The competition of ideas and values increasingly resembles a “soft” arms race

When it comes to the weaknesses of the Russian foreign policy arsenal, all commentators—both well-meaning and not so well-meaning—agree on one thing: a deficit of “soft power.” That is, the ability, with the help of one’s own example, charm and persuasion (not coercion), to attract others to the implementation of one’s undertakings and interests. The problem has been recognized more than once and officially, however, systematic work to solve it has not been possible - neither when special foreign companies were hired, nor when they tried to intensify the work of government institutions.

Budgets for this will most likely continue to be allocated. But the changing international environment also affects the fate of “soft power”, giving it a different meaning than the one the authors of the concept intended.

It was introduced into circulation by the outstanding American diplomat and scientist Joseph Nye immediately after the end of the great ideological confrontation - in 1990. The emergence of this idea precisely then is symbolic. The Cold War ended without a major armed conflict. Life itself, it seemed, demonstrated the meaninglessness of accumulated tank armadas, megatons and megawatts, capable of destroying the planet many times over. Victory was achieved primarily through non-military means - cultural, ideological and economic.

There was nothing new in non-military methods of influence - they had existed throughout human history. However, Nye's concept introduced an important nuance, not only by academically describing this phenomenon, but also by formally recognizing it as a political tool. Joseph Nye legitimized cultural and ideological influence as a way to pursue national policies in the interests of a particular country. In general, the word power - strength, authority (it is no coincidence that the translation “flexible power” was also found in Russian usage) - refers to the classical vision of international relations as forceful interaction. That is, the scope of use of force has expanded.

Joseph Nye wrote primarily about the United States. It was assumed that others could (and should) compete using the same methods, but the United States obviously has the greatest “soft power” potential, because thanks to it they won the Cold War. In general, it was believed that the triumph of “soft power” marks the beginning of another era, when traditional power would remain the lot of relations with a few troublemaker countries (they are also rogue countries), and respectable powers communicate differently.

The result was not entirely expected. Firstly, everyone agreed that this is the most cultural and political “soft” influence - a means of politics. This means that it can serve the achievement of someone’s goals, and it must be perceived accordingly. And oppose him. Secondly, we must learn to use our “soft power” in response. Thirdly, if its potential is insufficient, it has to respond in other ways, the softness of which is questionable.

“Color revolutions” are a vivid example of what happens when “soft” and “hard” forms of influence enter into an interaction that develops into a clinch.

In the homeland of the concept of “soft power,” support for democratization in countries lagging behind on the path of progress is considered a legitimate way to accelerate it. The authorities of the states that become the object of such influence see in it a projection of force (albeit of an unusual type) in the interests of another state. And they either strive to block the corresponding channels, or react by using the power they have - the repressive apparatus.

Not only is the concept of force changing, the interpretation of war is also changing. They talk about “hybrid” warfare in connection with Ukraine, but war generally takes other forms when the main means approved in America, for example, are drones, sanctions and actions in cyberspace.

That is, the line between types of force, between peaceful and military, is generally erased. This allows governments to arbitrarily interpret any type of foreign activity as requiring resistance. And if in countries with systems of varying degrees of authoritarianism (including Russia and China) this fits into the general approaches, then in states with established democracies this is a new thing, but is also gaining momentum.

A sad sign of modernity is the new militarization of discourse. On the one hand, the rhetoric of a real Cold War is flaring up with threats to deploy tanks and troops. On the other hand, new concepts that were supposed to make competition more peaceful also take on a militarized connotation. The victims will be ordinary citizens, whose living space will once again be limited. But they are no strangers.

Strength breaks softness: what is the weakness of Russian foreign policy