How Putin lose the war with honor

The war in eastern Ukraine needs to be urgently completed. By mid -December, even its main sponsors, distinguishable among the Kremlin towers, agree with this statement. The position in which the Russian leadership turned out to be in connection with the ongoing conflict is difficult to give at least some positive definition. The point is not even in the sanctions, the collapse of the ruble and the reduction in GDP (although this also plays a role), but that the continuation of the Ukrainian crisis leaves Moscow less and less a chance to get out of it without catastrophic losses - political, economic, diplomatic and reputational. In addition, the unnecessary goal of the war - the federalization of Ukraine and the provision of the right of veto to the Donbass to the foreign policy decisions made in Kyiv - looks more and less achievable. The actual refusal of Ukraine from the sovereignty of the east of the country, the coagulation of the work of state institutions and enterprises there left the DPR/LPR without a livelihood. The Kremlin turned out to be one on one with a destroyed, poor, hungry and cold region, crowded with militants and weapons, including heavy.

This course of Kyiv made Kiev intensively scratch in the backs of many inhabitants of the Kremlin and the surroundings, who expected the Ukrainians to fight for the Donbass to the last person, while not ceasing to finance it. The President of the Russian Federation was clearly surprised and annoyed by what happened, explaining by his example what exactly he expected from Ukraine: “Even on the most difficult days, months, years, we can say, we never reduced the financing of the Chechen Republic, regularly paid not only pensions and benefits, but even subsidies to the budget.”

The escalation of the war would lead to super -profitable sanctions and rapidly reversing the Russian economy, but for Putin this is no worse than public humiliation.

However, the Ukrainians obviously did not like the Putin experience, they went their own way. As I wrote back in early September, it broke the game and put a choice of several unacceptable options for actions.

Put the Donbass on Russian allowance extremely linked economically and is very similar to occupation and even annexation politically. Quietly leave the Donbass, leaving the DPR and the LPR to die quickly, it will not work. After a year of fierce propaganda, the population of Russia will not understand the "surrender of our people to Bandera." Already now, Igor Strelkov-Girkin and such people shout at all the corners: “Cheating!” Crowning the authorities against the “drain” of Donbass and directly threaten the Kremlin of various kinds of troubles in case of “betrayal”.

It is also difficult to force Ukraine to restore financing of the region by force. Firstly, the Ukrainian army became significantly more powerful and organized than at the beginning of the conflict. Secondly, the escalation of hostilities threatens to strengthen sanctions, up to the excommunication of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, the subsequent collapse of the banking system and the economy as a whole. But to leave everything as it is either: in this case, in the east of Ukraine the real, and not invented by television propagandists, a humanitarian disaster will begin. Locals will finally hate a new leadership, and Russian inhabitants will again think about treason.

Well, the main drawback of all these scenarios is that not one of them brings the implementation of the main goal of the war by none by a millimeter - the federalization of Ukraine. Moreover, any of them makes federalization impossible in principle.

In the current conditions, Russian leaders can only rely on diplomacy and ask Kyiv to regain the financing of Donbass, paradoxically appealing to the morality and mercy of the "fascist junta." President Putin suddenly turned into a convinced supporter of the unity of Ukraine, stating that the Donbass and the rest of the country "need each other." In addition, realizing that time is working against separatists, Moscow is more persistently demanding a speedy resumption of negotiations in Minsk in a format, which involves the participation of the leaders of the DPR and the LPR. The Kremlin, it seems, does not lose hope for their international recognition, restoration of the funding of the Donbass from Kyiv and the constitutional reform in Ukraine - that is, the federalization of this country.

Ukraine should decide as soon as possible to the reform of local self -government, in particular, to introduce the election of regions governors.

However, Kyiv, having felt the weakness of the Russian position, is not in a hurry to resume the dialogue. In the Ukrainian capital, they also well understand who the time is working for, and they are not going to provide courtesy to the Kremlin, pulling it out of it dug pit. A formal reason for delaying negotiations is the lack of an agreement on the exchange of prisoners. The separatists were arranged by the previously agreed format of “all for all”, since in case of its implementation they will not have a single lever of influence on Kyiv. The condition for the issuance of prisoners, they call the restoration of financing of Donbass, actually demanding a ransom for hostages. The Ukrainian authorities, however, are not amenable to blackmail, waiting for the development of events. By this, they greatly irritate Moscow: after all, time goes on, and the position of people in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions is getting worse and worse .

The situation looks like Patova: no war, no peace. The Kremlin can neither take the Donbass for its maintenance or “bend”, recognizing its defeat. But to achieve victory - military or diplomatic - he is also not able to. Ukraine, in turn, took a waiting position without taking any active actions and expecting the circumstances to force Moscow to make concessions.

From the point of view of Kyiv, such a strategy looks promising: the rapidly increasing volume of problems associated with the Donbass already in the foreseeable perspective should force Moscow to become more accommodating. However, such a logic, internally impeccable, does not take into account a very important, possibly determining factor in the current Russian policy: the psychology of Vladimir Putin.

It would be a height of frivolity to expect that he, being driven into a corner, will be reputed humiliatingly, recognizing his complete defeat. Rather, it is worth expecting the opposite: in a hopeless situation, the Russian president can decide on devoid of logic and even a suicidal act. For example, he will try to cut down a land corridor in the Crimea, begin a full -scale military invasion of Ukraine or something worse. Yes, most likely, the escalation of the war would lead to super -profitable sanctions and rapid reversing of the Russian economy, but for Putin this is no worse than public humiliation. What is even worse, such a development of events is fraught with enormous deprivations, material and human losses for both Russia and Ukraine. It would be extremely unreasonable to bring to the implementation of such a scenario.

Putin will not just keep his face: for the client’s clientele and NTV, he will become a real hero.

Moreover, there is a reasonable alternative. If you allow Vladimir Putin to keep his face and announce the victory in the war even in case of its loss, the big blood will be avoided. For this, Ukraine should decide as soon as possible to reform local self -government. The introduction of the Institute for the Election of the Governors of the Regions has long been seriously discussed in the Ukrainian political elite, the conduct of the corresponding reform was both in the election program of Petro Poroshenko and in the programs of most parties that went to parliament following the results of recent elections. That is, there is nothing dangerous for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity in “decentralization”, as this process is called in Kyiv,.

Its main differences from the Kremlin “federalization” should be the absence of a veto’s right to the center of foreign policy decisions, as well as equality, and not a certain “special status” of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. In all other, “decentralization” and “federalization” - in fact, the same thing. The same expanded rights of regions and cities, the same increased financial and tax independence of the regions, the same redistribution of powers from the center to places.

For Russia, such an outcome of the war, of course, will turn into a complete defeat. Kyiv will leave the sphere of influence of Moscow, if not forever, then for a very long time. The Kremlin with their actions brought anti -Russian sentiments in Ukraine to a new height: not a single politician who speaks benevolently about Moscow will have the slightest chance of winning in nationwide elections for an indefinite long time.

But Russian state propaganda will not be difficult to explain that Donetsk and Lugansk in a heavy struggle gained independence for themselves, and the “junta” lost its “dictatorial” powers. In combination with the still working law on regional languages ​​that allow the free use of Russian, the picture for Russian television channels will be simply perfect. Putin will not just keep his face: for the client’s clientele and NTV, he will become a real hero. The need for “vacationers” and “volunteers” will disappear, tanks and howitzers will return to their native “military organizations”, and the Girkins will be sent to sew mittens somewhere in Siberia with this outcome of the war. It is possible that under this story and the West will remove part of its sanctions. At the same time, Ukraine will be a real winner in the war, which will confirm the commitment to the chosen development path, defend independence and independence in making the most important decisions, gets rid of militants, formations like the DPR and the LPR, and at the same time will carry out a reform that is really riveted.

Of course, the implementation of such a scenario will become possible only when the Kremlin finally realizes that its adventure in the Donbass completely failed and has no chance of favorable development. For this, it will probably take some time and tangible financial losses. But for the Ukrainian leadership and the West, it would be worthless to begin to consider the details of such an agreement with Moscow, so that at the right time it would be completely ready and waited only for the signature of the Russian side.