Stalin's change

The date of January 27, 1944 as the day of the final removal of the blockade of Leningrad was chosen with a share of convention. It is officially believed that on this day all the communications connecting the city with large land were liberated. But in fact, the October railway was cleaned of the Germans only on January 29. And even on January 21, when the success of the Soviet troops became obvious during the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, the commander of the Leningrad Front, Army General Leonid Govorov and a member of the military council of the front, the head of the Leningrad Communists Andrei Zhdanov turned to Stalin with the next message:

*In connection with the complete liberation of the city of Leningrad from the enemy blockade and from the enemy artillery shelling, we ask us to resolve:

1. To publish and publish on this subject an order of the front troops.

2. In honor of the victory won in Leningrad on January 27, a s/g at 20.00 p.m. Salyut with twenty -four artillery volleys of three hundred twenty -four guns.*

Stalin satisfied the request, and on January 27, a salute was made in Leningrad in commemoration of the final liberation of the city from the blockade. It can be assumed that Zhdanov came up with a date on January 27. The fact is that on January 26, the 20th anniversary of the renaming of Petrograd in Leningrad was celebrated, and Andrei Alexandrovich probably decided to make two significant dates to his neighbors.

The day of removing the blockade is primarily the day of folk sorrow, the day of commemoration of millions of dead civilians and soldiers. But the current anniversary was the reason for pompous celebrations, fake historical reconstructions and a powerful military parade, during which not only museum T-34, but also modern military equipment were demonstrated, including the Iskanders, which Putin scares European inhabitants. Moreover, the celebrations overshadowed a dispute between the city and regional officials regarding the installation of the monument to the defenders of the Nevsky Pigletka. City deputies erected a monument without coordinating the regional authorities, and the monument dismantled the monument just before the anniversary, but, then (probably, on command from Moscow), returned the monument to its former place. And regarding this shameful bureaucratic battle, there was no explosion of passions and angry statements, similar to the fact that they accompanied the transfer of a "bronze soldier" in Estonia.

President Putin, in connection with the anniversary, was concerned about the question of what to better name the day of the departure of the blockade: in his opinion, the current name is “the day of the full liberation of the Soviet troops of Leningrad from the fascist blockade” - “emerges” the contribution of the civilian population to this victory. Although, of course, only the Red Army soldiers, and not civilians, could remove the blockade. Is this the most important problem?

Of course, Vladimir Vladimirovich remembered 125 blockade grams, and he honored the memory of the young brother who died in the blockade. That's just that the number of victims of the blockade has already been considered accurately, the president is wrong. Until now, estimates range from 600 thousand to more than a million people, since the accounting of the dead was far from full. In addition, many of the evacuated died in the first weeks after evacuation, already on the Great Earth. And the number of Red Army soldiers and Red Flots who died during the defense of Leningrad and attempts to break through the blockade from the outside were still unable to count even approximately. It is only clear that the score goes to millions.

But the Rain TV channel revealed the real problem when he tried to conduct a survey on " Was it necessary to pass Leningrad in order to save hundreds of thousands of lives? " And he himself, frightened by either the reactions of bloggers, or, or rather, the discontent of the Kremlin, soon announced the very formulation of the question by a mistake and even apologized for it, deleting a survey from the site. Meanwhile, a variety of opinions are expressed on this subject. Well, I want to express my point of view.

When asked whether it made sense to surrender Leningrad, theoretically it can be answered in the affirmative. If, after the Germans broke through the Luga defensive line in mid -August 1941, when the surroundings of Leningrad became real (the Germans did not assume it with storming, fearing large, by their standards, losses), Stalin decided to leave the city, at the same time evacuating at least part of the inhabitants and industry, this would benefit the Red Army and Leningraders. Before the blockade ring was closed, there were more than three weeks left, and evacuation could be carried out and the withdrawal of troops was carried out in a relative order. If we distract from the moral impact of the fall of Leningrad (and it would be significant), purely militarily, the abandonment of Leningrad would give undoubted benefits for the Red Army, would reduce the Soviet military losses, as well as the loss of Leningraders.

The Germans partially evacuated the population of the Leningrad suburbs seized by them in the Baltic states (and not only disabled, but also the elderly and children; I have been talking in Estonia and Latvia with the descendants of these evacuated) and thereby saved them from starvation; Those whom they did not have time to evacuate were dying in the same way as in the besieged Leningrad. Of course, the Germans could not evacuate the entire population of Leningrad. He would have expected the fate of the inhabitants of other large Soviet cities captured by the Germans, for example, Kyiv or Kharkov. Those who were lucky enough to get a job would receive a meager, but ration. Some of the inhabitants would be evacuated to the Baltic states and, possibly, to Belarus, referring to their use primarily in agriculture, as well as sending to the Reich to work in industry. Otherwise, it would be left to either go to the countryside or starve. All Jews who did not manage to evacuate or escape from Leningrad would undoubtedly be exterminated. As for the rest of the population, in the conditions of the German occupation, hundreds of thousands of Leningraders would probably have died of hunger and repression, but there would still be less dead than in real conditions of the blockade.

As for the purely military aspect, those Soviet troops that turned out to be ground during the blockade and in attempts to break through it from the outside could be much more efficient to use the front in other sections of the front. Soviet losses when trying to break through the blockade, on the Nevsky Piglet or Sinyavinsky heights were almost maximum for the war. Of course, in the case of leaving Leningrad, the Baltic Fleet would have died. Most likely, the ships would be blown up, and some of the guns would be removed from them and used on land. But even if all the ships and submarines of the Baltic Fleet fell into the hands of the Germans, this would not at all affect the outcome of the war: the Germans could not use them.

The industry of Leningrad in the war was almost exclusively repairing military equipment and weapons. In addition, if Leningrad were left in a planned manner, even more equipment and workers would be evacuated, which would increase the production of weapons and equipment in the Urals and other regions of the East of the country. So, I repeat, if we distract from the moral factor, which is difficult to evaluate, purely militarily leaving Leningrad in early September 41 would reduce our losses and, in all likelihood, albeit a little, but would bring victory closer. Moreover, the surrender of Leningrad would lead to the actual exit from the war of Finland and liberated part of the forces that, in the real conditions of the war, had to keep the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus.

But all this, of course, is only a theory. In practice, Stalin, based primarily from the moral factor - the symbolic significance of Leningrad and the negative impact of its loss on the fighting spirit of the army and the people - was not going to take Leningrad in August - September, including because he underestimated the seriousness of the situation in which the Red Army was. For the same reason, he just refused to hand over Kyiv at that time, which led to the disaster of the Southwestern Front.

Stalin’s position against Leningrad changed after the main forces of the three fronts covering Moscow were destroyed in October, and the threat of the fall of the capital was created. As I already had to write , on October 23, Stalin demanded from the leadership of the Leningrad Front:

If you do not break the front over the next few days and do not restore a strong connection with the 54th Army, which connects you with the rear of the country, all your troops will be captured. The restoration of this connection is necessary not only to supply the troops of Lenfront, but also, especially in order to give out the troops of Lenfront to go east to avoid captivity, if the need forces Leningrad to pass. Keep in mind that Moscow is in a critical situation and it is not able to help you with new forces. Either you will break through the front in these two or three days and give our troops the opportunity to move east if it is impossible to hold Leningrad, or you will be captured ... concentrate the divisions eight or ten and break through to the east. This is necessary in case Leningrad is withheld, and in case of passing Leningrad. For us, the army is more important. (RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 488, Ll. 12-13).

Obviously, at that moment, Stalin was ready to sacrifice Leningrad and Leningraders for the sake of saving Moscow. In these conditions, no one thought about the evacuation of the population along with the retreating army. But if then Stalin insisted on a breakthrough with the abandonment of Leningrad, the consequences would be catastrophic. The bulk of the inhabitants would die from hunger and cold in conditions of impending winter. The enemy surrounding Leningrad would have the opportunity to attack the retreating armies of the Leningrad Front during a breakthrough and destroy the bulk of the retreating, even if they broke the corridor to the Great Earth. The troops of the Leningrad Front would have suffered the fate of the 2nd shock army of General Vlasov, almost completely destroyed by a narrow corridor at the meat boron in the spring and summer of the 42nd. And then the main forces of the North Army Group could be thrown to the aid of Army Group Center, which would significantly reduce the chances of holding Moscow. But a few days later, the attack of German troops to Moscow stopped because of the Helpers, and in the future, Stalin, fortunately, did not return to the idea of ​​passing Leningrad.

So we can and should be discussed alternative options in history. This really does not insult anyone and helps to understand the logic of those events that really occurred in history. The consideration of historical alternatives does not prevent us from honoring the memory of millions of victims of the Leningrad blockade.