Fyodor Lukyanov on the possible consequences of the Russian operation in Syria

Fedor Lukyanov, research professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, editor-in-chief of the magazine "Russia in Global Affairs"

The Russian operation in Syria is an undoubted milestone in the political development of the country. For the first time in more than a quarter of a century, the Kremlin is officially carrying out a large-scale military action abroad, motivated not by peacekeeping or “peace enforcement,” but by reasons of a strategic nature.

The "Afghan syndrome" is a thing of the past. After leaving Afghanistan in 1989, Moscow long felt idiosyncratic about military-political campaigns of this kind, not without slight gloating as it watched as the United States began to repeat Soviet miscalculations.

At the same time, the Russian government did not abandon the demonstration of force. Wars in the Caucasus, intervention in conflicts on the territory of neighboring states of the post-Soviet space, a demonstrative raid on Pristina in the summer of 1999 - reliance on military capabilities remained a key element of political thinking even after the country ceased to be a global superpower. However, the listed cases fit into the scheme of post-Soviet regional development, adaptation - often difficult and painful - to the new “truncated” role of Russia. Operations outside the conditional “sphere of influence” were not considered. Firstly, they were not considered necessary; ambitions were limited geographically. Secondly, the shadow of Afghanistan was reminiscent of itself.

Why the turn? The Ukrainian conflict, which last spring was perceived as a breakthrough to a new quality of Russia’s global influence, turned by the beginning of 2015 into a fixation of the country’s regional status. The crowning achievement was the Minsk process - a sticky and labor-intensive diplomatic marathon with an obviously unwinnable result. Moscow found itself “locked” in a double periphery. On the one hand, the European one: the Ukrainian conflict worries Europe most of all, and Europe is the periphery of world politics. Ukraine is also a periphery of Europe, and even in the Old World, not everyone is concerned about the outcome of this drama.

The Russian leadership felt that from the point of view of its role in world affairs, Ukraine had no prospects. And leading Western countries willingly supported a model in which the main, if not the only, subject of conversation with Moscow is the Ukrainian settlement. China, for example, was calm about Russia’s obsession with Ukraine (that’s your business), but with bewilderment - is there really nothing more fruitful?

The Middle East, despite its hopelessness, is a much more significant phenomenon. It is located at the intersection of a number of strategic directions, and not on a side dead-end branch, like Ukraine. It so happened, more by coincidence than as a result of Moscow’s deliberate actions, that perhaps the only serious remaining foreign policy asset of Russia is relations with Damascus. And it was around him that the battle for the future of the Middle East unfolded. Vladimir Putin's political instinct worked - he sensed an opportunity to break the situation by forcing others to respond to Russia's initiative, and not vice versa. This quality of the Russian president has manifested itself repeatedly over the years of his reign - both in the international and domestic arena.

The effect is similar to that produced two years ago by the idea of destroying Syrian chemical weapons. It came as a surprise to everyone, but everyone recognized that the scheme could be a way out of the situation. (It is worth noting that Moscow’s current readiness to come to the aid of Assad may partly be rooted in that epic. By destroying chemical weapons at Moscow’s insistence, Damascus abandoned its “last resort” defense in case the survival of not only the regime was at stake , but all those who consider him the lesser evil. Abandoning him in this situation is not entirely decent.) Of course, now the situation is much worse and there are much more dangers. However, the initially restrained reaction of the West (ambiguously negative) and the clear presence of some kind of mutual understanding with the United States (at least at the level - we do not interfere with each other) suggests that the operation has a chance. Let me remind you that at first almost no one believed in the feasibility of the proposal for chemical weapons.

Of course, it would be extremely unfair not to mention that the Islamic State is truly an enemy of Russia, the weakening of which is necessary for our security in any case. But we must be aware: Moscow entered the civil war on one of the sides - Bashar al-Assad and his supporters. This can be called the fight against terrorism, but there is no other way than to support the formally legitimate government against its enemies. The cunning tricks of the US-led coalition, which claims to oppose both ISIS and the Assad regime, are rhetoric, but in reality they have to choose a situational ally. Essentially, Washington admitted this, saying through John Kerry that it no longer required the immediate departure of the Syrian President. However, Russia needs to be prepared for a sharp escalation of attacks related to the fact that it is fighting all of Assad’s opponents, and not just IS. For the Gulf monarchies, for example, this is not just a failure of their policies, but also a humiliation.

Moscow's function is technically similar to the role that the NATO coalition played in 2011 in Libya. NATO provided air cover for the rebels, who, thanks to alliance airstrikes, turned the tide of the campaign. The difference, of course, is that Russia is on the side of a regular and fully combat-ready army, coordination with which is higher and more effective than in the case of poorly organized Libyan militias. This, by the way, makes Russian strikes more effective than American or French ones, since the United States and France categorically avoid interaction with Damascus.

In addition, a coalition has been created. Not the one that Vladimir Putin announced at the UN, but it is very practical - Iran and Iraq are uniting their actions with Russia and Syria, and the Lebanese Hezbollah movement can be added to them. This is a serious regional bloc, which, presumably, will continue after the end of the campaign. There is a downside - by entering into close partnerships with the Shiite part of the Muslim world, Russia risks finding itself in the center of a religious war.

In modern wars waged by large countries, the most problematic thing is the definition of victory. The US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq ended not in victories, but in the search and implementation of an “exit strategy.” Direct occupation of territory is an extremely rare phenomenon today, and in the case of Middle Eastern conflicts, meaningless. The question arises: why spend and sacrifice at all? The same Afghan and Iraqi undertakings did not even end with the establishment of a loyal government. It is especially unpleasant for Washington that Iraq is now on the side of Damascus and Moscow. Technically, the Libyan operation can again be considered a success for the interventionists - the regime was changed, they did not suffer any losses, they left painlessly. The destruction of Libya as a country does not count...

Officials swear that there can be no talk of any ground action. There is no reason not to believe them, but it is difficult to exclude unforeseen developments. For example, the need for retribution for sacrifices made (especially if, as is customary with ISIS, they are of a ritual nature) can become a mechanism for drawing people deeper and deeper.

If emergency situations can be avoided, success will be a turning point in the fighting and throwing ISIS back months. In the circles of inspired Moscow officialdom, there are statements about complete victory over the enemy, but the Middle East experience hardly gives grounds for such optimism. But if successful, Russia’s position in the region will be strengthened, Moscow will definitely break out of the Ukrainian quagmire and will be able to operate in a much wider operational space. Recreating the former Syria is unrealistic, but Assad’s consolidation in a certain territory, which will simultaneously become a Russian bridgehead in the Middle East, is possible. Then, however, the regional struggle, fueled by disgruntled Sunni regimes, will most likely resume.

If the Assad regime survives, it will be very difficult to force him to leave. It is stupid to leave power when the main enemies are crushed. However, long-term stabilization if it persists is unlikely. The Middle East has entered a period of change that will continue regardless of the fate of ISIS. The military scenario, whether it will be successful or not, must be accompanied by intensive diplomacy, remembering that such complex conflicts are resolved, and such specific wars are won at the negotiating table no less (or more) than on the battlefield.

If things don’t go as planned, that is, not according to the Libyan, but according to the Iraqi or, even worse, Vietnamese scenario, Russia will face big problems internally and externally. Material and human losses, a surge in domestic terrorism, external pressure, because there will be a lot of gloating people.

However, in addition to the military-political pros and cons, there is an aspect, so to speak, existential. For the last two years, since the fall of 2013, when the Ukrainian battle over association with the EU flared up, Russia has been living in an atmosphere of military-political excitement. There are objective reasons for it; the situation in the world is heating up and fueling all possible emotions. But this passion, the social mobilization and agenda it generates, replaces everything else. In particular, the need to develop a new model of socio-economic development to replace the one that had exhausted itself even before the crisis, and now does not at all correspond to the dramatically changed situation. And despite the constantly heard mantras about national interests and the correspondence of foreign policy to domestic needs, geopolitical achievements become valuable in themselves. Of course, the topic of ridding the world of the Islamic State plague is much more attractive than the dreary discussion about the need to raise the retirement age. But it won’t be possible to endlessly replace one with the other.

Excitement after syndrome