of exporters and budget revenues. The losers are companies servicing foreign currency loans.

A decrease in the exchange rate to 43-44 rubles per euro and 32.5-33 rubles per dollar could have occurred without verbal interventions, due to objective factors: commodity prices and exports are declining; the Russian economy is on the verge of recession; Our inflation is higher than in Europe and the USA. In January-May, the real exchange rate of the ruble against the dollar was 3.7%, and against the euro - 2.8% higher than a year earlier. The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate of the ruble does not keep pace with the difference in inflation rates. So there is nothing wrong with a slight weakening of the ruble.

But why do this artificially?

After all, the weakening of the ruble has no less disadvantages than advantages: an increase in the already huge outflow of capital, a decrease in investment, investment imports and foreign loans.

The reaction of the market and the population to words about a possible devaluation once again demonstrated that everyone is prepared for the worst and does not listen to subsequent denials from officials. It seems that the population would not be surprised at the exchange rate of 34-35 rubles/$1 in the fall.

Such a fall in the ruble would reduce imports and sharply increase profits for exporters. But there are no objective reasons for it yet. If officials, trying to “lighten” the ruble, try to significantly increase the purchase of foreign currency entering the country, then the rubles issued to the market will spur inflation. Then the real exchange rate of the ruble will rise again, and the goal of spurring economic growth through devaluation will not be achieved.

2. Easing monetary policy. It would seem that the Central Bank has many means at its disposal to spur economic growth. He can lower interest rates, increase lending to banks, reduce their contributions to reserves, and even (this has been actively discussed in recent days) set them “indicative rates” for loans to the real sector.

Interest rates will probably have to be reduced, despite the growth of the annual inflation index from 5-6% to 7-7.2%: the economy is slowing down too sharply. But due to rising prices, the Central Bank will not be able to significantly reduce rates. The very high refinancing rate - 8.25% - is mainly of administrative significance. And the rates at which the Central Bank actually provides liquidity have recently been reduced to the inflation level and below (5.5-7%). In June, the Central Bank lowered rates on the longest loans.

Give banks money at almost zero interest rates, like the Fed and the Bank of Japan? This, given the dominance of state banks, will only lead to an increase in defaults, non-targeted loans and mass imprisonment of state managers. So, a further reduction in rates is determined by the extent to which officials will be able to appease the tariff appetites of Gazprom, power engineers and Russian Railways, since the increase in tariffs “provides” more than half of Russian inflation.

The Central Bank is almost unable to apply other measures. The state of the banking system is not good: banks have had “bad” loans since 2008, which are extended, restructured and transferred to the balance sheet of subsidiaries in order to improve bank reporting. And new problem loans issued according to the order - like in Sochi. Banks can sharply increase lending only at the cost of deteriorating the quality of the loan portfolio. The mechanism for rescuing large banks in Russia, unlike the United States and Europe, has not even begun to be thought through. In such conditions, giving the Central Bank (like the Fed) a mandate to maintain economic growth is a very bad idea. She seems to have been rejected. Why does the Kremlin need many Moscow banks that need to be saved?

The situation with loans is quite strange. Lending to citizens is growing quite well . Between April 2012 and March 2013, ruble loans increased by almost 40%. Loans to non-financial enterprises, on the contrary, are growing very weakly: by 15.8%. But it is impossible to rejoice at the growth of loans to individuals: the average weighted rates on them are 15-30%.

This is irrational behavior.

On the contrary, enterprises take out loans extremely carefully, although their average weighted rates are 11-12%. Very reasonable: the economy is slowing, and loans that cost more than the return on revenue can be dangerous. And profitability, according to calculations by the Development Center (HSE), does not exceed 9-10%. Banks need to think about reducing their high margins by the standards of developed countries (long-term liabilities in our country cost 6-8%). This is hampered by the rising costs of complying with regulatory requirements.

3. State investments . Officials dream of investing accumulated petrodollars, pension savings and VEB funds in infrastructure projects (energy, transport and housing and communal services). This will not increase budget expenses. Industry subsidies, increasing state guarantees for exporters and slowing the growth of monopoly tariffs are being discussed - the most reasonable of the anti-crisis measures.

Increased government investment is a recipe that Russian politicians have been following for many years. It did not lead to success. Among the projects proposed by the Ministry of Economic Development, there are many politically motivated ones, such as the Moscow-Kazan high-speed railway, notes Director of the Development Center Natalya Akindinova. The Ministry of Finance, of course, is against it . Such projects provide a short-term surge in economic activity and a long trail of investigations by the Accounts Chamber, the Prosecutor's Office and the Investigative Committee. It's time to look for other options.

What is not discussed . The surprise is not that growth in the Russian economy has stopped, but that this did not happen earlier. The state has done everything possible for this over the past 10 years. Completely corrupted the law enforcement and judicial systems. Increased regular taxes and the corruption “tax.” In some industries it nationalized attractive assets, while in others, on the contrary, it sold lucrative enterprises to friends and acquaintances of the country's leading politicians. Competition has not only been banished from politics, it has also been banished from economics. Small players are free to bite each other, but rising a little higher, they inevitably offend the interests of some influential character.

The only thing that saves you is friendship with an even stronger player.

The social and infrastructure sectors have not become more efficient, but they do absorb a lot more money. The rapid increase in wages for customs officers, police officers and other public sector employees is forcing the private sector to “catch up” with them. Unit labor costs are growing by 5% per year in dollar terms: dollar wages are outpacing labor productivity growth in most sectors of the economy, estimates Valery Mironov from the HSE Development Center. In most competitor countries they are falling.

Another factor depending on the state is the continuous increase in the number of people engaged in unproductive labor. Soon there will be men at stations who will inspect passengers on long-distance trains. In terms of the number of security guards per capita, we seem to have surpassed everyone else. Business losses due to control and supervisory activities of government agencies and the annual costs for them exceed 1.5% of GDP, calculated Svetlana Avdasheva and Polina Kryuchkova (HSE).

What the state has messed up, it is fully capable of correcting. Cancel widespread persecution against small businesses - owners of stalls and kiosks. Stop considering them enemies who drink and smoke people. Reduce social contributions. Or don’t be surprised that since November 2012 the number of individual entrepreneurs in the country has decreased by 459,000 (11.1%). In Buryatia, every fourth person (26.4%) canceled their registration, and in the Kirov (shout out to Navalny) and Bryansk regions, Chuvashia and Udmurtia - almost every fourth (18.8-19.9%). Even Tataria lost 16.6% of IP.

All this is not only about the business climate. The problem is broader. The vertical of power creates such an atmosphere in the country that only desperate daredevils or friends of officials can do business in it. You need to see social polls behind the declining macroeconomic indicators: Russians categorically do not want to do business. And this is a completely rational position: a state-owned company is more reliable and richer. But then where does GDP grow from? By and large, officials have two options for anti-crisis policy. Either wait until raw materials become more expensive again, or try to make the country suitable for business.

Alternatives to devaluation: how to restart the Russian economy