How a decline in commodity income destroys dictatorships.

The color revolutions of recent years can be assessed in different ways - both as a leap forward in the development of the states that experienced them, and as a loss of stability by these states and a rollback. But what is interesting about color revolutions is not what happens inside the country (all revolutions are a little similar to each other), but the resonance that they caused in the world. Perhaps no geopolitical phenomenon has recently evoked so many emotions, dominated by the fear of autarkic leaders and dictators - as if they feel that a Pandora's box has been opened for their souls.

On the one hand, this is strange - the world is constantly experiencing changes in power, unrest and uprisings, and recent years have not brought anything new. On the other hand, dictators can be understood. At first glance, the only thing that connects Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and - suddenly - Ukraine is an authoritarian regime that suppressed the opposition and integrated political power and the personal enrichment of the elite into an inseparable process. Yielding to the natural psychological desire to find someone to blame outside, supporters of authoritarian regimes blame a series of revolutions on external forces, usually the United States, whose rhetoric from political leaders often contains calls for the “export of democracy.” However (unlike, say, Iraq and Libya) the States clearly did not interfere in the situation in the countries of color revolutions, and if meetings with the opposition, grants to human rights activists and “cookies” in the squares could really change the ruling regimes, then the wave of color revolutions would not be limited to would be four victims, sweeping at least half the world - the United States actively cooperates with liberal organizations always and everywhere, and they have plenty of “cookies”.

There are many authoritarian countries. Near the Maghreb are authoritarian Saudi Arabia and Jordan; next to Ukraine are Belarus and Russia; half of Latin America, a third of Indochina and all of Central Asia are autocracies. Nevertheless, in most autarchies there is no smell of revolution, unless there is a demonstration here and there and the authorities arrest a dozen people. There must be some other properties common to the “members of the club of color revolutions” that “quiet” dictatorships do not have.

These properties, as one would expect, are in the economic field, and the main factor is the share of resource rent in GDP. Before the revolution, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine consistently had approximately a 10% share of rent in GDP. Judging by the analysis of world statistics, 21 countries have approximately the same share of rent. Australia and Norway are included in the club. With them, everything is simple: their democratic institutions were built long before the advent of rent, and they are not easy to destroy.

Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan, Togo, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan. These are the poorest countries, yet their recent history has many similarities to color revolutions. Sudan, Togo, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Cote d'Ivoire, Kyrgyzstan and, in a mild form, Malawi have experienced multiple or sporadic revolutions and insurgencies, very similar to the Colored ones, in the last 15 years. In Zimbabwe, the government did not change, but the situation in the country was always on the verge of general chaos. Tanzania is a calmer exception, where only separatist protests on the islands can somehow be associated with the “influence of the 10%.” But there are no rules without exceptions.

Relatively wealthy Colombia, Peru and Malaysia (GDP from $6,500 to $11,000 per person). Today, all three countries are calm, but Colombia lived in the process of permanent revolution for a couple of decades, Peru survived the overthrow of the regime of Alberto Fujimori, Malaysia at a time when its per capita GDP was below $7,000 per person, had higher rents, and today it is knocked out of the club as richer.

Besides Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine, only Myanmar and Vietnam remained in the club. Both countries experienced civil war, military-socialist dictatorships, and mass unrest. Vietnam today is more or less stable, which cannot be said about Myanmar, where a situation close to a color revolution may well develop around the upcoming elections.

The statistics are impressive: with the exception of two democracies, it seems that all countries of the “10% club” are marked by doom. It is reasonable to assume that a large share of rent in GDP (15% and above) sufficiently provides totalitarian power with resources for stability. Countries with such a level of rent develop, other things being equal, slower than countries with low rent, but in them the government easily consolidates economic leverage, depriving the potential opposition of capital, and “socializes” the economy, making the bulk of the population dependent on the budget. Low rents (less than 5-7%) force countries to develop diversified economies, which contributes to the development of democracy and faster growth or - in rare cases like Singapore - a rise in GDP and stabilization of the regime thanks to the support of the population and business. The countries of the “fatal share of rent” are too rich in raw materials to diversify, the raw material margin is higher than the production margin, and the elite fights for it, forgetting about alternatives. However, there are not enough raw materials to create a “safety cushion” in the form of reserves, government spending on the social sphere and state businesses, infrastructure, etc. The government in such countries, naturally, is not stable, the elite does not satisfy its appetites on meager raw material flows and is incapable of diversification, constantly competes for the “throne”, which gives advantages in the distribution of rent.

It is interesting to note that the USSR in the late 1980s had approximately a 13-14% share of rent in GDP - slightly higher than the level of the color revolutions. And Syria, which 10 years ago was a completely stable state, then had about 20% of rent in GDP, and this share was declining.

It seems that the culprit is not the influence of the States, as the dictators believe, and not corruption, as many fighters against the regimes believe, but the trap of the average level of rent, combined with a per capita GDP below $6,000–7,000 per person per year. In this sense, the Russian authorities should think about it: by the end of 2015, Russian per capita GDP will decline to approximately $8,000–9,000, and the decline will continue in 2016. At the same time, the fall in oil prices this year will make the share of rent in GDP approximately equal to 14%. We are approaching a dangerous limit, which so far has only been successfully overcome (from the point of view of avoiding a color revolution) by extremely harsh repressive regimes - and even then not always.

Economics of color revolutions