Economics: exit without exit

Putin hopes to get through the crisis while maintaining the Putinonomics. The program, which is made up of his statements, consists of illusions, omissions, false hopes and micro-concessions.

The most recent figures he reproduced are for October. The results of November just summed up, with the industrial index falling by 1.2%, unemployment rising to 5.2% and other signs of a recession, were not even mentioned. Not to mention the scale of the collapse of the ruble in December and the rise in inflation to 10% year on year.

This is probably the inevitable evil that Putin decided to turn a blind eye to and recommends that the people and economic entities do the same, calmly waiting for the measures "which we used, and quite successfully, in 2008." Namely: spending state reserves to support state-owned businesses, and, if possible, ordinary people. There are no plans to stop even the rapid growth of military spending: "The resources that we needed to fulfill not only social obligations, but also to develop the defense sector, we have all of them laid down, all provided." One should simply wait, as the head of Russia predicts, two years of crisis, after which either the economy will in some inexplicable way “adapt to the conditions of low energy prices” (Putin said that he was ready to withstand $60 or even $40 per barrel), then whether oil prices will come to their senses and return to their former exorbitant heights. Here is the whole program for you. It is completely utopian for at least three reasons.

First, international reserves now stand at less than $415 billion compared to $598 billion on the eve of the 2008 crisis.

Secondly, foreign debts, mostly those of sanctioned pillars of Putinonomics, amount to almost $700 billion and must be paid according to their schedules with no hope that they can be over-borrowed. During the last crisis, from October 2008 to October 2009, debts fell by only $67 billion (from $541 billion to $474 billion). And now they will have to return $100-150 billion annually.

Thirdly, the words about two difficult years are clearly inspired by memories of 2009-2010, after which the oil price jumped to $110. But this time around, there are many more difficult years ahead, as cheaper energy prices are driven by fundamental factors that Putin mistakenly perceives as machinations by enemies. The reduced reserves will obviously not be enough to sit out this long crisis.

$40 oil, which Putin admits, would mean at least half the price of Russian exports, to somewhere around $250 billion. This proceeds will have to finance the payment of external debts, the evacuation of capital and the deficit in trade in services. After that, only $50-70 billion will be left to cover imports. This is a return to the level of the 1990s - a reduction in the import of foreign goods by a factor of five compared to today.

As for business, Putin addressed three ideas to him, each of which hinders normal economic growth.

Idea first. The demonstrative action to seize property - the seizure of Bashneft from Vladimir Yevtushenkov - is the right thing to do, and Yevtushenkov should be morally consoled by an invitation to Putin's New Year's Eve conversation with businessmen.

Second. The head of Russia is pleased with Rosneft and especially Igor Sechin personally, along with his ultra-high income, the size of which he basically “does not know”. That is, the supermonopolies that plunged the country into crisis are not only not subject to dismantling, but, on the contrary, are taken under protection.

And the third. Offshore amnesty is promised to be extended to shell companies in Russia itself. In practice, this will legalize not so much the shadow business in general, but the business of corrupt officials, strengthening this layer in its opposition to any changes.