Conclusion from the boiler

The story of the Debaltsevo boiler seems to end. The hopes that the Ukrainian General Staff has some plans or reserves hidden for the time being for a radical correction of the situation have disappeared. The truth is simple: despite the stubborn resistance, several thousand Ukrainian military remains in the center of Debaltsev daily in the daily narrowing territory (February 17 was already in the center of Debaltsev), which, at best, will be captured and exchange through the procedure under the Minsk agreements. The Ukrainian army loses a huge number of military equipment so necessary for it in the boiler. The morale of the nation is struck by a strong blow. The war with Russia did not end, but only suspended - well, if for several months.

And why was it all needed? The answer to this question is not so simple. On the one hand, the Debaltsevsky ledge, preserved after the successful attack of the Ukrainian army in July-August, gave it a great strategic advantage. In a situation of war, he allowed at any time to move to the assault on all the main cities of the Donbass agglomeration - Gorlovka, Enakiev, Makeevka and Donetsk himself (actually Donetsk, Enakievo and especially the gorlovka). In a state of peace, this protrusion made it possible to control the only railway route between Donetsk and Lugansk and the shortest way along the road. And this meant a huge influence of Ukraine on almost the entire economy of Donbass, which greatly depends on railway transportation.

However, from the first half of August, the situation has changed a lot. The Ukrainian army has already opposed not scattered and poorly armed groups of militants. The Russian army handed them dozens of tanks and artillery units, including salvo fire installations (mainly from Ukraine in Crimea), hastily trained local experts and mobilized the "volunteers" from among the former Russian military with combat experience. And, no less important, put these groups under the general command, which was headed by the Russian general. Moreover, Russian troops, taking positions 20 km from the front line, began to insure militants from breakthroughs of the Ukrainian army, and were also involved for artillery shelling and individual particularly important operations on the front line. Thus, there was a qualitative change in the state of what is called the "armies" of the DPR and LPR.

In this situation, the Debaltsevsky ledge became a problem for the Ukrainian army. Its long walls had to be held, and for this, for this, in the new conditions, it was clearly not enough. All army resources were mobilized back in August-September, and Ukraine could offer anything fundamentally new for confrontation with the enemy. The supply of Ukrainian troops with weapons improved significantly (thanks to their inheritance, they never had problems with ammunition), but the main point in the preparation of a new campaign was the mobilization. The Debaltsevsky protrusion protects only 7-8 thousand people. The battles are carried out by very small forces - groups from two dozen to hundreds of fighters with the support of one or two tanks. And the fact that at the decisive moments the Ukrainian side did not have a half -thousand people of the reserve and the corresponding number of armored vehicles to eliminate especially dangerous breakthroughs, had the most sad consequences.

The reasons for this (in addition to the reluctance of a significant part of the conscripts to go to war) are now arguing. Many accusations (probably fair) were addressed to the Ukrainian command, which turned out to be unable to ensure the effective management of reserves and the concentration of troops in the directions of the impact (which was shown only by the partially successful attempt to push the front from Mariupol). The political leadership of the country, which made many soothing statements about the situation in the “cauldron”, was criticized not without reason and slightly reacted to requests for help, did not provide timely evacuation of civilians. And this despite the fact that the threat of the environment of the Debaltsev group was obvious from at least mid -January. These days, the political leadership already requires effective measures to release or withdraw troops. However, he most likely has nothing to answer. And attempts to maintain morale, acting with loud statements about the new Stalingrad, you can’t help the case.

What conclusions can be extracted from the sad story of the Debaltsevo boiler?

1. The Ukrainian army showed that it can generally effectively hold the defense, in any case against the systematic attacks of the irregular units of the Russian army, due to the misunderstanding of the "militias" or "separatists", as well as individual Russian units, including tank.

2. However, she does not know how to attack a strong enemy - and it is not known when she can acquire such a skill, especially with the current composition of the general. In general, it is obvious that the last hope for a successful offensive operation to liberate the entire Donbass died in early August. And while Russian troops will stand in the Donbass, there can be no talk of any decisive offensive.

3. The Ukrainian army is experiencing problems in supplying everyone except ammunition, and it is not known for how long the Ukrainian civil society has enough funds, strength and patience to support it. Changes in the situation can most likely be expected only after large -scale reforms of the entire state apparatus, which so far develop too slowly.

4. The army is too small and still poorly provided with modern weapons. The question of the supply of foreign "lethal" weapons will most likely be resolved in the coming months - and the situation with Debaltsev is in every possible way contributes to this. However, Ukraine will have to thoroughly take care not only about mastering the received, but also about producing its sufficient quantity. It will come in handy not so much for the offensive as for defense.

5. The Minsk agreements did not lead to a full -fledged truce, and even if they earn (after the final defeat of the Debaltsev group), the war will continue. This is primarily wanted in Donetsk and Lugansk, since the military-political structures that have developed there are not adapted to peaceful life. Former small bandits who have become at the Roll of the DPR-LNR cannot manage the economy and social sphere. In addition, in a situation of peaceful "downtime" they begin to tear out contradictions on the basis of personal ambitions and sharing the loot.

6. The losses among the Russian Irregular Army over the past year and a half, even in a tactically winning situation for her, were so great (at least 1000 people), which, probably, there are not many hunters for the next offensive. Therefore, Russian contractors will most likely go to deep breakthroughs necessary for the new configuration of the front line, as it was already at the end of August. Russian society, Ukraine, and the cosposers of the peace process should be prepared for this.