Translated material
Middle Eastern solitaire
What goals Moscow pursues in Syria and what risks the military intervention of Russia carries - the point of view of experts
Orientalist: There are solid facts. First: Putin saved the Assad regime. At least for the foreseeable period, a piece of land that Assad controls - about 20% of the territory of Syria will be a bastion that its enemies will not be able to take. Moscow will give as many weapons as necessary. This was one of the main goals of the operation, because the regime was weak every month. If he collapsed, it would be a loss of face for the Kremlin: it would have turned out that he supported the louse for four years.
The second fact: there will be no ground operation. It is good that at least there was enough mind not to send our guys to Syria so that they die there, helping one Arabs to kill other Arabs.
The third fact: Putin outlined the deadline for air strikes - for the duration of the Syrian army of offensive operations. And here is the question: is Assad’s army capable of this? After all, it is opposed not only by ISIS*, but also by the Islamist groups that compete with him, as well as the moderate opposition, supported by the West, Turkey and many Arab countries. One look at the card will show that Assad is fighting not so much with ISIS*as with other groups, some of which are at the gate of Damascus.
The fourth fact: Russia will be voluntary to the “Shiite Front”, which includes Iran and led by the Shiites of the Iraq and Syria government. This is fraught with the dissatisfaction of the Sunni majority in the Arab world - Saudi Arabia has already protested. In addition, with bombing, more civilians are always perishable than terrorists. The bloodied bodies of women and children shown on TV screens are unlikely to improve the reputation of Russia in the Arab world, and as for the jihadists themselves, they will now feel at war with Russia, and the attacks are not excluded with us.
In short -term terms, a slight decrease in the degree of hostilities is possible. But the groups hostile to Assad will not go anywhere, they will strengthen, receive everything necessary from the Turks, Saudis and the United States and sooner or later resume the “campaign to Damascus”. Then Moscow will have to raise bets, send new equipment, spend a lot of money.
Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and Politics of the Higher School of Economics: the goals of Moscow’s intervention in the military conflict in Syria are obvious. The first is to prevent the final transformation of Syria into a failed state and into a source of terrorist infection, including for the southern regions of Russia. The second - ISIS victory* will inevitably cause a situation close to genocide, first of all, the remaining Christians, and then it will still be necessary to intervene. And the third - it is absolutely clear that Russia is trying to strengthen its international positions with the help of the Syrian gambit.
This is a risky gambit. He may even be fatal if Russia is drawn into a long conflict. I hope that people who make decisions and see their eyes to the detriment of the United States into the war first in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq, learned these lessons and understand: sooner or later from Syria it is necessary to leave. It is better to prepare for this in advance.
If the conflict is delayed, this will distract our armed forces, create difficulties with a number of partners and cause a negative reaction within Russian society. In this ball of snakes called the Middle East, our society will not want to be. It is one thing to bomb from above, and another thing, if the army is pulled into the conflict zone.
Syria as such does not exist. Worse than it is, it can no longer be for them. Russian intervention is likely to help delay the tragedy or create for government troops the opportunity to create enclaves on the coast, a kind of mini-glass for alavites and other minorities, including Christians.
Director of the Center for the Study of the Cold War of Harvard University (USA): depressingly ineffective and indecisive policy of the Obama administration throughout the Civil War in Syria gave Putin the opportunity to do everything he wants there. Syria provides him, albeit only for a while, distracting attention from Ukraine, where his grandiose project to create New Russia crashed, as well as from difficulties in the Russian economy. This situation also allows Putin to declare that Russia is not just one of the regional powers. In their approach to the Syrian question, the Putins show a sequence, invariably doing everything possible to protect the regime of Bashar al -Assad and preserve the base of the Russian Navy in Tartus. The Russian authorities do not care about the death of 250 thousand Syrians killed by their ally - they are only interested in the preservation of Russian positions in this country. These strategic goals were also manifested in the logic of the air attacks of Russian aviation in Syria, which were directed precisely against those rebels who now pose the most serious threat for Assad forces. At the same time, significant territories controlled by the Islamic State*do not become the goals of Russian aviation. Thus, when last week Putin announced his plan for the fight against IG*, he lied, as before, many times on the Ukrainian issue.
Although the Russian armed forces will not fight with the IG*, many other rebel groups also do not deserve condescension-especially related to al-Qaeda*, such as the “Ang Nusra Front” and the “Tavhid Khorasan brigade”. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear whether the Russians are fighting with them. In addition, doubt causes the overall effectiveness of Russian bombing and their technical ability to inflict spot strikes. Despite the growth of investments in the development of the Air Force over the past decade, Russia is still noticeably behind in this regard from the United States.
In a word, it will not end in anything good. Putin will tolerate another failure. Until now, his mistakes almost did not affect his ratings in Russia, but sooner or later the totality of failures will lead to the result that he deserves.
Partner Rusenergy: There is no such event in the world that they would not try to explain the interests of oil and gas companies. And now - it was worth Russian planes to start the bombing of Syrian territory, the commentators immediately put forward two hypotheses. Firstly, Moscow, they say, is trying to inflate the fire of war in the Middle East in order to achieve an increase in oil prices and save the Russian economy from the inevitable collapse. Secondly, fighting is carried out for the sake of riding Gazprom from competitors: Russia supposedly wants to disrupt the plan for the construction of a gas pipeline from Qatar through Syria and Turkey to Europe.
Meanwhile, the aggravation of the situation in Syria and retracting into the active actions of Iran does not lead to violation of the supply of Middle East oil, but to strengthen the stability of these supplies. Iran, distracted by the suppression of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, is by no means interested in additional conflict with the Arabs in the Persian Gulf - namely, through this bay, a third of oil enters the world markets. Nothing threatens the traditional routes of tankers, as the Syrian events as a whole do not threaten oil prices.
As for the gas pipeline from Qatar to Europe, this project was unrealistic without Russian participation in Bashar Assad’s operations. Nobody will pave such a route through Syria, where fighting can drag on for decades. It would be much more appropriate to consider the option of building a gas pipeline from the Arabian Peninsula through relatively peaceful Jordan and Israel, especially since Israel with Saudi Arabia has an improvement in relations.
* ISIS or IG (“Islamic State”), as well as “al-Qaeda”-are prohibited in the Russian Federation as terrorist groups.
Photo: AFP Photo / Ammar Suleiman