Agreements signed in February this year in Minsk gave rise to hopes for a quick achievement of peace in the Donbass. Almost six months have passed since then, and these hopes, alas, began to gradually melt. The voices of experts are increasingly heard: they say, it is impossible to fulfill the Minsk agreements, and this is obvious to everyone. Obviously this, thank God, is not everyone. Most Ukrainian citizens support the Minsk agreements, although the number of their supporters has recently decreased. In February-March, 74% of all of all surveyed by the Kyiv Institute of Sociology of Ukrainian Citizens (without “DPR” and “LPR”) were expressed for them, 57% in July. The military solution to the problem is now supported by 28% of respondents. That is, in Ukrainian society, Minsk-2 supporters are twice as much as advocates of military decisions. But in the political establishment of the "party of war" is much stronger.

The environment of President Poroshenko, apparently, does not want a military decision, but it is very afraid of the pressure of the “party of war”. Trying to somehow “slip between the drops of rain”, it demonstrates double approaches. Poroshenko constantly certifies his Western partners in the commitment of the Minsk agreements. But his statements, so to speak, “for domestic consumption” sound in a completely different way. This is what he says to the West: “We are ahead of schedule. The 11th paragraph (Minsk Protocol. - V. M. ) The de facto executed: we launched the constitutional process, the law on the features of local self-government was adopted, and positions were clearly written out there. Ukraine has fulfilled its obligations. ” The president assures Ukrainian radicals that the amendment adopted in the first reading to the Constitution does not imply any serious differences in the status of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions: "There is no and can not be any special status for those areas."
Both the West and the Ukrainians Poroshenko are misleading. The 11th point of the Minsk agreements, of course, has not yet fulfilled (neither de facto nor de jure). Firstly, because there is a “special status of individual regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions” , from which Poroshenko categorically renounces. Secondly, because constitutional reform, allegedly neglected, suggests “as a key element to decentralization, taking into account the features of individual regions of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions agreed with representatives of these areas,” but for now no one agreed with anyone. And the third: in the 11th paragraph, we are not talking about the launch of the constitutional process, but about the " conducting constitutional reform in Ukraine with the entry into force of the end of 2015 of the new Constitution." Only when a new constitution enters into force, in which the special status of individual regions of Donbass will be enshrined and this status will include a number of provisions prescribed in the Minsk Protocol-it will be possible to talk about Ukraine’s implementation of the 11th clause of the Minsk-2 agreement.
So far, it is very far away. The law on the features of local self -government in certain areas of Donbass, to which Poroshenko refers, enters into force only after the whole Donbass is controlled by Kyiv, and this, if possible, only after the complete completion of the “Minsk process”, and not at its current stage.
The transitional provisions, where they made an amendment regarding the Donbass, is by no means the main backbone of the Constitution.
The text of the amendments allows various interpretations (one of them just demonstrated Poroshenko, claiming the absence in the text and a hint of a special status), which will allow the president and the Verkhovna Rada at any time to change both the decisions of the local government in the Donbass and this power itself. And finally, the latter: the launch of the process may not be completed, since in the first reading the amendment passed by a simple majority (288 votes), and in the second reading the majority of qualified (300 votes), which the supporters have no Poroshenko, will be needed.
Kiev political scientist Vladimir Fesenko reveals the meaning of the position of the presidential team in this matter: "Now the inclusion of this proposal in the constitutional bill fulfills a purely tactical function - it demonstrates Western partners with a willingness to fulfill the Minsk agreements." In October, the “DPR” and “LPR” will be held by local elections “without the participation of the Ukrainian side in them”. Thus, Fesenko believes, the separatists themselves will bury “Minsk-2”, and then the need for a “conflictogenic sentence” will disappear, and it can be removed from the constitutional bill. Therefore, you should not rush with the final vote for the project.
The tactics indicated by Vladimir Fesenko is already being implemented. On July 17, the Verkhovna Rada appointed local elections throughout Ukraine on October 25, saying that the elections will not be held in the occupied part of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. Few people paid attention to this, but a pity.
Indeed, by its decision to cancel the elections in the areas of Donbass, the Verkhovna Rada actually crossed out two points of the Minsk agreements at once-the 4th and 12th.
In paragraph 4, we are talking about the need to jointly develop the conflict by the conditions of "holding local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation." The 12th paragraph states that "issues regarding local elections will be discussed and agreed with representatives of individual regions of Donetsk and Lugansk regions." Instead of coordinating and developing something, Kyiv simply canceled the elections.
Elections will not be held in the Donbass, new complications will arise-the clause of the 9th agreements will not be implemented: on the restoration of the full control of Ukraine over the state border, “which should begin on the first day after the local elections and end after a comprehensive political settlement ... subject to the implementation of clause 11”. The point in which Kyiv is most interested in, since it means preserving the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The leaders of the “DPR” and “LPR” offered the Minsk contact group their version of local elections - no one even discussed it. Then they stated that they themselves would hold the elections and turned to the OSCE with a request to ensure control: the OSCE refused them, citing the lack of consent of Kyiv. Most likely, local elections in these republics in October will still be held, but they will not be recognized as the world community. And the Minsk agreements will be considered to be disrupted.
Obviously, Kyiv will assign the responsibility for the breakdown of Minsk-2 to the leaders of the “DPR-LNR” (forgetting what he himself did for this), and the West, of course, agrees with this. It makes no sense to lay responsibility for everything to the self -proclaimed republics: they are not recognized anyway. It is much more important to understand what will follow after Minsk-2 fails.
One gets the impression that Kyiv does not have a reasonable strategy in the Donbass. There are scenarios, but whether they are thought out, it can be judged by analyzing the possible options for the development of events proposed by the director of the National Institute for Strategic Research Vladimir Gorbulin (the newspaper Mirror of the Week, 07/19/2015). Note that it is Gorbulin who represents Ukraine in the subgroup, which is responsible in Minsk for the political settlement of the conflict.
The first scenario is the Total War , in which Ukraine has a chance to win, "at a price of which will be" destroyed infrastructure and economic potential of Ukraine, numerous sacrifices among military and civilian. " Although the first scenario, according to Gorbulin, is not the goal of Ukraine, he does not consider it absolutely unacceptable. It contains, from his point of view, serious advantages: Ukraine will forever get rid of the existing “fifth column” of frank supporters of the “Russian world”; He will receive his own “heroic epic” as the ground for patriotic education of future generations; “Most of the issues of Ukrainian-Russian relations will be completely resolved, and the historical paths of both peoples will be dispersed forever,” which, apparently, Gorbulin is quite satisfied.
But if not a "total war", then what? Gorbulin has three more peaceful scenarios. The second scenario is the “ elimination” of all the occupied territories of Donbass. “Is it worth continuing the struggle for the territories destroyed during the armed conflict, the remains of the population on which do not express the desire to return to Ukrainian jurisdiction”, if the loss of Ukraine, “where Renegat and consumer sentiments dominate,” will create suitable conditions for reforming the country. Such a development of events could, according to Gorbulin, could completely arrange Kyiv, but it will adversely affect the prestige of the country and cause some difficulties in adapting to a new situation. The third scenario provides for unilateral concessions to Moscow, and therefore does not suit Kiev at all. The fourth scenario: “Frozen the conflict” on the model of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia. So Gorbulin writes, but he implies clearly completely different, namely, that the current territories of the “DPR” and “LPR” “remain in Ukraine, possibly on the conditions of their authority.” Something similar is precisely the Minsk agreements. Gorbulin admits that the fourth script could quickly end the war and arranged EU countries, allowing them to deal with other problems, but Ukraine is not interested in it. Because she will have to restore the Donbass, to bear the economic burden “in the person of the affected refugee regions”, which will serve as a source of political instability. In a word, the fourth scenario provided for by the Minsk-2 agreement is not needed, it is not a sin and to disrupt it.
Judging by the said Gorbulin (and he, by the post, is the chief designer of the strategy of the Ukrainian state), Kiev focuses his policy mainly on the fifth script - the script: “Neither war, no peace” or “limited war and permanent negotiations”. It is supposed to combine a “ limited and restraining war against Russia and collaborators in the East in order to inflict as many demotivating losses as possible” with “a constant negotiation process, however, without the final record of the results in the form of various agreements and formats”. In fact, it was this, and not the Minsk scenario should be called "freezing the conflict." I’m only afraid that freezing will not work - there will be a “smoldering bonfire”, which, if it does not extinguish it, can break out with a new flame even more destructive than before, war. It is unlikely that such a strategy can be called constructive.
There is simply no reasonable alternative to the Minsk agreements. Therefore, now it is extremely important to provide them with public support. So far there is no such support. There are many abstract conversations, there are no specifics. They engage in specifics in the Minsk contact group, and even the leaders and ministers of Ukraine, Russia, Germany, France, the USA and the OSCE during their negotiations with each other. All these negotiations are closed, which is quite natural: not everything can always be taken to the public. But the public should not stand aside. It is necessary, I think, public lobbying of the Minsk agreements.
What is necessary for this in practice?
The most urgent topic that requires public discussion is the question of how to hold local elections in some areas of Donbass, which will be recognized as the world public. If such elections take place, Kyiv will have a partner for negotiations on the future status of Donbass, which he will have to admit, and at the same time a formal justification of the anti -terrorist operation will disappear. It is impossible to allow the preservation of the constantly smoldering warfare in Europe. It is important to ensure that European leaders increase pressure on the sides of the conflict in order to prevent any actions that could complicate the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Something: the rejection of the constitutional consolidation of the special status of Donbass, the orientation on the “limited war and permanent negotiations”, the abandonment of the amnesty of all participants in the conflict and, of course, the continuation of mutual shelling, during which people die.
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