

How do I see the prospect of the next 4-5 years today, the day before the new, 2015? A couple of weeks ago, the probability of certain future events, turns, decisions would seem to me different. Probably, they will also change and shortly after writing these lines.
I'll start with the background: the background of the world and the background of the Russian.
In my opinion, the global crisis of 2008–2009 designated the transition in another historical period. Essentially, world development has reached a point in which the degree of dependence of the countries on each other turned out to be greater than the possibilities of their coordination. And it creates problems. It is necessary either to create a more cruel and subtle system of international coordination - that the “big twenty” proclaimed in 2009, but could not implement. Or you need to weaken the degree of dependence, go into centrifugal processes, deglobalize, form regional blocks. In my opinion, world development went according to the second scenario, and Ukraine is one of the victims of this scenario. Once on the border of the formed regional blocks, the country began to be separated by these forces.
In this sense, what is happening in Russia fell into a deoglobalization wave, which exacerbates our problems and threatens with dangerous consequences.
All the spring of 2014, I believed that the smell of World War II is spreading in the world - we are much closer to it than it might seem. I think that this smell has not yet been completely dispelled. And it is very important for us to keep this in mind. 1914 is repeated. Then, in 1913-1914, it was believed that there was a political game and no one was going to fight. But in fact, the war was already on the threshold. It begins with Tsugtswang - when one of the participants in the global processes is driven into a corner and is forced to attack.
In 2011, in the course of work on the 2020 strategy, we did a lot of work and stated that there was no way out of the crisis to the previous growth model. It was necessary to change it, but it was not changed. As a result, the old model began to stop. The whole development of the Russian economy from 2011 to 2014 is an attenuation of investment activity with rare shocks like the Olympiad. Therefore, regardless of conflict with the West and sanctions, we are still close to its stop.
Roughly speaking, there are two options on how to start the motor again. Either you need to create a high -quality investment climate with a high level of trust and other guarantees that private investments earn in the economy - this is a liberal scenario. Or you can not do this, but make state investments. This is a mobilization scenario. In my opinion, there is now a struggle between groups in power and their ideas about further development. Meanwhile, we are still in the inertial scenario.
The inertial scenario is half measures: the movement is a little there and a little here. I think that this is partly explained by the Black Monday: the authorities simultaneously tried to liberalize the ruble exchange rate and throw state money through state companies.
In principle, it is possible to stay afloat with such an inertial course, but this requires tremendous art and manual control. This is feasible when there is a pillow - oil rent. Now rents are less, so the probability of maintaining an inertial course, for the first time in the last 15 years, has fallen significantly below 50%. This means that you have to make a choice.
I believe that basically this choice has already been made.
This year, my colleagues and I tried to evaluate the likelihood of movement on a mobilization or liberalization path in various economic areas: Kirill Nikitin evaluated what was happening in tax policy; Andrei Shastitko with colleagues considered a competitive and industrial policy; Oleg Buklemyshev and his center for research on economic policy analyzed where the world situation is directed; Oleg Karasev with the team watched that with an innovative process. A brief general conclusion: after all, the scales are inclined to the mobilization option.
We held a previous assessment as of the end of October, and the other day we tried to refresh it in the light of recent events. At the end of October, the probability of scenarios in our model was built in this way: in the region of 50%-an inertial scenario, 40%-mobilization and 10%-liberal-erupting. Now, in our general opinion, the probability of an inertial scenario has decreased below 40%, the probability of a liberal-erasure has not changed, and mobilization has grown.
I will explain on the example of tax policy.
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