Internet: environment, aggression, person

Disputes about whether the Internet (in this case with a capital “I”) is the most important engine of human progress or the biggest obstacle to such movement constantly flares up among philosophers, technology analysts and, especially, journalists. Ilya Klishin’s text , recently published on Colta.ru, is a very illustrative example of Internet pessimism. Ilya, who has come a long way from an online activist to the editor of a respected multimedia media outlet, projects our contemporary network reality onto the era of transition from the Roman Empire to the “Dark Ages” and predicts the onset of something like the latter - primarily due to the fault of the Internet and “horizontal technologies” in general ”, which gave everyone the right of authorship to the load of a smartphone, already inexpensive and rapidly falling in price. According to Ilya, what is “barbaric” is not so much specific political forces as the very structure of the network, its principles and logic - and, of course, the “majority” allowed to create content. Ilya (like many Internet pessimists) perceives the expansion of access as the destruction of traditional Enlightenment models (including the broadcast model), Maslow’s pyramid and other “vertical” bonds that supposedly ensured the flourishing of modern civilization.

Skepticism about the network is nothing new. Previously, however, it was exclusively a component of conservative discourse and was based on traditional fears about everything new in general. A normal conservative - be it religious or simply inclined to focus on the past, on the “Golden Age” of this or that society - tends to delay as much as possible and complicate the mass introduction of innovations, primarily because they are contradictory. For a conservative, almost everything new has the potential for destruction rather than creation, even if this or that technology (product, service) does not imply or reveal any intention to destroy.

However, network skepticism is also a component of liberal political discourse. As a rule, such an attitude turns out to be a consequence of the evolution of the personal views of one or another public character: from joy and romanticization to sober skepticism. For example, Douglas Rushkoff , author of Cyberia and Media Virus , iconic texts of the era of the hacker revolution, went from celebrating the Internet as a prototype of a new utopia to deep pessimism about the network and its impact on society (Present Shock ). Tim O'Reilly - one of the leading philosophers and Internet figures, the author of the term Web 2.0 - today speaks more in his speeches about the risks that come with network technologies, especially in the field of "combining" these technologies with the human mind (or even replacing the latter "Network").

It is curious that in both cases, skepticism about the network is closely related to three properties of the Internet, about which it is generally not very clear - whether it either really has them, or whether they are, so to speak, attributed to it.

First, network technology is perceived as having its own content:

something similar, but alternative to traditional mass media, something that destroys established public information systems.

Conventional conservatives see many dangers in such a universal, endless and unregulated media - the very principle of direct democracy destroys the usual hierarchies of Golden Age societies. For a conventional liberal, information democracy is a source of “grassroots fascism,” populism among an environment prone to simple solutions and trading freedom in exchange for something tasty.

Secondly, in the space of the material, mercantile world, which was created by the industrial capitalism of the twentieth century (and which, predominantly, remains a reality for modern man), a sign of social, political and economic progress is the growth of opportunities, which, in turn, according to Marx, depend on capital and investment - both of an individual person and of civilization as a whole. Man rejoices at the opportunities that civilization creates for him, and at the same time fears them. And here network technologies radically change precisely the material, material layer of civilization:

“network services” unexpectedly replace many previously physically existing objects and services, encroach on the sacred principle of ownership and call into question the task of reproducing added value .

The principle of a “ gatekeeper ”, endowed with the right to decide what becomes common, accessible, all-pervasive - and what does not become, remaining hidden, censored or narrowly accessible - is the fundamental basis of media, education, politics, business. By interfering with its implementation not only in terms of content, but also in terms of the value of the “guardian” service, network technologies violate more than the oligopoly of speech - they even destroy the world of dystopia (to use J. S. Mill’s dictionary).

Dystopia is an important component of the discussion about the role of the network in our lives. All the most important dystopias are written from a deeply liberal position; societies of suppression, described by Orwell, Zamyatin, Huxley, Lem (“Return from the Stars”) and others, first of all encroach on freedom and subjectivity, including personal autonomy. Dystopias see in the negative scenario of the future such a strengthening of the Hobbesian Leviathan, as a result of which he will be able to control the deepest manifestations of personality, suppressing (or buying, like Mephistopheles, in exchange for comfort, status, security, predictability, etc.) “social souls" of citizens who are more or less satisfied with this state of affairs. It is impossible not to notice that dependence on network services, on the Internet in general - as a communication and social tool - generally resembles the relationship of dependence between the individual and the “state” in dystopias. The pervasive Network is practically Big Brother. The network supposedly gives a lot (not only information/propaganda) - but also takes away a lot (primarily anonymity and privacy). The network, especially after Snowden’s revelations, has ceased to be perceived as a space of privacy. The Internet (or “someone” who is the “owner of the Internet”) is watching you, interfering in your decisions, influencing your behavior (obviously for a bad purpose). There is a new version of Big Brother 2.0 - all that remains is to find it and identify it.

Finally, the third topic that almost always comes up among Internet skeptics is “Internet aggression” ; “on the right” and “on the left” this aggression is seen somewhat differently, but its presence is postulated a priori. Personally, it is the conversation about the deliberate “aggressiveness” of the Internet (and network technologies in general) that seems most important to me. This is the most superficial of the “accusations” from Internet skeptics, however (as part of the reaction to Ilya Klishin’s theses) what is said below is not a refutation of it, but rather an attempt to shift attention to the more obvious role that new information technologies play in the life of society . If we believe that “aggressiveness” is a natural, “built-in” property of them, then yes, of course, we can perceive the Internet as the gates of Rome, open to barbarians, or as a dystopia of total control and controlled thinking.

It should, first of all, be borne in mind that we are talking about a multifaceted reality: it includes both material infrastructure and software protocols that determine the rules of behavior of network nodes, and secondary systems and structures superimposed on top of the infrastructure and rules (for example, social networks, forums, systems of relationships in comments on media sites), and content distributed through the network, and the creators of this content, and the reaction of consumers (individual or collective). We can talk about this as a gigantic territory of intersection and interpenetration of many scientific disciplines, social and engineering practices, only partially mapped on the map of social existence.

When discussing such borderline phenomena and areas of unclear status, there is always the danger that different disciplines will not only offer different explanations for the same phenomena, but will also impose along with the explanations their own, difficult to compare, vocabularies of description and methods of analysis. Aggression, as understood by psychology and the theory of interpersonal communications, and aggression, as understood by media theory, are two different “aggressions” that are nothing more than relatives to each other. However, talking, for example, about the “climate of hatred” on the Internet often implies both indiscriminately.

In addition, the topic of “aggression in the digital environment” is tied not only to the concept of aggression, but also to the concept of the environment. The Internet acquired the properties of a “medium” (both in our perception and in language itself) quite recently. Before that, it was a “technical novelty” (a technology proposed for development), then it was a “space” (which had to be specifically “entered”), then it was some kind of transitional entity that combined the qualities of “space” and “type of activity.” (“work on the Internet” / “go to sea”). And only in the last 5–7 years has the Internet begun to be explicitly conceptualized by communicators (and described in language) as a “medium,” i.e. an objectively existing object within which a person “is” and carries out his activities.

And this is where the transfer of the usual qualities of other “environments” of human habitation to the Internet as a “medium” began.

It turned out that the Internet “has properties” in relation to which different generations of consumers (as well as those with different views) use different vocabulary. Some of these properties are important for the consumer - and a certain attitude is formed towards them, such as aggressiveness. Others, not entirely clear to the average consumer, remain unnoticed and unnamed in everyday language (at least in Russian): for example, net neutrality . Modern people, who grew up and formed in structured societies with a constantly reproducing and delegated hierarchy, do not really understand that any Internet node is a priori equal to another: the very nature of the TCP/IP protocol is in the equality of nodes for the network as a system and in the equality of packets through this network transmitted. Illusions and aberrations generated by personal experience are transferred to the realm of laws and principles. And, for example, the bogeyman of “liberal propaganda on the Internet” arises, regularly used by pro-Putin journalists. It’s not the Internet that primarily delivers oppositional content to them: they look for it there themselves and find it. As the share of consumers (and creators) of Internet content in society increases, the Internet increasingly corresponds, in proportional terms, to the distribution of political views represented in society: the scale of representation of conservatives, patriots, liberals, fascists and “undecideds” cannot differ significantly online and offline. Yes, at the dawn of its development, the Internet as a media was mainly used - both in Russia and in other countries - by liberal-minded users (including the media). This is just natural: liberals are less afraid of novelty. However, the more the Internet universalizes and becomes a public property, the more often views that are deeply different from liberal ones will find expression here.

There is no reason to believe that the network itself produces “aggression” (in its communicative sense).

Any environment has objective properties that are given to us in sensations. For example, the environment of a forest is understandable, it is trees, moss, bushes, air. The forest environment is inhabited by other living beings, which are not necessarily human friends. But you can influence this environment, to the point of “abolishing” it (cutting down the forest), you can exterminate dangerous animals and destroy harmful plants with chemicals. It is unlikely that people will call the forest an “aggressive environment,” although the dangers to life in it are quite real. The objective properties of the Internet as a medium are supplemented by extensions of these properties intended to solve certain problems (they are sometimes called “applications” - they isolate a specific need of users of the environment and satisfy it; continuing the analogy with the forest, such an “application” is a hunting weapon, or an ax, or a compass that allows you not to get lost in the forest). The properties of the environment and the “applications” created for the environment, it seems to me, significantly contribute to the manifestation and consolidation of certain behavior patterns, including those that are assessed as “aggressive” - just as “applications” for the forest environment completely can become a weapon of human aggression towards humans. Another thing is important: the reasons for the appearance of “aggressive” content on the Internet are no different from the reasons for its appearance in other information environments, but they are fundamentally different from the reasons for aggressive behavior when using the Internet as a method of interpersonal or group communication.

It can also be assumed that a collision with the “information environment” affects stereotypes of human behavior: after all, the Internet is not only books that you can read, but also a space in which you can “conduct yourself” - provide feedback both to the author and with the audience.

Among the properties of the “environment” that become a nutrient broth for aggression is the lack of clear definitions of the sacred and profane, which are at least partially developed for traditional physical or communicative spaces. It is unlikely that a person would think of laughing in the “space” of a temple or dancing in a cemetery - behavior in these places is normalized. The hypothesis is that the “environment,” especially something as specific as a network, unlike “space,” does not particularly normalize behavior and does not limit it in any way. In such a situation, behavior (including manifestations of aggression, sloppiness, xenophobia, etc.) is determined primarily by the user’s upbringing. Some of the users and visitors of the Internet in general and any site, social network in particular, feel certain behavioral standards, or rather, the special properties of the Internet as an interactive, reactive environment form some temporary “signals”, signs of what is acceptable. But if your parents didn’t teach you to lower your voice in the theater or library, then most likely you won’t pick up these rather gentle and subtle signals on the Internet.

Can we say that the Internet environment (and, in particular, social networks) provokes some special level of aggression that deserves special mention? Like any comparative question, it requires a starting point common to everything being compared. A person learns aggression quite early, at the very beginning of socialization. The vast majority of schoolchildren, it seems to me, encountered the maximum level of aggression in high school; Some people have experienced wars and prisons, but this is clearly not the case for everyone. Accordingly, the majority determines the level of aggression in comparison with the dull hormonal aggression of older adolescence.

Defining aggression (including calling it aggression) is practically the key point in distinguishing between ethical and unethical behavior.

At what point does cockiness turn into aggressiveness? At what point does sullenness begin to be perceived as a hidden threat? Where is the barrier that separates emotionality, assertiveness, quality activity on the one hand - and anger, the desire to suppress, the desire to instill fear - on the other? Or is this not about personal communication at all, but about political, mass communication?

In political communication, “aggression” is certainly not one concept, but a family of concepts that describe a fairly wide range of types of messages, methods of conveying them and accompanying rhetorical techniques. In Soviet political communication, for example, the aggressiveness of the subject was mainly expressed through imperatives and appeals; power implicitly assumed a position of moral superiority, that supposedly unique locus from which speaking indicates the “morality” of the speaker (protection of the disadvantaged, justice, a better future for all without distinction). The Soviet tradition of political communication (as well as many others, in order not to sin against the truth) also used the method of dehumanizing an opponent in order to provoke an inhuman attitude towards him. The enemies of the USSR, especially in Stalin's time, were portrayed as rats, insects, zombies - anything so that the aggressive statement “crush the filthy reptile” remained relevant.

It is much more interesting that in the modern, “late Putin” Internet, not only truly aggressive behavior (trolling, insults, chauvinism, etc.), but also attempts to discuss the shortcomings of Russia as a country, Russian society and its representatives are labeled as “aggressive” ( especially if such discussion is self-reflexive or allows for an ironic attitude towards “Russians” and “Russian”). Such an expansion of the idea of ​​aggression is likely to have an induced nature - because, generally speaking, a person, even at all not inclined to self -reflection, is more likely to understand the aggressive intentions of partners in communication (“maybe I did not fully understand it”). At the same time, however, an exaggerated, constantly “pulled to the surface” discussion of someone else's aggression, marriage as such communication acts, obviously deprived of any features of aggressiveness, is a distinctive feature of the modern Russian (and wider russian) network public sphere.

Is it possible to discuss the objective property of the Internet as an environment in which there are no special restrictions on the spread of aggression in any form - from mass to personal? But you can discuss the induced, induced perception of the Internet as a special environment for the spread of a special “Russian” version of aggression? The traditional means of communications, although always used to one degree or another as “transport of aggression”, were still under the control of certain traditions, written and unwritten rules; Russian television, however, has recently been regularly “beyond the flags”. However, in relation to traditional media there are - at least at the level of sensations - the idea of ​​their controllability (“if they tell them to shut up, they will shut up”). In relation to the boundless and unregulated world, there is no such representation.

In such a situation, not actual aggression becomes important for the consumer, but what is named is named with “aggression” in authoritative media. The concept of network “atmosphere of hatred”, designed by television propaganda, partly allows us to understand how subtle and speculative techniques are used to manipulate public opinion. In the process of “demarcation” of Russian audiences on the issue of attitude to Ukraine and the “annexation/return” of Crimea, a massive relationship of traditional media and Internet communication channels (not only editorial sites, but also blogs and social networks) occurred. This epidemic outbreak has yet to be described and measured, to understand its nature and the degree of directional interference in the work of network and social algorithms. But, alas, we are already living on Wednesdays (not only on the Internet, but also in the communities of our friends, relatives, colleagues) who have been changed by aggression and continue to change.

If aggression in political communication can be practically infinite, although it is inclined to turn into a ritual over time (like Orwell - into a “five -minute hatred”), then personal aggression as a form of manifestation of personality cannot be constant.

It is built into the system of neurophysiological reactions: sooner or later the body tires to produce hormones that are required to maintain the appropriate state, and the relaxation phase occurs. This contradiction between political communication and personal was well studied in application to Nazi Germany. Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno, and Jurgen Habermas wrote more than enough about that social and media technology, with the help of which “evil” (including aggression as a component of “evil”) turns into everyday life, although at the same time at the same time Ritual property. Internet trolls that go to work in the office and carry out job descriptions-a typical embodiment of the banality of evil; Equipped with appropriate technology, which makes their work quantitatively effective, they even transfer banality into some new quality.

We, the Internet consumers (as a service and as content) and the inhabitants of the Internet environment may not like this specific reality - but, alas, it fits into the rules and convention fundamentally neutral to the maintenance of the network. In a sense, the danger of such injections of aggression or provocation (especially if they are really organized and directed as the events of the Russian-Ukrainian media confrontation, the communication of ISIS and Al Caida)-in the potential of long-term impact on the sensation of the Internet as an environment. You can put forward the hypothesis (although there are enough of them in these notes) that the most sensitive to the features of the Internet as the environment as an environment of the young audience was precisely why it began to leave the traditional web space to instant messengers and Ephemeral Media (Snapchat, WhatsApp, Telegram and others) that There is no background of aggression, a kind of "media back", which sets the tone of any communication.