Transform growing social protest into a patriotic upsurge - this technique has been used more than once in the last century by authoritarian regimes for self-preservation

Transform growing social protest into a patriotic upsurge - this technique has been used more than once in the last century by authoritarian regimes for self-preservation

Ilya SHABLINSKY,
member of the Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation

Even those who have never been particularly interested in politics, I think, understood that on May 6, 2012, not only the president, but also the political regime changed in our country.

An order quickly began to take shape, which in Europe in the last 100 years has usually been called the regime of political reaction.

Reaction to what?

By "political reaction" is usually meant a series of legislative, administrative and propaganda measures aimed at protecting the position of a privileged layer or ruling group from imminent changes or threats. But in such situations, law is disguised as actual arbitrariness, with the help of which this group cracks down on the dissatisfied.

The history of the post-war decades—if one does not dive deeper than half a century into the past—provides many examples of such regimes. They were usually born in conditions of weak or unstable economies, promising stabilization and protection of property. Their conservatism was aggressive. But this was supported by a part (more or less) of society.

In particular, in Indonesia in 1965, after the suppression of the communist putsch, a professional military man, Suharto, who invented the “managed democracy” regime, became president.

In 1967, a group of military men came to power in Greece, discarding democracy and establishing a harsh regime that became known as the "black colonels" regime.

In 1973, in Chile, as a result of a coup, General Augusto Pinochet became the leader of the state, and later, in the 90s, he gained specific popularity in Russia.

In 1976, a group of military men came to power in Argentina, replacing the center-left government, also promising stability and order.

And this is not a complete list of regimes that used the protective moods of a part of society. In all cases, people from the power structures declared to the nation that democracy is harmful and that the order they introduced would be extremely favorable to domestic business. The 60s and 70s were generally a favorable era for such reigns.

But we have 2014 in the yard. Can we say that this topic is still relevant? We have to admit that yes.

But can we consider in our case that it was a reaction to something? That it was some kind of answer to some kind of challenge? Partly yes.

Since 2000, power has been in the hands of approximately the same group of people, and the same person remained its leader - Vladimir Putin, Russian President No. 2. From the very beginning (but since 2004, especially actively), this group began to create conditions for itself for monopoly rule, establishing control over the largest media and rebuilding big business, finance and the party system for themselves.

We didn't have any revolutions. We had everything gradually.

By this time, it became clear to many what the risks associated with the coming to power of people from law enforcement agencies were. They definitely need to see enemies in the surrounding space. The normal political process is seen as a war of annihilation. They do not negotiate with enemies - they are eliminated from the battlefield, imprisoned, discredited. Democracy does not exist in such a coordinate system: there is only a set of tricks, and democracy itself is also a trick invented by the enemy. It can only and must be correctly imitated.

Taking into account this logic, a system began to be built in which a legal change of power, that is, a change as a result of elections, the victory of other, alternative forces, was excluded. All state media and election commissions should have worked against such forces.

But in December 2004, the first Maidan, a mass protest movement, took place in the neighboring state, in its capital, Kyiv. This was direct interference in the election process, which raised doubts among a part of the population. And the ruling group realized one important thing: by excluding all legal ways of changing power, mass street protests cannot be ruled out.

At the same time, the process of monopolization of power in Russia went on as usual. This process continued even when Dmitry Medvedev was our president from 2008 to 2012. The fact that he was Putin's nominee did not at all exclude some of his personal characteristics. For example, he considered it important enough to provide some additional legal support to domestic businesses. His four years has accelerated the formation of a layer of Russians who regard economic and political freedoms as something natural. And this part of society has already begun to understand what is the change of power and what is the monopoly on power. As you know, in late 2011 - early 2012, this layer decided to express their protest feelings. Specifically, in connection with fraud in the elections. But in general, in connection with the construction of political fraud as a principle. Many Russians have come to understand that a regime of personal irremovable and uncontrolled power is being built before their very eyes.

In general, the feeling of threat in our ruling group did not arise from scratch. This must be acknowledged.

Corridor narrowing

After the protests, there were some concessions that many lawyers considered to be subterfuge. Well, then came the Reaction. It, as usual, assumed the performance of a number of functions by legislators and the media. By the beginning of 2012, both chambers of the Federal Assembly were already prepared for their implementation. The Federation Council, formed in 2001 on the principle of political loyalty, did not play any independent role at all. In the State Duma, elected at the end of 2011, the faction that represented the interests of the ruling group, thanks to the falsification of precinct election commissions, nevertheless received an absolute majority. The real opposition in 2011 could not only participate in the elections, but even register a party. By the way, the situation when the parliament only imitates political life, serving the ruling group, is generally quite a typical phenomenon for reactionary regimes.

Further, as you know, a series of legislative acts followed, the essence of which could easily be put into the old formula: “Keep and do not let go!” At the very beginning, there was a set of amendments to the Federal Law “On meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches…” and the Code of Administrative Offenses, which increased fines for violating the procedure for holding rallies for citizens by 60 times - up to 300 thousand rubles. Then there were amendments to the federal laws "On non-profit organizations" (NPOs) and "On public associations", which puzzled lawyers with the formula - "organizations that perform the functions of a foreign agent." In December 2012, these measures were supplemented by another very general rule, according to which “the activities of NPOs that implement projects and programs in Russia that pose a threat to the interests of the Russian Federation” are suspended by the state body that registers NPOs (that is, the Ministry of Justice). This formula somehow did not find itself in the center of public attention, since it was hidden in a law, the main meaning of which was a ban on the adoption of Russian orphans by US citizens.

Then there were acts demonstrating concern for morality. Perhaps the political technologists who serve the ruling group have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to provide some moral and ideological basis for the reactionary course. Indeed, conservatism, which is based on the desire only to conserve power, is not expensive. But the genre of state ideologies is still prohibited by the Constitution. Therefore, the matter was reduced to separate laws.

In November 2012, amendments to the Federal Law “On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development” came into force. The protection was expressed in the detailed regulation of the labeling of video, television, radio products with special discs indicating the permissible age of consumers. In June 2013, a new article 6.21 of the Code of Administrative Offenses came into force, establishing liability for "Propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations among minors." Both laws were supposed to play, in the opinion of many lawyers, a purely propaganda role. Whether it succeeded is a matter of debate.

The reactionary policy in the media space meant, first of all, the elimination of any opposing points of view from television and the Internet space. The first was a completely solvable problem, the second - not yet. At the very end of 2012, at the initiative of the television operator Rostelecom, the broadcasting of the programs of the Sovershenno Sekretno TV channel was stopped: formally due to a number of financial problems, in fact, due to the admission of “undesirable persons” and their statements to the air. In early 2014, the Dozhd TV channel was attacked: as you know, legal mechanisms of the media law were not even used to remove it from the media field. Tactics came down to pressure on cable network operators.

Special care was taken about the resources of the Network: a law was passed on extrajudicial restriction of access to sites and any Internet resources that posted "calls for uncoordinated public actions and for the implementation of extremist activities." As expected, the concept of “calls for extremist activity” was interpreted by prosecutors in the broadest possible way. In mid-March 2014, on the basis of this law, access to the Grani.Ru, Kasparov.Ru, EJ.Ru websites, as well as to Alexei Navalny's blog on the Livejournal.com platform, was blocked.

In fact, it looks like some kind of pathology. State TV channels daily promote economic and sporting successes, the rating of the head of state is over 70%, the regions report on stable development. And at the same time, the corridor of legal freedom in the political and media space is narrowing almost daily.

Syndrome

As a result, today we can say that the regime that has formed in Russia has more and more common features with the reactionary regimes that have been operating in various states of Europe, Asia and Latin America over the past century. Nothing new. But in this context, we are particularly interested in one particular thing. The way in which some of these regimes, in the face of economic downturns and turmoil, took on risky foreign policy operations.

Regime leaders often saw such operations as their only way out. Of course, their calculation was obvious to everyone: to transform the growing social protest into a patriotic upsurge. But at the same time, each of these leaders probably sincerely believed that he was giving his people a long-awaited gift.

In 1974, the leader of the "black colonels" Dimitrios Ioannidis, irritated by student protests, the economic crisis and other troubles, decided on a well-thought-out special operation. He supported the seizure of power in Cyprus by a radical group that advocated "enosis" - the reunification of the island with Greece. Enosis was an old idea. Detractors said "syndrome". So, at one time Crete was annexed to Greece. The policy of Ioannidis, who provided financial and military-technical assistance to his compatriots in Cyprus, aroused an explosion of enthusiasm among the people of Greece. Purely formally, the Greek army did not invade Cyprus (the Turkish side, however, adhered to a slightly different point of view). "Enosis" was to be carried out by the army of Cyprus - in fact, the Greek self-defense units. Yet the Greeks on the island were the vast majority: about 85% against 15% of the Turks. The operation had good chances. But Turkey categorically did not like this plan, which considered itself entitled to protect the Turkish community of the island. The Turks landed troops on the northern coast of the island and, after stubborn fighting, occupied the entire northern part of Cyprus. The reunification plan failed and this led to the overthrow of Ioannidis and his group.

At first, a similar operation started by the President of Indonesia was more successful. At the end of 1975, Suharto, who was experiencing some economic difficulties, captured East Timor, a Portuguese possession with a population of under a million people. Portugal, having just gone through the so-called "carnation revolution", was unable to hold or defend the colony. Suharto acted, of course, on behalf of the majority population of East Timor. More precisely, those local groups that he managed to take control of. From a military point of view, the operation was a success. From a diplomatic point of view, it turned out to be more difficult: no one recognized the annexation of East Timor, although, say, the United States and Australia responded to Suharto's actions quite indifferently. From their point of view, he acted against the leftist rebels (after all, there was a cold war going on then). Even Suharto spoke about his anti-colonial mission, about the unification of Indonesia on the scale of the archipelago. And the island de facto remained with the dictator.

In 1982, the head of the Argentine junta, Leopoldo Galtieri, worried about the rapid devaluation of the national currency and the growth of democratic sentiment in society, decided that he had found a good solution to the problem. He ordered the occupation of the disputed Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, which Britain also considered to be its possession. The Argentines landed troops on the islands, and President Galtieri, of course, was a national hero for several weeks. Bringing back the Malvinas was, he said, the dream of several generations of Argentines. The short Anglo-Argentine war at sea, I remember, was watched with bated breath by the whole world. For Argentina, this adventure, as you know, ended badly. For Galtieri too.

It is more important for us here to note something common to all three "reunions". In all cases, military operations were carried out despite the difficult economic situation, and quite obviously played some kind of compensatory role. In all cases, territorial acquisitions were supposed to unite the nation and strengthen the regime of personal power.

For the Greek and Argentine dictators, everything ended so sadly, because they clearly did not calculate their own forces and the forces of a possible enemy. But for the Indonesian president, on the contrary, everything worked out well at first. East Timor was declared the new, 27th province of Indonesia. However, over time, attitudes towards the occupation of the island began to change - both within the country and abroad. First of all, not a single state recognized the annexation. Then it turned out that the Indonesian authorities were oppressing part of the indigenous population of the island, which gradually launched a guerrilla war against the invaders. For 30 years, thousands of people have become its victims. Another part of the population, which initially, perhaps, sympathized with Suharto, also turned out to be disappointed: instead of the promised prosperity, the new government brought more vegetation. Since the entire Indonesian economy was developing very unstable during that period, it was all the more not the best time for East Timor. At the same time, the state treasury cost the island dearly. Since the overthrow of Suharto in 1998, East Timor has become increasingly demanding for independence. And he got it in 2002.

Since we are going to move on to the problem of Crimea here, I would like to emphasize that it is not only and not so much about historical analogies. In the end, each of them clearly suffers from incompleteness. The Russian government in 2014, obviously, does not have such serious opponents in the struggle for the disputed territory as Greece in 1974 and Argentina in 1982. And unlike the Indonesian army that swept into East Timor, the Russian military (or self-defense units?) occupied the designated territory without killing anyone. (It is not yet clear whose victim was the only dead Ukrainian serviceman.)

The point, I emphasize, is different. In my opinion, the Russian government in the second decade of the 21st century fully accepted the paradigm of the dictators of the middle and second half of the 20th century: risky expansion of territory instead of economic and technological development. The word "instead" here, I think, unfortunately, is appropriate. After all, even before the annexation of Crimea, the situation in the Russian economy could be characterized as stagnation. After all, in recent years, our manufacturing sector has not been particularly attractive for investors and, what is especially important, for scientific and technical personnel. Many investors have formed a strong opinion about the too wide possibilities of the Russian power structures. On the dominance of forceful methods. About a situation close to their arbitrariness. Unfortunately, the Crimean operation only confirmed this priority of the state.

It is possible, of course, to somehow improve life in the annexed territories according to relatively new standards; it is possible to somehow solve the problem of energy and water supply; you can introduce new flights and railway routes bypassing Ukraine (take a look at the map, by the way); you can put pressure on aviation and railway companies; maybe something else... Basically, it will be, apparently, purely administrative efforts, that is, the same force pressure and burden on the budget. All the same. It is rather difficult to develop business and technologies in the territory recognized by the UN as annexed, as experience shows.

By the way, it should be remembered that we live in an era, one of the most important features of which was the abolition of state borders. And, accordingly, the deprivation of the meaning of any territorial claims. This was one of the lessons of the last world war. And the dispute over Alsace-Lorraine, apparently, is over. And the dispute over Trieste too. And, by the way, our citizens could travel to Crimea quite freely, without visas, and quietly rejoice at low Ukrainian prices. These were the realities of the 21st century. Our government, it seems, really wants to return us to the twentieth century.

Yes, I believe that the Crimean operation dealt a serious blow to the country's international prestige. What was said above about some of the foreign policy actions of authoritarian regimes shows where we are. Judging by the speeches of representatives of most states who spoke at the UN General Assembly - and not only those who ultimately supported the resolution on Crimea - they see the imperial syndrome in the behavior of the Russian authorities. Such a demonstration of strength, and in such circumstances, usually does not cause any respect. Blame all these assessments on pressure from the West? I think it will be self-deception.

In general, I think that our country - which occupies the largest territory in the world - needs something different now. Creating the necessary intellectual atmosphere for professionals so that they do not leave. The closest economic and technological cooperation with developed countries (developed democracies, by the way) - so that we can develop some kind of development. But these obvious conclusions already sound like nonsense today. Is it up to that ... The reactionary regime has one super-task - to maintain the status quo, suppressing opponents. All other tasks are subordinate to this main one.