How much does war cost?

On August 28, the head of the self-proclaimed DPR, in an interview with the state-run Rossiya 24 channel, admitted that Russian troops were fighting in eastern Ukraine. How much will it cost taxpayers, analyzed the economic observer of The New Times

As is often the case, in order to provide an answer, we first need to agree on definitions. In this case, by “war” I mean the military operations conducted by Russian citizens (servicemen on order, military personnel on vacation, paratroopers who got lost, retired military personnel, other thrill-seekers) on the territory of a neighboring state, which the whole world recognizes as Ukraine ( after all, even Russia did not dare to recognize the self-proclaimed republics in Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states). Some of these Russian citizens are located directly on the territory of Ukraine, participate in hostilities or help plan and manage them. Some are on the territory of Russia in the Rostov region, from where artillery fire is being conducted, or, perhaps, in Moscow, where military operations are planned. All this in modern political jargon has been called "hybrid warfare."

The price of such a war for Russia consists of two parts: direct and indirect. The direct line includes, for example, the cost of paying salaries to the belligerents, for their supply (food, ammunition, fuel). And I am not inclined to believe that this component is very large. So far, the fighting is extremely limited in scale and, according to various estimates, from 12 to 15 thousand people are involved in them on the side of the self-proclaimed republics. Even if we assume that there is not a single idealist among them, and that they all fight only for money, then even then the cost of their salaries is not very high. It is clear that it is difficult to obtain accurate data (the figure was 10 thousand rubles a day in the media), but if we use, for example, data on the salary of soldiers of the French Foreign Legion, we can assume that on average one person participating in hostilities , costs an average of 100 thousand rubles a month - officers receive significantly more, but there are few of them, ordinary soldiers receive significantly less, but there are many of them. With such a hypothesis (no taxes, social contributions, kickbacks and cuts, including compensation for the families of the dead and wounded), we get 15 billion rubles a month. For comparison: expenditures on “national defense” in the federal budget for 2014 amount to 2,472 billion rubles, i.e., if the above estimate is correct, then in annual terms we are talking about 2.5% of the Russian military budget. A lot of? Yes. But, I think, the Ministry of Defense has both reserves and "sponsors".

The situation is even simpler when it comes to estimating the costs of armaments, ammunition and ammunition. All this is taken from warehouses, where the stocks of obsolete (for a war, for example, with the USA or NATO) weapons are so large that the Ministry of Defense can even save costs due to the costs of storing this junk. In theory, Rosstat should account for the reduction in arms stocks as a deduction from GDP (just like the reduction in any other stocks). But who will allow Rosstat, firstly, to obtain such data, and, secondly, to reduce GDP due to this? Transportation costs, fuel, food are completely dissolved in the budget of the Russian military department in articles for maneuvers, for unforeseen expenses, etc.

The indirect costs of the war are much more difficult to estimate. Well, how can one prove, for example, that Russia lost 1% of GDP because of this war? Or who is ready to estimate what it cost the Russian economy for the fall of the ruble by almost 2% and the fall of the stock market by almost 4% on the day when it became known about the capture of Novoazovsk by militias and “Russian volunteers”? And how much will a new round of sanctions cost Russia?

The indirect costs of the war are much greater than the direct costs and stretched out over time. Even if the fighting on the territory of Ukraine ends in a month, it is unlikely that sanctions will be lifted in a month. And even if, for example, the ban on providing new loans to Russian state-owned banks and state-owned companies is lifted, this does not mean that they will be able to attract new loans right tomorrow, and interest rates (as a payment for risk) may not decrease for another couple of years.

And who is ready to prove that the reduction of investments in Russia this year by 20%/40%/60% is not connected with a political factor? And, according to statistics from the 2000s, 2% growth in investment in Russia translates into 1% GDP growth. And who is ready to promise that Russian and international business will reduce their assessment of political risks in Russia the day after the end of the war in Ukraine and resume investment? And how can one economically evaluate the distortion of the brains of a significant part of the Russian population, which believes that “Crimea is ours”? Or efforts to replace food products or medicines banned in Russia? And how much money / resources will be required for the production of all those components that are purchased for aviation, and for astronautics, and for oil workers? Psychology “at the behest” will break labor discipline, will push the authorities towards the self-isolation of the economy, which always and everywhere turns into, if not a recession, then lagging behind its competitors.

In a word, it is impossible to estimate the price of the war for Russia, but it should be recognized that in the current economic realities it may turn out to be the straw that breaks the camel's back.