There is a second Crimean war. It is useful to remember how the first began and how the first ended. And it began with a brilliant Sinop victory! One of the three strips on Guses, the delay collars of Russian sailors is dedicated to her. Alas, the victory turned out to be Pirrova: the destruction of the Turkish squadron came in the recovery of the Black Sea Fleet, and the burning of the Sinop - the defeat of Sevastopol.

This was easily foreseen even Nakhimov. Here is what Napoleon III wrote to Nicholas I about his victory: “France and England did not consider it necessary to send landing troops to the aid of Turkey. Their banner was not affected by clashes that took place on land, but it was completely different at sea. At the entrance to the Bosphorus there were three thousand guns, the presence of which was quite loudly told by Turkey that the first two sea powers would not allow him to attack her on the sea. The Sinop event was as offensive to us as unexpectedly. For it doesn’t matter whether the Turks wanted or did not want to supply combat supplies to Russian territory. In fact, Russian ships attacked Turkish ships in Turkish waters when they were quietly anchored in the Turkish harbor. They were destroyed, despite the assurances that the offensive war would not be undertaken, despite the neighborhood of our squadron. It is no longer our foreign policy that received a blow, but our military honor. The cannon shots at Sinop spoke painfully in the hearts of all those who in England and in France have a living sense of national dignity. There was a general cry: wherever our guns can reach, our allies should be respected. ”

Give Navarin!

In 1853, Nicholas I decided that it was time to crush Turkey, the benefit was a serious reason: the Turks took the keys to the Bethlehem church from the Orthodox priests and gave them to Catholics. And in general, I wanted victories and overcoming - both the king and the last peasant. But the admirals of Kornilov and Nakhimov were especially lusting. They fought in the Navarinsky battle with young lieutenants, but a quarter of a century passed, but there were no more victories. Large. Justifying admiralism.

The repetition of Navarin was an idefix, and on October 23 (November 4), 1853, even before the declaration of the Turkish war, the fast on the rise of Kornilov raised his flag on the steamboat Vladimir and went out with the armed boat, Odessa and Khersones for reconnaissance. In case of meeting with the Turkish fleet, which he wanted to destroy, the Admiral gave a sealed envelope with instructions for his instructions for his friend-river Nakhimov, whose squadron was to go along the Asian coast to the Bosphorus to cut off the retreat to the Turks. Kornilov himself was going to act from the front from the front from Sevastopol to act from the front. If, he wrote, “you will be able to warn the Sevastopol squadron and find the enemy anchor under his fortresses, then block him to the connection, and then, with God's help, the Battle of Navarinsky can repeat it!”

Doesn't it seem to you that the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet showed amazing indiscretion? By that time, England and France gave Porta guarantees of the security of her ports from the Russian attack and brought this to the attention of the Russian government (see above the letter of the French emperor). Moreover, their powerful fleet was already in Bosphorus, and Kornilov himself warned Nakhimov to beware of his attack. It was not at all difficult to foresee what the repetition of Navarin would lead to ...

Hunting Osman Pasha

Kornilov’s steamboats found a Turkish squadron of five frigates, a corvette and a steamer at the entrance to the Bosphorus, but a flurry of flurry and early autumn darkness forced to turn back. The fuel was running out, and the admiral refused to date with Nakhimov, heading for Sevastopol, so that on the morning of October 29 (November 10) - just a day after arrival! - Having entered into the command of the Novosilsky squadron, to bring six battleships to intercept the enemy.

Alas, a strong storm flew in the late evening of the same day, on November 11 and 12, Kornilov’s ships hardly stayed still, and turned to the north on the 13th. Nakhimov detained the same storm at Cape Kerempe, but on November 1 (13) he received a royal manifesto with joyful news - the war began! Already on November 4 (16), his ship Bessarabia was captured by the Turkish steamer - the first trophy!

Where was the Osman Pasha squadron at that time, which Kornilov hunted for and who was waiting for Nakhimov? She, having waited a storm in Amaster, went to meet the latter and was already close ...

Kornilov was preparing for battle and wrote down: “Nelson was wetting the bed covers and tarpaulins in case of fire. It is necessary to shoot at the case. In the battle of Abukir, ships stood against the cheekbone of the enemy. All precautions against fire. Remember Orion under Abukir and Achille in the traffic. ” But he did not find the Turks at the Bosphorus and sent the Novosilsky squadron to the east to transfer two 84-gun ships to Nakhimov, and he went forward on Vladimir himself to quickly inform Pavel Stepanovich about Turkish steamboats and then go to the bunkering in Sevastopol.

Here the most interesting thing begins in our history: the Kornilov error chain, thanks to which the Sinop battle took place. He, in turn, entailed the entry into the war of the British and French, the comedy of mistakes became a military drama, and then the tragedy of Sevastopol. Kornilov, who dreamed of the laurels of the new Navarin, who put so much strength in search of the enemy and brought almost the entire Black Sea Fleet to the storm sea for this, missed Osman Pasha!

Error chain

M.P. Lazarev at one time wrote to Prince A. S. Menshikov, offering to appoint Kornilov chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet: “I don’t know how your Grace will accept my idea of ​​Kornilov, but I can assure you that there was nothing else, like a firm conviction in the merits of this officer, it was the reason that I decided on it. We have a lot of counter-admirals, but is it easy to choose one that would combine in itself the knowledge of marine affairs and the enlightenment of the present, which, without fear, could be entrusted in critical circumstances and the honor of the flag and the honor of the nation? ”

Subsequently, when these critical circumstances occurred when it came to the honor of the Fleet and the fate of Sevastopol, Kornilov justified Lazarev's trust. However, on that day that could become decisive and give Russian sailors the long -awaited victory, and the victory in the sea, maneuverable battle, he was mistaken. And not once, but three times! If not four times. Moreover, his mistakes were very characteristic, that is, they talked a lot about the character, the style of his command, and even the degree of correspondence of his position.

If you blow the patriotic gilding, then the synop should be considered as an official omission. Whether the intelligence and sentinel service on the Black Sea Fleet is better established, be Cornal more responsible, the Russians could end the Osman Pasha squadron two weeks earlier, not giving the British and French a reason for the war. Nakhimov was waiting for the Turkish squadron and was ready to intercept her. For three weeks, Pavel Stepanovich, a harsh and responsible person, plowed the cold autumn sea. The prey itself went to him, and, staying in place after the capture of the Medari Tidzharet or move in the same course along the coast, Osman Pasha would have hit him in his hands the very next day. But instead of a guaranteed victory (what are Turkish frigates with untrained teams against powerful battleships of the Black Sea Fleet in a sea battle?!) He will be forced to scour another two weeks on the stormy sea, looking for these damn Turks.

There is good reason to believe that the culprit of this Afront was Kornilov. Instead of finding the main enemy forces, he used ships to satisfy personal ambition, chasing - the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, the brain of the fleet! - For prizes. Of course, after such an embarrassment of Nakhimov, the sea was ready to dig a sea, just to make amends. And the fate of Sinop was decided. Thus, the fate of Sevastopol also decided. So a small stone, rolling down, tears a whole avalanche ...

Record from November 5 (17) in the “Historical Journal of the Nakhimov squadron” reports: “... at 10 o’clock we heard to W shots, why and the Bessarabia steamer was sent to the other side to view the horizon and for a survey of the three -masted vessel, and at 11 o’clock, seeing that the finger was intensified, I decided to move the squadron to Was completely silence to W through steamers ...”

Nakhimov made titanic efforts, trying to advance the squadron to the place of the cannonade! He believed that Kornilov had finally tied the case with the Turkish fleet, and was eager to help. He immediately recalled the Bessarabia from the chanting of the sailboat and ordered her to be towed by the Brave ship, and the flagship was towed by the prize ship. Having advanced 12 miles by 3 o’clock in the afternoon, he sent Medari Tijaret for “Yagudiyle”, and after another two hours he sent “Bessarabia” - for “Chema”. Then a light wind rose, the ships entered the sails and moved to the north-west.

But what happened there, beyond the horizon? Who shot?

The following happened. As Kornilov writes in reporting to Menshikov on November 19 (7): “On November 5, with dawn, they saw the Anatolian coast between the port of Amastasta and Cape Kerempe, and steaming smoke towards Sevastopol, and soon the squadron of Vice Admiral Nakhimov in the left side, at the distance of a distant signal. Believing that you can always have time to return to our squadron, I ordered to take a course towards the apparent steamer. ”

The famous battle of November 5 (17), the first fight of the steamers in history is the key moment in our history. On that day, Kornilov (more precisely, Butakov) won a difficult victory, taking the prize, but she not only led to the Sinop battle, but was also similar to him - her unnecessaryness and recklessness. Napoleon, having read the words attributed to him on the island of St. Elena: “I did not commit crimes,” said: “I committed something worst - mistakes!” It should be recognized that this case is just such a case. But neither Kornilov nor Russian historians admitted mistakes.

And there were a lot of them. Firstly, the Odessa steamboat, lifted up with the exit from Sevastopol and was looking for Kornilov’s squadron, stumbled upon the Osman Pasha from six pennants on the night of November 1 (13). The storm carried her to the north, and now she was returning to her course along the coast of Anatolia, about to go to Penderaclia (now Eregli). But Odessa was never able to find either Kornilov or Nakhimov to inform about it.

Secondly, the navigator was strongly summed up. Kornilov believed that he sees the Turkish coast between Amaster and Kerempe, where he expected to find Nakhimov, while “Vladimir” was opposite Pendderakli, where Osman Pasha was going. The ship that he saw from Sinop also returned here - the Egyptian “Pervaz Bahri”. But Eregli is located 60–80 miles to the west, and Osman Pasha was supposed to be in this area! And where else could he be if Nakhimov guarded him from the east, and in the west he himself Cornilov combed the entire coast from Sulin to Bosphorus?

Thirdly,-and there is already a direct fault of Kornilov,-even making a mistake in the number, in no case could you rush in pursuit of a single steamer, not understanding the unknown squadron. The purpose of the entire fleet in the sea was still not hunting for individual vessels, but the search and destruction of formations that carry landing to the Caucasus.

A. M. Zayonchkovsky in his capital book “Eastern War” justifies the admiral, who “thanks to the erroneous calculation of his place, he set himself in the morning of November 5 between the port of Amastasta and Cape Kerempe, while he was against Pendereclia. The adoption by him under such conditions discovered to the south of the squadron, approaching the number of vessels to the Nakhimov squadron, is quite understandable for this latter. ”

But let me, Andrei Medardovich, is just completely incomprehensible! Kornilov had no reason to consider the ships seen in the distance by Nakhimovsky. So, Prince V. I. Baryatinsky, the flag officer Kornilov, who stood on the bridge of “Vladimir”, recalls: “On November 5, the Anatolian coast was opened at dawn, and soon we see a squadron of 4 large and 2 small sailing ships, to which we are heading, believing that this is a squadron of Nakhimov” (from the memoirs of Prince Victor. Ivanovich Baryatinsky // Russian Archive.

That is, Kornilov knows nothing for sure, he just believes that he sees Nakhimov's squadron. And instead of making sure of this, or that in front of him the enemy, whom he had been looking for a long time, he ... rushes in pursuit of the ship. Wanting at all costs to capture the prize!

Kornilov saw an unknown squadron "in the distance of a distant signal." The Encyclopedic Dictionary of F. A. Brockhaus and I. A. Efron in the article “Marine alarm” gives the following information: “Day signals are divided into signals at close distances (up to 4 sea miles) and remote signals. Signals at close distances are made by the help of flags and semaphores. ”

“Day signals for long distances. These items rise to the mast in various combinations and thereby give numbers from 0 to 9, of which the signal number is compiled. The coloring of these objects does not play any role, since at such large distances, color differs very difficult. But usually one color is accepted; We have accepted - black in the Russian fleet. ”

Maybe Nakhimov really approached and signal Kornilov? No, Nakhimov’s squadron did not see “Vladimir”. There, as we already wrote, at 10 a.m. we heard distant shots, went to the sounds of the battle, but they reached Kornilov and Novosilsky only at 10 pm. Judging by the journal of the squadron, she went to the meeting place during this time more than 30 miles! Then Kornilov could not see Nakhimov.

Or did Osman Pasha signal it by taking “Vladimir” for the Turkish steamer? Also not, the Turks used a different signaling system, so Kornilov would immediately understand the situation. And one more thing: he had to give a response to Nakhimov’s signal, but this is not mentioned anywhere. “Vladimir” walked even without a flag-the same Baryatinsky writes: “Almost simultaneously, in a different direction, we see the smoke of the ship ... by approaching the distance of the cannon shot, we raise the Russian flag, to which he immediately meets the rise of Turkish-Segipetsky.”

The memoirs of Admiral G. I. Butakov, then the commander of “Vladimir”, clarify the situation somewhat: “At dawn of the 5th, the Anatolian coast was seen in front of Vladimir, in the right hand on the horizon of the squadron, which was completely similar to the squadron of Nakhimov, and in the left back on the horizon of the smoke of the steamer. Putting right on board immediately, I went to report to Kornilov about it. At 8 o’clock he went upstairs, and since the Bessarabia steamer was not visible under the Nakhimov squadron, and the pers that we persecuted had a direction to Sevastopol, Kornilov and concluded that Nakhimov sent Bessarabia for the coal, because she had to remain a little. Others shared this opinion, but at the request of my Kornilov agreed to continue the chase until 9 o’clock. Then the masts and rea became already visible. I asked to continue while the covers open, and in this way we finally saw that not a Russian ship fled from us; This is all the more clearly that he suddenly changed the course to the right and then to the left, that is, he fussed, finally seeing that a foreign ship was coming to him; And he could not see this earlier, because our anthracite is the most military thing - there is no smoke! ”

Next is a detailed description of the cruel battle, which was long for a long time. “Although it was obvious that the Vladimir nuclei and bombs made terrible destruction in the corps, a rank, tueling and the chimney of our desperate enemy, that his boats were beaten and, dropped, swam past us that many cores fell into his caskets and bombs burst in the stern, the unspecified captain was all the time on the site and turned the steamer from time to time Yours to let some bad nuclei.

The time, meanwhile, passed. “However, will we finish with him soon?” -asked Vice Admiral Kornilov in an irritated tone. - “Now?” - "Of course, pleasing." I commanded: “Full move! Markch!” A few minutes later, the hellish rain of the card bullets poured into the Egyptians and the crackle, produced by each nucleus, was clearly heard. But our opponents did not lose heart: they also responded with buckshot, and this shell acted much more successful than nuclei. In a few seconds flying through a smoke pipe, and then between me and the Admiral of the card bullet killed on the leather boat of the adjutant of his Zheleznov in the chest; Under my feet, under the site, the maids shot down in the head fell in the head, the commander was seriously wounded by the nose of the commander, and two more on the Utah. At the same time, he fell on the site of the persecuted steamer, shot down in the side, his captain, but soon rose again. The new shots of our sailors are hooked at the sight of the blood of our and - soon the enemy captain disappeared, wounded by the second bullet, and after him the core of the core, on which he controlled so bravely. A few more nuclei in a distance of 50 soot, and the enemy fire stopped, and after that ours.

... The most remarkable thing is that this 3-hour battle was heard at the same time with three squadrons, which gave out a thunder of bombing guns the idea that a general battle was taking place, and they are connected through the hands and feet of calm and cannot take part. Одна из эскадр была вице-адмирала Нахимова, другая та, которую вице-адмирал Корнилов оставил под флагом контрадмирала Новосильского и которую быстро приблизил попутный ветер, и третья, турецкая, которую искал взятый пароход, и оказалось, что командовавший ей Гуссейн-па-ша не только также слышал эти выстрелы, но с салинга его видно было, что бой происходит между двумя пароходами.

… когда пленных перевезли на „Владимир“ и наша стрелковая партия заняла караул у крюйт-камеры и по всему пленному пароходу, а партия, назначенная по расписанию к заделыванию пробоин, хлопотала вокруг взятого парохода, чтобы привести его в состояние продолжать путь — с салинга закричали, что видны две эскадры! Одна была к стороне берега, другая несколько ближе первой к нам. Пленные показали, что у них в море две эскадры. Которая же наша из видимых? Это сделалось самым интересным вопросом. Имея в руках избитый приз и своих людей, утомленными продолжительной работой у тяжелых орудий, не обедавшими (до 6 часов вечера) и не евшими ничего с 6 часов утра. Когда я спустился в каюту доложить об этом Корнилову, он лежал усталый на диване. „Что бы вы сделали, если бы меня не было здесь?“ He asked. — „Пошел бы к ближайшей и, опознав ее, действовал бы смотря по тому, чьей она окажется“. — „Так и делайте“.

Оставив приз исправляться и потом следовать к Севастополю, мы пошли к ближайшей из видимых эскадр, чтобы до наступления темноты опознать ее. К крайнему нашему удивлению, она оказалась эскадрой контр-адмирала Новосильского, так неожиданно быстро подославшего нас до самой полосы безветрия, в которой происходило сражение. Передав начальнику ее дополнительные приказания к вице-адмиралу Нахимову, вице-адмирал Корнилов приказал править к призу нашему…»

Любопытно, не правда ли? Бой с «Перваз-Бахри» рисуют исключительно в розовых красках: как же, первый бой пароходов, заложивший основы новой тактики, блестящая победа русского оружия! Но, судя по воспоминаниям Бутакова, сам Корнилов особого восторга от хода боя не испытывал. Неспособность его корабля, за строительством которого он лично наблюдал в Англии и на который положил столько сил, быстро справиться с более слабым противником расстроила его и раздражила настолько, что в разгар боя он просто ушел с мостика в свою каюту!

Энциклопедия известного журнала «Вокруг света» в статье, посвященной Корнилову, пишет: «Вице-адмирал не сковывал инициативу командира „Владимира“ Григория Ивановича Бутакова и не давал ему указаний. Для него было важно наблюдать первый в истории бой паровых кораблей». Вот так Корнилов его и наблюдал — лежа на койке в каюте. Вот так и пишут русскую историю.

Сопротивление турок сыграло свою роль, причем важнейшую: они отвлекли на себя всё внимание! По-беда Корнилова оказалась пирровой по многим причинам, главная из которых — потеря времени, в результате чего Осман-паша — а это паруса его эскадры маячили на горизонте — успел скрыться.

Дальнейшее описывает князь Барятинский: «В продолжение 2-х часов мы стояли на месте и чинили повреждения взятого парохода, дабы он мог дойти до Севастополя, и мы затем идем туда, взяв „Перваз-Бахри“ на буксир. Вскоре мы открываем на Севере эскадру из 6 больших судов и в то же время различаем по другому направлению верхние паруса тех судов, которых мы видели утром.

Будучи уверены, что последние принадлежат к эскадре Нахимова, предполагаем, что эскадра, видимая на Севере, неприятельская. Чтобы в том удостовериться, Корнилов приказывает пароходу „Перваз-Бахри“, на котором уже была Русская команда под начальством лейтенанта Попандопуло, идти прямо в Севастополь, а мы сами направляемся к подозрительной эскадре. Спустя некоторое время мы узнаем в ней эскадру Новосильского…»

По другим данным, спешное латание приза заняло более трех часов и к Новосильскому «Владимир» подошел лишь в пятом часу…

Это была третья ошибка Корнилова в тот день: бой и починка приза сильно задержали его; но, убедившись, что перед ним корабли Новосильского, что он должен был сделать? Думаю, броситься на полных парах на юг, к подозрительной эскадре, приказав следовать туда же Новосильскому. Не он ли, Корнилов, лишь вчера приказал ему встретиться с Нахимовым? Вот и встретьтесь поскорее на моих глазах, чтоб душа была спокойна. А что делает вместо этого начальник штаба ЧФ? Празднует триумф в императорском стиле!

Он приказывает призовому пароходу вернуться, берет его для пущей своей славы на буксир, как римский триумфатор, за колесницей которого вели пленных врагов, и «…мы проходим вдоль всей линии наших кораблей с нашим призом на буксире, что вызывает восторженное ура судовых команд посланных по вантам. Мы подходим под корму „Трех Святителей“, и Корнилов велит Новосильскому идти на соединение с Нахимовым» (Барятинский, там же).

Затем адмирал на «Владимире» уходит в Севастополь, сопровождая свой драгоценный приз и так и не пожелав ни выяснить принадлежность неизвестной эскадры, ни встретиться с Нахимовым, который был уже на подходе. Не знаю, как вас, но меня сие удивляет чрезвычайно…

Кстати, нехватка угля на «Владимире», из-за чего Корнилов якобы не мог произвести разведку, отнюдь не является оправданием. Пароходофрегаты тех времен были кораблями с полноценным парусным вооружением и хорошими ходоками без машины!

Как меланхолично замечает Скрицкий, деликатно недоумевая по поводу азарта Корнилова: «Тем временем виденная у Пендераклии эскадра Осман-паши благополучно прошла мимо, ибо единственный наличный пароход был вовлечен в несвойственное ему дело вместо разведки» (Скрицкий Н. В. Георгиевские кавалеры под Андреевским флагом. М.: Центрполиграф, 2002).

Приз ценой в Синоп

Вряд ли приз, захваченный такой ценой, можно считать подарком судьбы. Да, фортуна как будто улыбнулась адмиралу, но насмешливо. Через день, 19 (7) ноября 1853 года, «Владимир» вошел на Севастопольский рейд, ведя на буксире избитый деревянный пароход. Позади шел — они встретились на подходе к порту — железный красавец «Медари Тиджарет», захваченный нахимовской «Бессарабией» без боя. Погода была прекрасная, и стечение народа огромное — всем хотелось поближе рассмотреть плененные суда.

Между прочим, Корнилов получил 19 037 руб. 50 kopecks. призовых денег, Бутаков — 38 075 руб., тогда как «Медари Тиджарет» оценили в 250 тыс. руб. Увы, изрешеченный бомбами «Перваз-Бахри», скромно переименованный в «Корнилов», недолго служил источником восторга севастопольцев и через день пошел ко дну…

Упоминание о призовых деньгах вполне уместно: они были кстати. Надеюсь, Владимир Алексеевич получил их, ибо был беден как церковная мышь! Даже тысяча рублей серебром была для него суммой, решающей все проблемы. Они на пару с братом владели крошечными деревеньками, поступления с которых никак не могли компенсировать затраты на большую семью, а впоследствии и на поддержание адмиральского декорума. Корнилов жаловался в письмах на долги, на нехватку средств; он вовсе не рад был чести попасть в царскую свиту, генерал-адъютантству, орденам, пожалованным царем, — всё это означало дополнительные расходы и новые долги. Довольно дорогие знаки пожалованных орденов по существующим тогда правилам приходилось выкупать за свой счет…

Что ж, подведем итоги

Две недели кряду Корнилов рыскал по морю, организовывал и посылал на поиски эскадры и отдельные корабли, выспрашивал, выискивал, разведывал, оповещал и координировал, строил планы, мечтал о новом Наварине. И всё это лишь для того, чтобы из-за одного избитого, насквозь продырявленного и тут же утонувшего приза пустить насмарку все сии великие труды! Он проворонил Осман-пашу сам и помешал поймать его Нахимову. Вместо чистой победы в морском бою, каковая не могла вызвать у англичан и французов претензий, Нахимову пришлось долго крейсировать в бурном море, один за другим отправляя поврежденные непогодой корабли на ремонт в Севастополь, затем блокировать и атаковать турецкий порт, от чего царя ультимативно предостерегали, да еще и сжечь его дотла. После чего вступление в войну европейцев, а значит, и ее исход были предрешены.