Life without trust

Life without trust. Two views on political institutions

Leonid Blyacher. The art of an uncontrollable life. Far East / Notebooks GeFter.ru. - M.: Publisher

"Europe", 2014. - 208 p.

Ivan Krastev. Management of distrust / notebooks Gefter.ru. - M.: Publisher

"Europe", 2014. - 128 p.

The theme of future democratic institutions in modern political science remains invariably relevant. It is discussed, each in their own way, and two such authors as Leonid Blyacher and Ivan Krastev. Despite the fact that both books are a conversation about the crisis of confidence in political institutions, the initial methodological position among the authors is fundamentally different. This determines the difference between views, easily noticeable during the consistent reading of these works: Russia, as the badge describes it, is quite comparable to the EU Krasthev in such parameters as the heterogeneity of the territories, the remoteness of central government, the distrust of citizens, etc. At the same time, the conclusion of each of the authors regarding the future of political institutions in these two social and geographical communities is radically different. Blyacher argues in categories of the natural order of life of the regions of Russia, contrasting it with the tasks of the central government of the colonial type. Krasthev is an institutionalist, he talks about the pan -European trend of distrust of the masses to elites related to structural changes characterizing the modern global world.

Not close

In the book of Leonida Years, under one cover, redesigned materials are collected, partly published in the form of coffee articles, including on the pages of Oz 1. However, it is the unification of the large case of materials that allows you to see the author’s concept as a whole - it is much wider than what can be shown in individual publications.

The book has a small volume (just more than 10 printed sheets), but the breadth of the professional horizons of the author can puzzle the mass reader. At the same time, a specialist can appreciate the general direction of author’s thought, a book can give many reasons for in -depth thought. In some chapters, the Helpers uses arguments and methods from the arsenal of structural anthropology to substantiate its position (characterizing political consciousness as a mythological, but precisely in structure, and not as a “false” sense in the Marxist understanding), economic and systemic theory (separation of political and economic power, the division of the world into various functional zones), urbanism (in a conversation about global cities as global cities Regional centers of attraction), the neoin-institutional economy (the theory of the stationary bandit of Mansur Olson), political geography (chapters with regional studies are withstanded in this style).

In a generalized form, the answer of the whore to the question of why you need to talk about the Far East as an independent and interesting research case, it is possible to formulate geographically-due to distances. The main reason for the neglect of regional specifics the author considers the remoteness of the region from the centers of power. It is easier to present a remote territory from Moscow from Moscow with an exotic country where almost antipodes live. This is not a “own” land, this is a colony, almost “overseas possessions”, with the only difference being that you can get to them by land. On the other hand, it is precisely the “inattention” to the distant outskirts, growing in a period when the central government occupies their problems, allows you to grow there a more effective “natural order” of life.

The whole development of the Russian Far East (from the 17th century to our days), according to the whore, passed cycles, within the framework of which the increased attention of the central authority to the remote region to the "fat", economically prosperous years was replaced by periods of its oblivion, which opened the prospects of independent growth before the region. In the last cycle - with the heyday of Soviet emergency industrial development - large, including defense industry rose in the Far East. Then these times were replaced by a process, which from Moscow saw a decline: the “depopulation” of the region in the early 1990s. Representatives of the region tried not to destroy this sad impression, at the same time on their own (and not always within the framework of federal laws) attaching its prosperity.

Thus, the natural order of regional life, according to the thought of Blyacher, is opposed by the colonial efforts of the Russian authorities in the development of the Far East. In order to function effectively, such power requires a number of conditions, says the whore. The first is the acute need for state unity with the impossibility of natural unification, as a result of heterogeneity and the length of the territory without a clear “Hegemon”; In this case, it is power that acts as an integrating frame, without which society will crumble. The second is the presence in the power of an external resource, many times superior to public, local, as a base for possible repression and forced “harmonization” of social relations. The third condition is the distance of power, its origin in the representation of people from a source that has nothing to do with their own “common will”. This dictates the structure of power, in which a certain transcendence, the external value of which the authorities originates from which the monarch, revolution, democracy or the “Russian world” becomes a necessary element.

The disappearance of any of these conditions, says the badge, leads to the decline of the effectiveness of power and the growth in the subject territory of the "gray zones", where its own regional order of life is formed. Communities are trying to survive in the conditions of “retreat of the state”, forming for the needs of their survival some primary solidarity: related, local, friendly or others, which are endowed with their highest value. Thus, the actual departure of the authorities, its temporary retreat from the colonized territory forms the sphere of local amateur performances (which the Blyacher calls a spontaneous order). But behind the period of retreat, the return of power should be in a new guise, but all with the same set of qualities that allow it to talk about it as an external, colonialist.

Unlike Russia in Europe, the formation of modern policy as a separate public sphere is associated not with the destruction of ideas about the sacred nature of the authorities, but with the development of national production. The emergence of a layer of people whose resources and statuses were associated not with their origin (nobilititis, nobility) in the countries of Europe, but with an economic resource, allowed these countries to break the indisputable connection with political power and destroy the idea of ​​sacred (given from above) the nature of this power. Descalized European power is transferred into the hands of people and leads over time to the emergence of procedural democracy. In Russia, the process of separation of state and socio-political does not occur.

In the early 90s of the twentieth century, democracy tried itself in the role of another transcendental source of power: its elements turned out to be outwardly assimilated by the region, where local governments also arose. But this trend quickly breaks off Moscow - as 1993 showed, the authorities are ready to react extremely negatively to attempts to reduce the distance, to establish a political dialogue, to set demands. As for the economy, during the period of the “long 90s” the role of a business regulator (“power operator” in the terms of the whore) instead of the state, criminal “roofs” were performed; Then they were replaced by omnipotent chosen governors - regional barons who felt sovereign owners, “local”, and not by the messengers of another will. At this time, a local business, focused on foreign economic relations with the Asia -Pacific countries, developed more freely in the region.

Then came the period of strengthening the vertical of power, gradually changing the lifestyle of the Far East. The huge federal transfers undoubtedly contributed to the development of the region and affected their international image. Governors-subsidies who did not seek to integrate into regional economic networks retained loyalty to Moscow. All this significantly narrowed the window of opportunities for local business, focused on trans -regional projects - less spectacular, but necessary to maintain the social fabric of the region. Of course, the Far East did not decline, but the quality of the strengthening of the social fabric was noticeably worsened, people began to rely less on their own initiative and focus more on subsidies and benefits.

The new significance of the Far East for Moscow, the slaughterhouse is sure, is due to the "eastern turn" - a sharp strengthening of legitimation, not related to integration into Europe. The current task of the center is to make the region a comparable alternative to the European direction of exports, and for this to strengthen the share of Russia in the turnover of the Asia -Pacific countries - conflicts with the internal spontaneous order that saved the region for decades. Local, not always impeccable business strategies for doing business, having been under the gently eye of the state, can no longer use beaten -free moves. The region’s own voice on a state scale is not so heard, but it doesn’t sound at all (the regionals have no habit of articulating their interests outside the local space). Even if this voice appears, the badge is sure, the strategic interests of the state are also not articulated and cannot be a guide. Spontaneous local development is put under blow. In the current conditions, only two types of relations with the center are possible for the remote region: to remain unnoticed or to be depressed.

The crisis of confidence in political institutions, in this way, is overcome very simply: the center should give the region the opportunity and the right to vote and even revise the federal agreement over time. It is only necessary to change the angle of view of the authorities to lower social structures and institutions, since now it either neglects them or distorts their image. This will allow the federal budget from the current multi -billion dollar expenses for the loyalty of remote territories and maintain the integrity of the country.

Universal failure

In a completely different problem, Ivan Krastev sees the problem of the inefficiency of modern democratic institutions. His book is a compact and beautiful instrumental-procedure model of decline in democracy under the influence of the global market.

It is interesting to compare the two copyright views that carry a different methodological charge. Blyacher claims that truly democratic power should contribute to the integration of the region into global economic networks and promoting the collective interests of its inhabitants. Krasthev shows how the same globalization process can complicate the possibilities of the region’s inhabitants to say “in its voice”, and not because democracy has “deteriorated”, but because the democratically made decisions depend in the globalized modern world not at all from voters. Democratic tools lose their effectiveness because too many other factors intervene in the political process. Comparing the positions of Blyacher and Krasthev, you can see the watershed characteristic of social science discussions: is it necessary to talk about the order of “natural-violent”, that is, “moral” or “natural” (like a badge), or about a procedure in terms of form, that is, observing the procedure (by Krasthev).

At the same time, it is interesting to note that the pan -European community in a number of formal criteria, which is described by Krastev, is described by Krasteva, as a number of formal criteria, is quite like the image of modern Russia, as Leonid Plagier introduced it to its reader. Ivan Krasthev does not make historical excursions, but it can be reminded that the EU arose in the 50s of the twentieth century as an economic association, unified political institutions-a product of the late twentieth century, and the unity of cultural is the eloquent slogan about the general origin from Hellenic civilization statistics: the most massive language of communication in the European Union is now an English, and it can be explained on it a little more than half the population (51 %, 51 %, 51 %, 51 %, 51 %, 51 %, 51 %, 51 % And out of this number only for 13 % this language is native) 2. Thus, Krasthev could well have borrow the argumentation of the whore regarding the external nature of the authorities in relation to the citizens of regional centers, about the misunderstanding by the center of the needs of the periphery, about the alienated image of power in the eyes of citizens, etc.

Krasthev invites the reader to think about the following incident: at that moment when democracy firmly takes the position of the only global political idea, its ability to serve as a justification for the choice of a collective goal is called into question those countries that were its cradle. Such a loss of confidence in voters with national governments and supranational structures, says Krastev, the general problem of modernity. Hence the commitment of people to a new populism, expressing not the aspirations of oppressed and powerless, but reflecting the disappointment and powerlessness of the authorities, that is, citizens. Krasthev gives surveys that show: despite the fact that in most Europeans recognize the EU with a good state union, up to 90 % of respondents see an expanding gap between folk expectations and actions of the government; Only 18 % of Italians and 15 % of the Greeks feel the significance of their votes even in their own country (surveys in the EU countries in April 2012).

Distracted for another minute from Krasthev’s book and returning to Russia, you can compare these data with the indicators of turnout for the elections and the results of the Russian surveys. So, the CEC of Russia reports on the turnout on a single voting day on September 14, 2014: from 20 to 60 % of those who voted in different regions3. The question of why citizens do not exercise their electoral rights is often related to how influential a particular election body seems to be influential to protect the rights of citizens themselves. As for the direct protection of the violated rights, according to the estimates of the Levada Center specialists in 2014, two of the three Russians do not apply anywhere with complaints, motivating this with disbelief in the result, lack of money, time, etc. At the same time, Russia is not an outstanding case of public anemia, degradation of public institutions and stratification of society. Thus, according to Gini’s coefficient, which is a ratio between the income of 10 % of the richest and 10 % of the poorest citizens, according to the estimates of the world bank in 2013, our country is close to the United States (lagging behind 0.7 points), a little ahead of the stratification of many European powers and far from the extremes (the highest recorded stratification index - 64.3, the lowest - the lowest - the lowest - the lowest - the lowest - the lowest - the lowest - the lowest 24).

Krasthev sees an explanation for the phenomenon of the growing distrust of citizens to his governments that the relationship between the individual’s personal freedom and the collective capabilities of voters was violated. The crisis of modern democracy as an institution grows from the “division of labor” between voters and markets, when decision -making in the economy is withdrawn from the sphere of democratic policy. Important political changes that could be interpreted under other conditions and as the achievement of the system of representation, in fact, are the result of the power of financial markets (Krastev leads as an example the departure of Silvio Berlusconi from the post of Prime Minister Italy-an event desired by ordinary citizens, but carried out only with the supply of corporations). Welcoming this event, citizens feel not only glee, but also powerlessness.

Democracy is constantly experiencing crises, for Krasthev they are the flip side of the self -regulation of society. But the peculiarity of the last crisis is a strong disappointment and decline in trust in democratic institutions, which was not before. Unlike other great crises (like great depression in the United States in the first third of the century and stagnation in east of Europe in the latter), each of which, having weakened the trust of one of the institutions in the bundle of the government - a free market, confirmed the belief that the second could solve the first problems, the 2008 crisis was of another nature: in decline in the institution of the market in the west and the planned economy on The East did not come his revival.

According to the author, this was the result of the five revolutions of the 1970s-2000s, which influenced the consciousness of man. “Woodsters” (weakening of social stereotypes), “end of history” and digital technologies (the assertion of the global world), a demographic revolution (decreasing the birth rate and an increase in life expectancy) and the “political revolution of the brain” associated with the behavioralist economy (new discoveries in the field of decision -making) are among their Krastyv. All of them, weakening certain social stereotypes and providing people with new technical capabilities, gave a new meaning to human freedom, confirming the individual choice of consumer as supreme value.

Именно структурные изменения, начавшиеся в 50-е годы ХХ века, согласно Крастеву лежат в основе того, что тяжелые последствия экономического кризиса 2008 года не стали предпосылкой возвращения политики. Триумф индивидуального человека оказался одновременно и источником повышения фрагментарности общества, опасений, связанных с утратой культурного единства. В сфере демократической политики они только ослабили вес «человека политического», рядового избирателя, превратив его в идеального потребителя услуг политики.

Крастев полагает, что граждане повсюду в мире утрачивают доверие к демократическим институтам не потому, что те плохи или слабы, а в связи с утратой возможностей их контролировать. Его слова о том, что новая элита — это элита торгашей, слабо связанных патриотическими узами с той или иной родиной, в полной мере применимы и к современной России. Сейчас ее встроенность в глобальный рынок реализована через центральный аппарат, а не из региональных центров, в чем видится решение проблем Бляхеру. Но вопрос, которым нельзя не задаться, сопоставив происходящее в нашей стране с тем, что описывает Крастев, состоит в том, будет ли настоящим решением лишь одно увеличение числа центров власти?

Еще один вывод, важный — и грустный, потому что также применим к России, причем в целом, а не только к отдаленным регионам, — Крастев делает относительно связи демократии и новых возможностей открытости, принесенных мобильными технологиями и общедоступным интернетом. Власть технологий имеет и свои пределы, и они обнаруживаются весьма скоро. Смартфон, говорит Крастев, можно считать детектором гражданской лжи. Технологии позволяют моментально понять, что на руке патриарха заретушировали часы, опровергнуть неверное официальное заявление и т. п. Смартфон, подключенный к «Твиттеру» или «Фейсбуку», может стать великолепным инструментом координации массовых действий. Расстояния имеют все меньше значения, информация о том, что происходит за 300 и за 30 тысяч километров, приходит одновременно. Но технологии не могут помочь в формировании стабильного политического сообщества, способного обеспечить переход от имеющегося состояния к желаемому. Само по себе технологическое развитие не вызывает никакого стимула к политическому действию.

Так, по мысли Крастева, протест рождается при отсутствии веры в перемены. Вывод вполне сопоставим с российским опытом последних лет, но, говоря о причинах этого явления, Крастев предлагает совсем иные ответы, нежели Леонид Бляхер. Бляхер в своей книге связывает неэффективность территориального развития с низким уровнем самостоятельности региона, который задается центральной властью исходя из узкого понимания задачи сохранения политического суверенитета, традиционно понимаемого в России как поддержание жесткой управленческой вертикали. Крастев показывает эту же картину с другого ракурса — он утверждает, что и экономическое производство, и политика в эпоху массового потребления и Big Data определяются волей крупных корпораций, которые для увеличения прибыли разрабатывают все более тонкие технологии манипулирования общественным сознанием. Продолжив эту линию размышлений, мы находим, что проблемы России, в том числе связанные с федеративным устройством, это не (только) наследие прошлого, но и образ будущего многих стран, выбравших демократию. Апатия граждан и недоверие к политическим институтам, как в удаленных регионах, так и в центре, — это не восстановление советского патерналистского паттерна, а вхождение в тренд, присущий новому глобальному популизму. Впрочем, будущее демократии в любом случае туманно и оторвано от выражения воли людей как первопричины.