M. Stulov / Vedomosti

Devaluation brings its first results in the form of rising prices. The Ukrainian crisis promises new economic problems. But Russians' support for the Kremlin's course is growing - unable to find the strength to influence the unloved government, citizens find justification for the government in an aggressive foreign policy.

Rising prices have always been the main concern for Russians. The latest Levada Center poll confirms this point's leadership: the largest number of respondents are concerned about rising prices (69%), poverty (51%), unemployment (33%), and the high level of corruption (32%). And today, rising prices are not only a sociological concept; the devaluation of the ruble has already rewritten the price tags on most products and consumer goods. Imports are declining due to falling demand. Russian grain is becoming more expensive and food prices are rising all over the world (as reported by the FAO), including due to the risks of the Ukrainian crisis.

At the same time, Vladimir Putin's trust rating has reached, according to sociologists, its highest point since he took office again in May 2012 - 69%. This figure seems surprising given the traditionally low interest of Russians in big politics and high interest in everyday problems. Of course, the Sochi Olympics, which fueled "pride on TV" for the country and its leader, played a major role in this.

But then this pride was transferred to the "Ukrainian direction" of the government's policy. Most Russians (70 to 75%) recently spoke out against interference in Ukraine, but now, after the massive impact of official propaganda on all state channels and on the Internet, the situation may change.

Many may support the introduction of troops into Ukraine and, in particular, into Crimea, presenting it as a “small victorious war” on the model of August 2008.

The high level of support for the government against the backdrop of growing economic and social problems is not a recent phenomenon. The Soviet state and its propagandists successfully created and exploited the imaginary unity of interests of the state apparatus and the majority of citizens, whose progress and prosperity are hampered by common external and/or internal enemies. The discontent of the majority due to unfulfilled expectations of a better life and everyday troubles was transferred from the state to imaginary opponents, be it the imperialist environment, "specialists-saboteurs", "rootless cosmopolitans" or Ukrainian nationalists. Now many are ready to tolerate personal inconveniences for the sake of territorial expansion of the state, demonstrating its superiority over eternal enemies. According to sociologist Alexei Levinson, Putin has successfully found and exploits the paternalistic sentiments of ordinary people who believe the president and his versions of events in Russia and beyond.

People are unhappy with the state of affairs in Russia, but they are passive. And the state plays too significant a role in their worldview. And when the state finds external enemies and begins to threaten the West, Russians have a traditional Soviet outlet - the opportunity to be proud of the greatness of the state in exchange for refusing to participate in politics and high standards of consumption.

From the editor: Patriotism will write off everything