The terrible days of chaos and violence in Ukraine are becoming a thing of the past. The corrupt regime has collapsed, its representatives are fleeing the country in panic. However, any revolution (and the February Revolution of 2014 is no exception), focusing the attention of citizens on politics and politicians, pushes economic problems into the background. Problems that will remind us of themselves very soon. Therefore, we believe that all parties involved in the events around Ukraine should now, without putting things off for too long, think about steps that can ensure its successful development.

And this is not about the threat of default and handouts from Moscow that could delay it, but about the fact that the economic system of Ukraine - and it was precisely this that provoked the February Revolution of 2014 in Kyiv - must radically change if Ukrainians want to actually realize their age-old dreams of statehood and turn into a united civil nation.

The Ukrainian economy is a powerful redistribution mechanism that until recently worked for the "effective managers" who moved from Donetsk to Kyiv as part of the "team" of former President Viktor Yanukovych. Both his henchmen and the Kremlin's political strategists create an image of a confrontation between "responsible managers" - Donetsk residents and "freeloaders" - Westerners, but the thesis that the East of Ukraine "feeds" its West is an outright lie.

Yes, the GRP of Donetsk Oblast exceeds the combined GRP of Zakarpattia, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil and Lviv Oblasts. But at the same time, it receives 31.3% of all transfers from the state budget that are intended to support the regions. In 2013, Donetsk Oblast enterprises managed to recoup 129(!)% of the VAT they paid to the budget from the treasury. Gas, which until recently was purchased in Russia at $410 per 1,000 cubic meters, went to the industry of the East at $160-210 per 1,000 "cubes" (largely because the enterprises were controlled by structures belonging to the president's son). We are not even talking about the coal industry, which receives more than $2.5 billion a year from the treasury. As a result, it turns out that in 2012, various subsidies for the eastern part of the country reached 18% of the total GRP of Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov regions, and the largest net contributor to the state budget of Ukraine was... Poltava region.

The East of Ukraine is not so much a source of success as a problem for the country. If the "flagships" of Ukrainian industry are forced to buy gas at market prices in the future and lose politically motivated subsidies from Kyiv, they will go bankrupt in a few months: labor productivity here is currently 7-9 times lower than in the EU, energy intensity is 4-6 times higher, and the technologies are mostly Soviet. To this day, oxygen converter plants have not been put into operation in the metallurgical industry of Ukraine, and the stake is still placed on outdated blast furnaces. If someone does not believe us, let them believe investors: the most popular sector of the Ukrainian economy for them (it accounts for 21.5% of foreign capital investment) is the agro-industrial complex, and not metallurgy at all.

As a result, a vicious circle is created. The "leading" industries increasingly require subsidies. Failure to provide them is fraught with social unrest. A reduction in employment and an increase in productivity prove undesirable. All this makes the country vulnerable to rising gas prices and creates vassal relations between Kiev and Moscow. The recent revolution - if we evaluate it in this "coordinate system" - was the population's reaction to the government's refusal to try to change the model and follow the European path. Seeing Poland and the Czech Republic next to them, Ukrainians do not understand why they should admire a regime under which they live three times worse than their neighbors. And they can be understood. The choice is not only between Europe and Russia, but also between a modern and a hopelessly backward economic structure, and, in our opinion, it is more critical than the choice between democracy and authoritarianism.

Moscow does not look like a refuge for a dictator who hates the free Ukrainian people. It "only" strives to preserve in Ukraine the Soviet system that the Russian political elite has come to love so much in recent years. Russia does not want to see a serious normal economy so close to its own borders, otherwise something might happen. However, maintaining a quasi-Soviet economic system is impossible without raw material rent; this means that the struggle "for a Soviet Ukraine" is futile. The price for persistence may be political destabilization and the loss of tens of billions of dollars in investment - and therefore today it is wiser not to resist the natural course of events, but to take part in it.

Moscow's mistake was to give money to the Ukrainian authorities. Even if they were not kleptocrats, they used these funds to maintain a hopeless system. Brussels' mistake was to not promise Ukraine the money without which it has no chance of breaking the vicious circle described above. There is a lesson to be learned from these mistakes. Both Russia and Europe should stop playing geopolitics and jointly repeat what has become one of the most successful transformations in modern history.

We are talking about the Marshall Plan, implemented by the US in relation to post-war Europe. From 1948 to 1951, America provided European countries with more than $13 billion ($125 billion at the current rate), which the Europeans could spend on economic recovery. Now, Ukraine faces exactly the same task: to help it become the first country outside the EU to overcome the Soviet economic system.

The new “Marshall Plan,” which would require the mobilization of $100-120 billion, could play the same role in the history of Eastern Europe as the previous one did in the history of Western Europe. It should be based on massive financial assistance to Ukraine from both Moscow and Brussels. This assistance could be provided subject to a number of conditions, such as preventing radical nationalists from joining the government (in the 1940s, the United States provided loans to countries where there were no communists in the government), open and honest elections, reform of the civil service system, and guarantees by all parties of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The plan should include a strategy for the development of the Ukrainian economy, supported by all countries involved. However, the funds allocated to Kyiv should be used to purchase any goods and equipment required by Ukraine, and not by the authorities and companies of donor countries.

The plan would be implemented on the condition of political non-interference in Ukrainian affairs. The parties could declare that Ukraine would not become a member of either the European or Eurasian Union in the next 10 years, and would not participate in military blocs. At the same time, Ukraine could receive special preferences from both the EU and Russia: visa-free entry for citizens of the country to both the EU and the Russian Federation, freedom of trade with both partners, participation of Europe and Russia in the construction of transit routes through the territory of Ukraine. In essence, the parties would take responsibility for the economic future of Ukraine and turn it into the main bridge between the EU and Russia, a testing ground for cooperation between the main players in the Eurasian space.

For Ukraine, the plan would open up a chance to use its unique geopolitical position and reform its economy; for Europe and Russia, it would give the opportunity to move away from the primitive accusations of all mortal sins and to engage in that strategic partnership, the mere mention of which has recently been perceived as a joke.

A new “Marshall Plan” could be announced by a “neutral” party, historically closely linked to Ukraine. Canada, with its 1.1 million Ukrainian diaspora, is ideal for this role. Russia and the EU could provide the bulk of the funds; the operator would be a bank (or fund) for the reconstruction of Ukraine, which would provide loans to the government or companies on a repayable basis and could attract additional funds. The initial size of the fund would be $40-50 billion, and the same amount could be raised on the market under the guarantees of the two main partners. The entire program would be based on investment logic, not on the principles of charity. The horizon for repayment of funds could be 25-30 years.

Russia, in our opinion, is extremely interested in such a project. The victory of the February Revolution and the irresponsible course pursued by the Russian authorities since 2004 created the conditions for ousting Russia from Ukraine. We can now consolidate our positions only in partnership with a more attractive player and only in the case of constructive cooperation with the new Ukrainian authorities. In addition, Russia needs to preserve its investments in the country, guarantee the return of loans issued and continue supplying raw materials to the Ukrainian market. Both participation in this scheme on an equal basis and the emergence of significant financial resources by the Ukrainian authorities will solve these problems. One payment of gas bills at European prices will provide an additional $5-6 billion per year compared to the conditions we agreed to last November. Russia is more interested in preserving Ukraine as a transit corridor for energy supplies to Europe than the EU. Finally, free trade with Ukraine will ensure the continuation of cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian companies, which is on the verge of collapse.

International cooperation to bring Ukraine out of the crisis could initiate the repatriation of Ukrainians and Ukrainian capital. Today, the Ukrainian diasporas in the EU, North and Latin America number up to 5.5 million people - more than 10% of the population of Ukraine. Among the Ukrainians living abroad, there are many wealthy people and highly qualified specialists. Nowadays, it is rarely remembered that the "rise" of China began with the arrival of the huaqiao, who brought both capital and civilized business practices to the country. With changes for the better in Ukraine, the vital forces of a nation scattered around the world will begin to support their homeland.

It is impossible to sketch out a plan for the revival of one of Europe's largest countries in a few days. But we are convinced that the low-grade political bickering over Ukraine, which humiliates both Russia and Europe, must become a thing of the past. During the heyday of Kievan Rus, this region was both part of Europe and the cradle of Russian civilization. Making it the center of Russian-European interaction again is a unique chance for politicians in Moscow and Brussels. And if they realize the significance of this chance, the proposed plan will quickly be filled with the necessary specifics and details.

Otherwise, we will all face a multi-year crisis with a worsening political and a fading economic component - a crisis in a country that is second only to four EU countries in terms of population and is critically important for Europe and Russia. And we hope that reasonable politicians will recognize their responsibility to their citizens and will be worthy of them.

Authors - State Duma deputy; Director of the Center for Post-Industrial Society Studies

Valeriy Zubov, Vladislav Inozemtsev: "Marshall Plan" for Ukraine