Medlenno.ru: Protomens K.

The following text will be very serious, intentionally business, dry and - at least by intonation and intentions - delicious. It will be about one of the most important problems of modern Russian society and public consciousness. The catastrophe that we are observing now is a direct consequence of the insoliability, neglect of this problem, even intentional skiing.

It will be about Russian journalism - its genres, formats and language. I will make a reservation right away: Russian is understood as journalism in Russian, regardless of the scene of writing and publication. The audience is important here - and the language of conversation with it.

So, what is happening with Russian journalism is quite easily determined by three main points.

1) Self -isolation and the disappearance of interest in the world around him, not directly related to “Russian affairs”.

2) militant anti -intellectualism, an attempt to replace a rational and analytical approach to emotional, aimed at the “quick reaction” of the audience. We also add a total distrust of any serious knowledge about the subject of journalistic interest, a decisive unwillingness to study the “history of the issue” and so on.

3) the whole big dependence of the media on “its audience”, the fear of reaching “alien” or even “neutral” territory, offering consumers to some other “agenda” than that thanks to which you can calmly exist in the current borders and further [1] .

The disappearance of interest in the world around him, not directly related to "Russian affairs."

As a result, Russian media, finding himself in the conditions of information and propaganda war (for the most part-becoming its most important tool), monstrously lost their products-and we are talking about both sides of this war, conditionally “official” and conditionally “opposition”. The degradation of the media is noticeable, if only because the “normal intelligent” audience, far from the extremes of both one and the other political position, more and more often leaves the media arena in general, considering it unnecessary and even offensive to consume bad monotonous products of extremely low levels. After all, the media today work only “for their own”, giving them only what they expect from them - and in the most primitive form. These media do not see any other way to strengthen (precisely to strengthen, and not increase) their audience.

The situation was aggravated by the closure - or reformatting - several liberal (or relatively liberal) Russian media, which tried to work in addition to the direct “malice of the day”. The death of “Lenta.ru”, the regret and final fall of “Gazeta.ru”, strange things that are happening once in “Kommersant”, marginalization of other publications - all this deprived a significant part of the Russian city audience (the age between 25 and 55 years, with higher education, people trying to “understand” what is happening, and not follow other people's ideas) of those media that can be trusted, read them constantly and read them constantly and read them constantly and read them constantly Seriously discuss. That is, deprived them of "his press." This is a considerable part of the Russian population - perhaps not the largest, but in any case, the modernization of the country, only this social group and no other can make any positive changes in it. That is why it is important.

For example, among the most serious media “losses” of the last year is the region of international politics, economics, social problems, and culture. In the current propaganda agenda, only that “foreign” is included, which directly serves propaganda, no matter which side. The quality of this kind of media product fell sharply, and its format has changed a lot. Meanwhile, the demand for it exists, even if it is not so noticeable. Such demand can be attributed to the category of “slow”, “sustainable”, it does not give rapid quantitative results, but it is he who creates a reputation for media and - at the same time - forms public opinion much deeper and structured more than “quick reactive journalism, addressed to feelings and emotions”, journalism addressed exclusively “their own”, journalism of “short circuit”. Actually, what happened to the Russian society in the last year directly indicates this circumstance. Numerous readers of opposition media, habitually scolding the Kremlin, participants in processions against the authorities of 2011-2012 turned out to be covered by the most banal xenophobia, the official patriotism of the fascizoid, intolerance to opponents - and simply to any other image of thought and even life. After more than 20 years of work - outwardly very successful - liberal pro -Western media in Russia, such a result cannot but surprise. Meanwhile, it is obvious: the media landscape in Russia, with a little exception, has never been built on the principles of “long -term interests” and “serious public agenda”, it is difficult to find examples of attempts to structure public consciousness, clarify its own real political, social, economic interests - each social group, respectively, separate. Moreover: there were no attempts to seriously analyze the place occupied by Russia in the modern world - not to consider the emotional remarks of the opposite nature (“Russia is stronger than all” Russia “Russia is worse than all”); Actually, the real attitude of the leading countries of the world towards Russia turned out to be completely unknown to most of the audience. Hence, by the way, such a violent public reaction to the Western response after the occupation of Crimea. This is a reaction of people who do not understand how the world surrounding Russia works.

Media today work only “for their own”, giving them only what they expect from them - and in the most primitive form.

As a result, that part of Russian society, which is trying to rationally determine itself and the outside world, turned out to be completely disoriented. Moreover, she was deprived of the language of public discussion, a conversation on pressing political, social, economic and even cultural topics. Instead, she received at the disposal the language of inflamed non -reflexive journalism and direct propaganda. It is easy to notice the regrettable condition in this area by opening any Russian-speaking forum, a discussion on a social network or even comments on online publications. As soon as such a discussion at least remotely affects politics, one can clearly observe instant primitivization of speech, streams of insults, emotional gestures that have nothing to do with an attempt to convince the interlocutor. The point is not that “Russian society has gone crazy,” as some say; The fact is that he does not have a conversation language on these topics, and such a language is in many ways media (plus a school, plus a social environment. And there and there are only ruins). So we have the result of a media failure. By the way, such an option is not excluded that the growth of social dissatisfaction with the current Russian regime will make many “Putinists” to the opposition - but the criticism of the authorities on their part will be exactly the same non -encouraging in nature as their current swearing in relation to the “fifth of the USA”/US/Heiropes [2] . In other words, the lack of experience in rational thinking, the language of statement on the most important socio-political topics leads to the fact that society becomes easily manipulated. All this is obvious, even banal, but hygiene of thinking requires obvious things in places. I'm afraid that there has been nothing like this.

The current Russian government uses this situation in full. It is beneficial for her not only by the embodiment of an emotional, anti -rational, anti -intellectual wave in the media subordinate to her - in fact, the fast reaction of the opposition press is also beneficial if it is designed in the same spirit and style. Any serious problem easily turns into an occasion for mutual insults and manifestations of one’s own feelings, it is not discussed, it is “crashed”. As a result, the dissatisfaction of society by the real state of affairs goes into the background, and the political status quo is not only preserved, but also stronger.

Numerous readers of the opposition media turned out to be covered by the most banal xenophobia, intolerance to opponents - and simply to any other form of thought.

Thus, the rational, educational and even more so analytical conversation on important topics, especially those that are not entirely included on the current agenda of Russian journalism (and, alas, Russian society), is not only a socially significant, but also politically necessary. The Russian society, unfortunately, does not realize its real interests as “political”, separating acute issues of corruption, employment, problems of education, medical support, huge shortcomings and vices of the judicial system and state bodies in general from “politics” itself. Dissatisfaction, for example, is in no way aware of the situation in the neighboring clinic in ideas about the duties of the authorities, the responsibility of the citizen himself, his rights, and so on. This connection does not exist in the mind due to the fact that it does not have the most elementary idea of ​​the nature of the formation of political interest in the modern world. And a similar idea in society, which was totalitarian 25 years ago and still carries all the diseases of totalitarian consciousness, who recognizes either civil rights or personal responsibility of a citizen for his fate, such an idea cannot arise in the current media context. It must be created, constructed, even “grown” for many years.

An objection may arise: they say, media exist, first of all, for quick informing about what is happening - plus the media depend on this, depend on their popularity, the public and the market. This is so - in a structured, mature Western society. This is not so in Russian society. Here, it is not “demand that the demand dictates”, but “the proposal dictates demand” - in other words, while the public (its most intellectually, economically, socially and, in the future - politically active part) does not offer a thorough, serious conversation on serious topics that cannot be discussed in a couple of minutes, there will be no demand for such a conversation. Moreover, the majority of Russian media, who have preserved at least the remnants of a thorough approach to journalism, depends on the market not so much: they already have a reputation, it is unlikely to become worse if these media begin to think strategically and in the interests of part of Russian society, most important for salvation in the current disaster.

Propaganda based on lies and leading in a hysterical tone cannot be opposed to propaganda; The Soviet Union and Communist ideology did not collapse because of “counter-propaganda”, but because a serious cultural conversation was conducted with the “Soviet man” at a high intellectual level. For example, speeches, books (samizdat, Tamizdat and even Sovidat), radio experts (not on Soviet radio, of course) Solzhenitsyn, Autokhanov, Belinkov, Lotman, Averintsev, Pyatigorsky, Brodsky, Gurevich, Sakharov and others more much more changed the consciousness of the Soviet intellectual, which has become a massive support of reorganization and further changes than everything. Though good - propaganda efforts of the West. The decrease in this level - catastrophic, as we see now - largely led to the current crisis of Russian society. The guilt of the media in this process is difficult to overestimate.

Russian society is deprived of the language of discussion. Instead, it received at the disposal the language of inflamed non -reflexive journalism.

Therefore, the important task of residues of almost destroyed Russian media today is not even the development of a new language of public discussion, but the creation of a kind of media space, frames and opportunities for such a conversation. And here we should recall modern technologies and how they affect this situation.

The last one and a half years of media history have been a time of “acceleration”, decentralization and “dissolution” of the press in the audience. Social networks actually abolished the time between the event and the journalistic message about it. Printed media first turned into online newspapers, and then-for the most part-to the aggregator of references to a variety of materials. A horizontal system of relations came to the place of vertical connection of “Media -Public”, in which the media plays a role, rather, a shapeless distributor of the most diverse content, and not a supplier of clearly regulated - social responsibility, political engagement and economic expediency - information and analysis. Public Content shook the very idea of ​​media as an authoritative source of information and opinions. Social networks distribute media messages, media constantly refer to social networks. In this situation, in Russia, the lack of an authoritative opinion that would offer a ready-made explanatory model-and here there is still an addiction on such an opinion-it compensated for propaganda. If any fact can be called into question, since it is not worth the authority of the respected responsible media, then the propagandist becomes such an authority to which the state allows us to say anything, without paying special attention to the facts. The figure of the propagandist himself is important here - it can be anyone - and that place, the rostrum that is provided to him. The source of authority and trust in the propagandist is the tribune itself. It doesn’t matter even to the content of propaganda - its intonation, appeal to emotions, and not to mind or facts and, most importantly, lack of competition, are important. At each individual moment, the propagandist broadcasts to the public alone-and Russian society, which has lost Soviet skills of critical attitude to official discourse, but still living in the world of hierarchical ideas about the need for someone who indicates, how to think, listens to him. Even if the liberal takes this rostrum, the opponent of the current regime (or someone else, at least the Dalai Lama), the situation will remain the same, because the content of propaganda is completely unimportant. It is important that public consciousness works in this way, and not in another way. And this means that situations similar to what happened (and ongoing) in 2014 will be repeated.

Internet, social networks did not free the consciousness of society at all; On the contrary, strengthened in prejudices.

That is why no online revolutions could affect the nature of public consciousness in Russia; Moreover, they only aggravated his illness. Internet, social networks did not free the consciousness of society at all; On the contrary, strengthened in prejudices. That is why any attempt to change this situation based on the use of obvious fruits of the technological revolution - accelerating the time of media, decentralizing voice and authority - will lead the result, if not worse.

Many understand this now [3] . An example of this is the fashion for LongRides in Western Media (LongReads) that arose a few years ago (so far). However, the point is not a very new format or even a genre. We are talking about changing the media paradigm - “slow, thorough, complex journalism” instead of “quick, simple, brief” [4] . Such a change is impossible without abandoning many - primarily economic - the grounds for media activity today; First of all, we are talking about Russia. The real “complex slow journalism”, which is aimed at creating a language of public discussion, forming “real social and political interest” in the audience, appealing not to most, not closing in format and targeted framework - it cannot be economically self -smoked and even more to bring profit. This project is social, sociocultural, not market (although reflection may be reflection on the values/malformations of the “free market” as one of the goals of the entire enterprise). Such journalism until some point exists not only “for society”, but “instead of society”, until this society becomes mature and will gain language. Money for such projects should be given by people and institutions that are truly interested in the future of Russia, the present future of Russian society - because without a language of conversation about his future, his image in the public consciousness will not appear. Moreover, “slow journalism” should not be a purely “metropolitan”, nor “party”, nor purely “educational” (although the last element is completely necessary in it). And the last: “slow journalism” does not cancel “quick journalism” (I want to write “unfortunately”). The latter is always present by a media background, without it the press cannot exist. But this is precisely the background on which the long leisurely ringed body of Slow Journalism unfolds its long leisurely ring.

PS The term Medlenno.ru itself - for a completely different reason - the writer Andrei Lebedev invented. He even had a community with that name in LiveJournal.

[1] Naturally, to one degree or another, all this is also characteristic of Western journalism, but (as it will be seen from further reasoning) there are other circumstances, a different context - and other results of these processes.

[2] Яркий пример — радикальное изменение отношения к Китаю в последние пару лет: от страха/ненависти/расистского презрения к почти уже лакейским надежде/восторгам/уважению.

[3] Кстати говоря, к подобным выводам — но на примере совсем других, собственных обществ — приходят в Западной Европе и США.

[4] Здесь можно углядеть параллели с еще одним проявлением этой западной тенденции последних двадцати лет — со «slow food» versus «fast food» . Надо сказать, что движение «медленной еды» сильно изменило привычки и даже способ мышления западного общества, несмотря на то что в конце девяностых оно выглядело экзотичным, смехотворным и даже просто бессмысленным. Slow food действительно способствовало улучшению качества жизни — не говоря уже о том, что в результате этого движения возникла целая индустрия, а это значит рынки, рабочие места и так далее.