Photo by Vadim Savitsky / Department of Press Service and Information of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Even good diplomats cannot disguise the lack of goals in foreign policy

Russia's decision to take an active role in the Syrian crisis has once again taken everyone by surprise. The degree of confusion in the West is even higher than in the case of Crimea. There, at least it was possible to immediately attach the usual label of “imperial ambitions” and “restoration of the USSR.” In connection with Syria, even those who believe in the irresistible force of Russian revanchism guess: Russia cannot and will not play anything close to the role that the Soviet Union played in the Middle East. So why then?

There are many practical explanations that are given both in Russia and in the West. But if you look at what is happening more broadly - in the context of the development of post-Soviet foreign policy, we are seeing another turn.

The previous milestone was the annexation of Crimea and the proclamation of the concept of the “Russian world”. If the first meant the entry of the process of disintegration of the USSR into the next stage (the abandonment of the informal taboo on changing the previous administrative boundaries), then the second contained a request not only for ideology, but also for mission. This is a change from all foreign policy after 1991, which was based on solving applied problems. At the same time, symbolic gestures like the attack on Pristina in June 1999 were not excluded, but the meaning was still practical - to compensate for the lack of effective instruments of influence with ostentatious daring.

After the Munich speech of 2007, there were attempts to formulate a mission. Thus, Gleb Pavlovsky wrote that objectively the preconditions are emerging for “a unique, not at all eternal role for Russia - the role of a deterrent force against the unilateral policy of the United States.” Then it didn’t go further than declarations - after the Georgian aggravation and the change of presidents, a reset began. We could return to such a task now, but, oddly enough, the current situation in the world does not create that “request to contain America” that was written about seven years ago. Rather, there is a request to minimize risks for each of the players individually, but here everyone is trying to cope alone.

"Russian World" was perceived as a revival of the ideological agenda in foreign policy, which was intended to fix Russia at a higher level of the hierarchy. It quickly became clear that this doctrine, which is very effective inside the country, does not expand possibilities outside, but limits it. Essentially, the “Russian world” is anti-global. It outlines a certain area, but it is impossible to captivate anyone else with this idea; it obviously interests no one except the Russians. There was, however, an attempt to fill it not with ethnic, but with value content (conservatism, morality, etc.), but a holistic ideological alternative did not arise.

As a result, the Ukrainian conflict, which began with talk that Russia was tired of enduring Western domination and was challenging the foundations, led to the political periphery.

Despite all the importance of Ukraine for us on a planetary scale, it is a secondary focus with no prospects of winning anything there in the grand scheme of things.

Either it was necessary to go for a much larger aggravation and sharply raise the stakes with unpredictable consequences, or what happened was what happened - a quagmire of the Minsk process and the function of a “regional power”, which Barack Obama defined for us. Regional, and not even on a Eurasian scale (Ukraine is of little interest to Asia), but on a narrow Eastern European scale.

The Middle East is again a departure from the mission, but a step towards returning to the global stage. The Kremlin has correctly assessed that Syria is the only serious asset it has. On the one hand, the key to all processes there. On the other hand, against the backdrop of the feverish hesitation of the other players, the Russian position, which has not changed for 4.5 years, looks at least consistent. In addition, the situation on the ground is so complicated that condemnations of Moscow's actions sound confusing, with many believing that the Russians at least do not need to be interfered with if they want to take risks.

The risk is really great, although there is a chance to gain a foothold - the positions of everyone else are too precarious. In any case, the main question remains unanswered - about the purpose of Russian foreign policy. The feeling of idling gets stronger. We have world-class diplomats who are masters of professional skills, but in the absence of clear goal-setting it turns into art for art's sake. Of course, in a chaotic and unpredictable world, it is impossible to choose a course and follow it alone. In this sense, the focus on speed and accuracy of reaction is correct. But this does not negate the need to answer the question, what exactly do we want?

What we want: why Russia needs a military operation in Syria