Translated material
Entertaining advice
What depends on the country's image
About why the image of the Russian state, despite tens of millions of dollars invested in PR, leaves much to be desired-The New Times asked Angus Roxboro, who served in the Ketchum PR-consulting Kremlin for several years
In 2013, just a year after the Premiere, the new edition of your book “Iron Putin: the View from the West” was published (The Strongman; Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia): you added a large chapter and wrote a new conclusion. Why did it take this? What has happened in Russian political life during this period?
In the 2012 publication, I wrote that the possibilities of the West to influence the domestic Russian policy are limited, and therefore it is better not to intervene. However, only a few months later I could not restrain myself and violated my own rule-I published an open letter to Dmitry Peskov, advising him to take advantage of the appointment (after May 6, 2012-The New Times) to the post of presidential spokesman to achieve the abolition of any political censorship, especially on TV. As expected, Peskov was furious. A lesson from this is this: the more we are trying to read notations in the West, the less he is inclined to listen to us.
In the new chapter, I say that the changes (in Russia) will certainly come, but from the inside of the power structures, and not from street leaders, like Navalny, and certainly not from the west. In Russian politics, this always happened. Western pressure is dictated by good intentions, but usually it has a result in the desired. For example, I fully support those who seek the killers of Sergei Magnitsky to appear before court. However, the American "Magnitsky Law", in my opinion, makes no sense. His only goal was to prick the Kremlin who did not come up with a better answer on how to prohibit the adoption of Russian children with Americans, while Magnitsky killers are still free. Of course, the West must criticize human rights violations (without forgetting, however, at the same time about its own shortcomings), but sanctions, punishments and teachings invariably lead to the opposite effect.
In an appeal to the 2003 parliament, President Putin called the European integration of Russia a “historical choice”. Ten years later, presidential vocabulary has changed exactly the opposite: the liberal values of Europe are “asexual and barren”, and Russia is a stronghold of forces opposing “dark (European) chaos”.
Perhaps Putin was really more liberal than ten years ago. Western politicians who dealt with him argued that, despite the authoritarian manners that had already appeared at that time (the closure of the media critically related to it, the Khodorkovsky case), Putin nevertheless considered Russia a part of the West or, at least, considered the West as an ally sharing its basic values. And he made gestures many times, which, according to his representation, were supposed to encourage the West to accept Russia as an equal partner. But the Western leaders were not very in a hurry. The authoritarianism of the Kremlin was increasingly alarming the West, strengthened the critical attitude towards Russia and led to the adoption of measures that Putin considered to be directed against Russia (expansion of NATO, flirting with Ukraine and Georgia, the development of a air defense system in Eastern Europe). As a result, Putin felt rejected, began to look for a way to defend himself and chose a strategy of self -isolation. A vicious circle formed: the more the West was indignant at Putin’s actions, the more Putin was offended and acted even sharper. Instead of trying to find points of contact with the West and the Russian intellectual class, he apparently came to the conclusion that his support is conservative forces, that is, the church, special services and politically not too sophisticated masses that are not doing to Western values.
And does it not surprise you?
By no means. Most Russian citizens are annoying permanent Western moralizing and shouting. Of course, they would have seen a different picture if the Russian media talked about a situation that is in reality. That's why I decided to give advice to Peskov about the need to ensure freedom of television. Okay, I admit: I should not teach him ... But I just hope that someday people will come to the Kremlin who will understand: an absolute condition for the formation of democracy is a free press, not limited by any censorship. State media should not exist in a democratic society.
From your book, it seems to me that the conclusion follows: no PR technologies and no appropriations will change the country's image abroad if reality does not change in this country. Do they understand this in the Kremlin?
At first, the Kremlin hoped that Ketchum would pay newspapers to print positive materials about Russia. We told them: such things are not done in the West. They also wanted us to put pressure on journalists, prompting them to “improve the interview” or “correctly” to illuminate officials of officials. But I do not know a single case that someone in Ketchum tried to do something like that. We all understood that Western journalists simply pointed to the door to our door. And they would do the right thing! We made reports for our Russian customers relating to the strategy of further work, where we urgently emphasized: twisting of nuts and an attack on human rights have a destructive effect on ideas about Russia. Moreover, if Ketchum bosses, accustomed to cherishing the Ego of their customers, tried to avoid criticism of them, then I insisted: hiding the truth that people think about the actions of the Russian authorities is pointless. And gradually our reports and recommendations became quite frank and tough. By the way, Peskov did not object to this at all, on the contrary, he seemed to welcome such an approach. We must pay tribute to him, he, I think, understood: the knowledge of complete, unlawed truth about what is being said about the Russian government in the West, in fact, only helps her. Perhaps they thus received the fact that their embassies abroad did not dare to inform them ...
In the title of your book is the English word Strongman, "imperious person." Many dictionaries consider it a synonym for the word "dictator". Or in this case, you would not agree with such a translation?
“Strong hand” or “authoritarian ruler” - perhaps it would be more accurate. I am very annoyed by those Western observers who depict the case as if current Russia are practically no different from the USSR. Of course, it is different! People have access to news and points of view from different sources, which means that Putin will never be able to become a full -fledged dictator. Although, I must admit, he managed to wrap the nuts surprisingly strongly. Inside the system, obviously, there are people who would be happy to liberalize it. However, as was evident from Medvedev’s timid attempts, they do not have enough strength to set the tone or even create a liberal fraction within the leadership. So, at least, it was still.
If you knew from the very beginning why the Kremlin policy would develop, would you accept the proposal to work its PR consultant?
I must admit that I guessed where it was going. But I had an illusion that I could somehow influence them. And yet I managed to clearly bring my opinion to them: the problem is not how their “Message” would be presented, but in the essence of their policy. It was obvious to me that some big gesture-for example, the liberation of Khodorkovsky-would make a great impression on the West, almost the same as at one time the return of Sakharov from Gorbachev from exile. I advised them to do it. But, of course, my advice could not really influence decision -making. And in the end, it was the ongoing twisting of the nuts that convinced me: “Improving the image of Russia abroad”, in fact, was not at all the main thing for the Kremlin ...
PS When the text of this interview was already prepared for printing, it became known about the decision made by Vladimir Putin to have mercy on Mikhail Khodorkovsky. “Probably, Putin has already read my interview,” Angus Roxborough joked about this.
With whom Russia scolded in 2013
1. With the United States-due to the decision to provide temporary asylum Edward Snowden
On June 23, the 28-year-old ex-CIA employee Edward Snowden flew to Moscow from Hong Kong, publicized the methods of the American National Security Agency (NSA) to collect information, including total Internet control. Washington demanded the issuance of a fugitive, but on August 1, Russia provided him with a “temporary asylum”. Discharged by the decision of Moscow, US President Barack Obama canceled a bilateral meeting with Vladimir Putin in early September in Moscow. However, at the G20 summit in St. Petersburg, on September 5–6, Putin and Obama managed to talk right during the plenary meeting for about half an hour. Nevertheless, experts came to the conclusion that the relations of Russia and the USA are at the lowest point from the end of the Cold War. These fears were reinforced by the news that came from Vishinton on December 18: US President Barack Obama, the first lady and vice president Joseph Biden will not come to the opening of the Winter Olympiad in Sochi.
2. With the Netherlands-because of the Arctic Sunrise
On October 15, in Moscow, the 60-year-old deputy of the Netherlands Apno Elderenbosh was beaten in their own apartment. In diplomatic circles, this attack was regarded as a “symmetrical answer” of the Russian intelligence services for the detention of the Russian adviser-USEP of the Russian Embassy Dmitry Borodin on October 5 in the Hague. The “Embassy War” finally ruined the relations between Moscow and Amsterdam, which worsened after Holland filed a lawsuit against the International Marine Tribunal (Hamburg Tribunal) for the illegal actions of the Russian authorities who detained the Arctic Sunrise icebreaker with the Greenpeace Overlands on board on the Pechora Sea. The icebreaker walks under the Dutch flag and is assigned to the port of Amsterdam. The tension somewhat softened the November visit of the Dutch royal couple to Moscow - to close the "cross" years of Russia in the Netherlands and the Netherlands in Russia. But - not for long. On November 22, the Hamburg Tribunal demanded from Russia to free Arctic Sunrise, Moscow refused to fulfill the verdict, saying that it did not recognize the jurisdiction of the tribunal in this matter.
3. With Saudi Arabia-because of the war in Syria
On June 27, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexander Lukashevich, accused Saudi Arabia of financing international terrorists in Syria. The statement sounded in response to the statement of the head of the Saudi Foreign Ministry of Prince Saud al-Faisal, who accused Russia of "unlimited military support for mass murders in Syria." The Syrian theme was once again raised at the unofficial meeting of the head of the National Security Council (SNB) of Saudi Arabia Prince Bandar Bin Sultan and Vladimir Putin in early August in Moscow. According to leaks, the Saudi guest unequivocally invited Moscow to refuse to support the regime of Bashar al -Assad. In return, Riyadh is ready to develop an oil production strategy together with Moscow, which will forever insure Russia from sharp differences in oil prices in the world market. In addition, Russia, even in the event of a fall in Assad, will retain the base of its Navy in the Syrian port of Tartus, the Saudovets promised. Otherwise, there will be no end to the war in Syria, and Russia will be difficult to ensure the safety of the Olympics in Sochi, given that many Chechens are fighting in Syria with Assad.
The inconsistency of Moscow, and most importantly, the refusal of the US and the EU in Syria on the side of the opposition disappointed Er-Riyad: on October 18, Saudi Arabia announced the abandonment of the UN Council of Security Council due to its rotation, due to the fact that this body is "not able to end wars and resolve conflicts."