How the two heirs of Byzantium built relationships

In Soviet times, historical literature said a lot and colorfully that during the Civil War, revolutionary Russia found itself surrounded by enemies. But for some reason nothing was said about the fact that Turkey was surrounded by the same enemy. After defeat in the First World War, it found itself in the same difficult economic and political situation as Russia. Its new leadership, led by Mustafa Kemal, which broke with the Sultan's government, like Lenin's Council of People's Commissars, tried to achieve recognition in the world without much success. Constantinople was occupied by Entente troops, Greek troops were advancing from the west, Italy occupied the southwest, the French were active in the south, the British in the southeast, and Armenia in the east. Under such conditions, a rapprochement between the Kemalists and Bolsheviks was inevitable. But each side wanted to get as much as possible, sacrificing only the least.

Due to circumstances beyond its control, the Red Army did not ignite the fire of world revolution on Turkish soil

Photo: Kommersant / RGAKFD/Rosinform

Ataturk, receiving Soviet help, was able to break through the ring of Turkey's enemies, but never became a friend of the USSR

Photo: Kommersant / RGAKFD/Rosinform

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Ordzhonikidze and Kirov convinced the Central Committee that with the help of Turkey they would quickly Sovietize Georgia (in the photo - a parade of Soviet troops in Tiflis, 1921)

Photo: Kommersant / RGAKFD/Rosinform

Armored trains of the Red Army used to move from their siding to the roads of the Sovietized countries (in the photo - an armored train in Baku, 1920)

Photo: Kommersant / RGAKFD/Rosinform

In the great game for the redistribution of the Caucasus, the future father of the Turks, Mustafa Kemal, was opposed by the future father of all Soviet peoples

Photo: Leemage/DIOMEDIA

Photo: Kommersant / RGAKFD/Rosinform

Due to circumstances beyond its control, the Red Army did not ignite the fire of world revolution on Turkish soil

Photo: Kommersant / RGAKFD/Rosinform

Ataturk, receiving Soviet help, was able to break through the ring of Turkey's enemies, but never became a friend of the USSR

Photo: Kommersant / RGAKFD/Rosinform

Evgeny Zhirnov

"The situation of the people has become even more aggravated"

Judging by the report of military intelligence - the Registration Directorate of the field headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, sent to the country's leaders on December 20, 1920, the situation in Anatolian Turkey, which was under the control of the government of Mustafa Kemal, left much to be desired:

“Before the war of 1914, a system of small-scale production and small-scale trade reigned throughout Turkey, which gave the population, despite all its poverty, the opportunity to somehow make ends meet. The war tore all these artisans away from work and developed speculation in large-scale procurement of materials for military centers devastated the province and, without an influx of fresh forces, threw the country into a state of complete poverty. From the moment Anatolia declared itself in rebellion against the Government of Constantinople, the situation of the people became even more aggravated due to incessant recruitment and internal fronts. At the present time, even the culture of fruits is falling in the fields; "It's mostly women who work in the gardens. Handicraft production of small consumer goods, leather dressing, etc. has almost completely died out."

Despite the lack of formal relations between the old and new governments, as noted in the report, trade continues:

“Despite the external break with Constantinople, trade is constantly going on between it and Anatolia. Livestock in batches of tens of thousands of heads, wool, fruits are sent to Constantinople, receiving in return textiles, sugar and canned goods. This trade is mainly in the hands of the Greeks and partly the Turks and Armenians and is carried out almost exclusively by sea on large ships... through all Anatolian ports, through which there is passenger traffic, the transfer of military cargo and units, small private motors ply, and therefore these ports represent the only more or less live points in the whole Anatolian Turkey".

The most important of them was Trabzon, to which military intelligence officers recommended paying special attention:

“From time immemorial, all the coastal cities of Anatolia considered Trebizond their head and always followed him. When Mustafa Kemal sent out an order to send deputies to the Great People's Assembly to Angora (Ankara - History ) and Trebizond did not send them, they refused to follow him the entire coast. When Trebizond was forced to send its deputies, they were immediately sent from Rize, Samsun, Kerasund, etc.”

The Register reported about the political situation inside Anatolian Turkey:

“At the head of the government of the country is the Great People’s Assembly with its chairman Mustafa Kemal, who is also listed as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In fact, he alone holds in his hands both foreign and domestic policy, as well as the nationalist party. In the province, each province is governed by two governors: a military and civilians. Previously (2-2.5 months ago) in Trebizond they were combined in one person - the head of the 3rd division, but now the power in the province is divided: the civilian governor, Shukri Ogus, is also the head of the political investigation group... The main one. The military governor has effective power. His staff is military officials, people with a very narrow education, absolutely no initiative and are well disciplined, the entire administrative apparatus works completely automatically, turning to Angora for resolution of issues."

The next level of power, as stated in the report, was represented by the beys:

“In general, the beys in Turkey reign undividedly over the people. Around their estates, all the villages lying are completely subordinate to them. The peasants, dark and downtrodden, look at their beys as beings of a higher order. A bey who goes to war leads the entire district with him, who believes in him as a prophet, rising at his call, working for him in peacetime for a pittance and enriching him without complaint. Other beys thus hold in their hands 30-40 villages. A typical example of a bey is Yagya-Kyagya, the chairman of the Trebizond Longboat Union and the owner. His past is very dark, over the past two years he has turned from a simple fisherman into a rich man and acquired the title of bey... The authorities take his opinion into account, he beats the captains sailing on his longboats with a stick, the inhabitants tremble before him in every one. The region has its own bandit bey of this kind."

"They live on cornbread"

So what could Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey have in common? Only common enemies. The Turkish army, as military intelligence reported, was in desperate need of help:

"The soldiers are dressed very poorly, they eat more than not enough. Some units live on corn bread."

The situation of the volunteer detachments was even worse:

“In partisan detachments they receive nothing and everything, from grub to weapons, must be purchased at their own expense.”

The Kemalists desperately needed money, weapons and direct military assistance from the Red Army. And the Bolsheviks were ready to provide help, but under certain conditions. A member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front and Stalin's confidant, Ordzhonikidze, on April 23, 1920, telegraphed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin:

“The leader of the national movement in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, demands that Azerbaijan allow Soviet troops to pass to the borders of Turkey to defend them from British attacks. The possibility of our bloodless entry into Baku and being declared to the Soviets cannot be ruled out.”

And already on May 4, 1920, Ordzhonikidze and Kirov telegraphed Lenin:

“On April 26, our troops crossed the border of Azerbaijan, knowing that the committee of Azerbaijani communists at midnight on April 28 demanded that the government transfer power to the communist committee. Our armored trains were in Khachmaso at that time. After a short meeting, the government transferred power to the communists who formed the Azerbaijani and Baku Revolutionary Committee, consisting exclusively of Muslims. The independent Socialist Soviet Azerbaijan Republic was proclaimed. The first act of the Revolutionary Committee was to appeal to Soviet Russia for armed assistance and propose a military alliance. After the transfer of power to the communists, our armored trains were gone. in Baku, having with them a battalion of infantry. The next day, our cavalry and army headquarters arrived entirely on our side. Turkish askers and officers played a very active role in favor of the revolution in Baku, a detachment of which prevented the government from escaping from Baku." .

The Kemalists were promised assistance with weapons, and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) decided to allocate them gold. But Ankara knew exactly what the Bolshevik allies really wanted - the Sovietization of Turkey along the Azerbaijani model. After all, the fact that they wanted to spread the revolution to the whole world was not a secret, but an officially stated goal.

Each region has its own bandit bey of this kind

Members of the Politburo had to restrain especially zealous supporters of the world revolution from the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caucasian Front. The instructions for the front RVS, approved by the Politburo on July 7, 1920, stated:

“We should certainly refrain from attempts to provoke an uprising against the governments of Georgia, Armenia and Turkey. It is necessary to explain to those elements in these republics who are striving for a coup that for general political reasons, in view of both the world situation and our military situation, they should not proceed at this time to achieve your goal."

In turn, the Kemalists, who tried to receive Soviet help as quickly as possible, diligently pretended that they had nothing against the arrival of Soviet power on Turkish soil. The Register report described how Turkish officials behaved before the arrival of the first shipments of weapons:

"A typical incident occurred at a meeting of the Trebizond People's Defense Committee in the middle of this September. One of the members of the Committee expressed to the governor, who was present there, the general opinion of the Committee regarding the union with Sovrossiya: "The people in no way agree to accept the Soviet program, and so Since Russia is likely to begin propaganda work in Turkey, it is necessary to stop this at the very beginning, adhering to a very cautious policy. As for weapons, money and other help from Russia, this, of course, must be accepted, avoiding close contacts at all costs." The governor responded to this in a decisive manner (although according to private information, he was only an ordinary Kemalist): "Taking help from Russia, we already owe it a lot, so friendly relations are inevitable. In addition, Bolshevism is not a local movement, but a global one, and sooner or later it will affect us, and in order not to remain aloof from global progress, we should not relate to the Sov. Russia is so negative. As for the Russians in general who are on our territory, I ask you, I also demand from all other citizens respect for them and their ideas."

The governor apparently hoped that Soviet representatives would find out about his words. But they also heard about many other things.

"Kemal breaks with Soviet Russia"

It was no secret to military intelligence officers that, in preparing to repel Bolshevik agitation, the Kemalists took a number of fairly effective steps. In particular, they themselves created a communist party, about which the Register reported:

“There is officially a Committee of the Communist Party in Angora, but in fact it is only a guise under which the most intense counter-Bolshevik activities are carried out. Their main task is to absorb all the revolutionary elements, past and emerging in Anatolia, instilling in them the following position: the Turkish people in their historical conditions and commitment to religion cannot fully accept the Bolshevik program; he must be long and persistently prepared for this. At the moment, agitation is not only harmful, but also destructive for the country, because the soldier, having learned that there should be no fatherland, does not. will defend him, having heard that there should be no enmity between nations, will not go to slaughter the Greeks, about equality - will not obey the authorities. In addition, party leaders are not familiar with the state organization of Sovrossiya and will not be able to create anything positive in their own country to replace the destroyed old foundations. and therefore, we must first become thoroughly acquainted with Sovrossiya and its order and eliminate all military actions, and until then, in the interests of the country and the people, we must resist with all our might all agitators and propagandists. “It will be possible to “introduce Bolshevism” only to the Turks themselves and only from above.”

The Register warned that an emissary of this party should soon arrive in Moscow:

“As a representative of this party, Sabri Bey will soon appear in Moscow under the guise of an authorized representative of the Angora government and the Turkmenistan Party... There is very strong evidence to suggest that he is far from being what he claims to be, but was simply sent by the nationalist party to find out (he has in Moscow great connections) about future plans regarding Turkey and, if possible, exert influence in the necessary sense."

When the first shipment of weapons arrived in Trabzon and the Soviet special group arrived, the Kemalists began to openly oppose the Bolshevik agitators. Their luggage was delayed, and a variety of obstacles were created for their entry.

“Introducing Bolshevism” will only be possible for the Turks themselves and only from above

But all this in Moscow was considered minor rough edges, not worth attention, against the backdrop of emerging events. Soviet leaders decided that the time had come to Sovietize Armenia. And Ankara considered that this was a good time to correct the Armenian-Turkish border in favor of Turkey. The documents say that the offensive from both sides had a severe impact on the morale of the army and the population of Armenia. So both sides solved the tasks without major problems.

And at that moment it became clear that the Kemalists decided to make a very strong move in their game with the Bolsheviks. The most important, key point in the Caucasus at that time was the Georgian city of Batumi. Through its port, Baku oil and kerosene reached consumers throughout Asia and could be exported to Europe. And the Kemalists began preparations for his capture.

“Starting from mid-October,” said the Regstrupr’s report, “the Turks began to talk intensely about Batum... The Turks confidently declared that if Batum was taken away from Georgia, it would only be by the Kemalists. In the 20th of November, parties began to arrive in Trebizond recruits. A special regiment has been formed in Rize, which will attack Batum under the command of Shukri-Ogus, who is still in Trebizond. A rumor persists that according to the government’s plans, after Batum, Baku will be taken, prepared for this by agitation on religious grounds. they speak with Sovrossiya as an inevitable fact that will give Mustafa Kemal a free hand in his policy with the Entente and will allow him to launch the Batumi offensive. Reports from employees partially confirm the persistently circulating version of an alliance with the Entente, and the following conditions are outlined:

1. The Entente liberates Constantinople.

2. France provides its troops for the Batumi-Baku front.

3. Kemal breaks with the Sov. Russia.

4. Advances on Batum-Baku

5. Places retreating (evacuated from Crimea to Turkey) Wrangel units along the Anatolian coast.

6. Takes co-workers hostage."

Try to expel the Turks from Batum with a strong blow, and then declare it a misunderstanding "p.)" so that the people want what we intend to prescribe for them by law

Military intelligence officers reported that preparations for the attack on Batumi were in full swing. But the Central Committee already knew that the negotiations between the Kemalists and the Entente had failed. On December 10, 1920, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin telegraphed the Plenipotentiary Representative of the RSFSR in Georgia A.L. Sheinman

“By all indications, the attempt at reconciliation between the Entente and the Kemalists is not improving. England refuses the required concessions, and the Kemalists’ Soviet orientation is again strengthening... The right wing of the Kemalists could not sharply turn policy against us at the moment and can only use intrigues and harm to to hinder us through diplomatic actions.

This does not save us from the possibility of a more serious danger from this side in the future. In particular, the transfer of Batum into the hands of the Turks is unacceptable. We must not abandon our line of friendly policy towards the Kemalists, while at the same time restraining them from actions that are undesirable for us. Too many reasons continue to push them towards friendship with us, but we must be firm.

Instructions were given to Sergo (Ordzhonikidze - “History” ) on the resumption of the issuance of weapons and gold. In particular, since you have gold, give it out gradually, guided by Sergo’s instructions.”

"It is necessary to Sovietize Georgia"

At the same time, Ordzhonikidze and Kirov insisted that Georgia urgently needed to be Sovietized. On January 2, 1921 they wrote:

"First. After the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, we pointed out the need to then Sovietize Georgia as a base for the counter-revolution in the Caucasus. Subsequent events in the Caucasus irrefutably proved this: the Georgian government transferred to the Crimea all the Denikinites who had retreated to Georgia, all the uprisings that took place in the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan took place With the direct participation of Georgia, in particular, the uprising against the owls in Dagestan is undergoing under the leadership of Georgian agents - the headquarters of the rebels is in Lagodekh (in Georgia, Sigrekhsky district). In order to firmly provide us with the North Caucasus (bread and oil), it is necessary to advise Georgia.

Second. In every possible way supporting and organizing uprisings in the North Caucasus and in Azerbaijan, the Georgian government hopes to distract our attention from it and is not successfully provoking us in the eyes of Muslims, intensively inflating the actions of our troops when suppressing uprisings, for example, suppression of the uprising in Ganja, after which in Angora is noticeable There was a certain cooling to us thanks to the enhanced agitation of the Georgian press.

Third. Sovetskaya Armenia without Soviet Georgia actually remains under the much greater influence of Turkey than our influence, due to the fact that the railway to Armenia goes through Georgia (from Naphtlug). At this time, Georgia does not miss even bread to Armenia.

Fourth. In the existing position, the Turks can easily create their own buffer in the Maki-Nakhichevan district, where they intend to create a special khanate, in the hands of which there will be a railway to Tauris, which cuts us off Persia and dismember Armenia.

Fifth. The situation existing in the Transcaucasia forces us to keep significant military forces in Azerbaijan, which is very burdensome for the population and is harmful to the military units. This position can result in dangerous forms and create complications in Azerbaijan itself.

Sixth. The Sovietization of Georgia, our occupation by Batum pulls out the last base against us in the south from the Entente.

Seventh. The Sovietization of Georgia is now necessary because the Entente has not yet managed to weed the remnants of the Wrangel Army and so far has no sufficient forces to counteract us.

Eighth. There is no need to hope for a decisive explosion inside Georgia itself, which is proved by the whole course of events in Georgia. Georgia cannot be advised without our help.

Ninth. There are reasons for our intervention in Georgian affairs, for this you do not need an open attack on Georgia, it is possible to raise movement in Abkhazia, in Adjaria, in the Borchalinsky district, where there is soil for this. In this regard, Turkey and Armenia can also help us, and such an environment is possible in which we will be the deliverers of the Georgia decomposed and entering the anarchy. ”

When the decision on the Sovietization of Georgia was made, the troops gathered by the Kemalists helped in the capture of Batumi. But they did not stay there for long. Stalin on March 19, 1921 telegraphed Ordzhonikidze:

"Under an agreement with the Turks, already signed, Batum departs Georgia ... Try to expel the Turks from Batum with a strong blow, and then declare this with a misunderstanding. The initiative should take on the command; the Georgian government must remain silent, remain in the shadows."

Later, the relations of the two countries developed differently, but the Soviet representatives failed to achieve a serious influence on Turkish affairs. Moreover, this was predicted in the report of the register, where the words of the representative of the Angora Press Bureau, who recalled the years of the First World War: were given:

"When the Germans were here and we knew that their word was the law, all German rights were holy for us, otherwise we would have had to be bad. The Russians had to send us a serious and educated consul so that he could put relations to the proper height and protect them Indeed, as a representative of his state, he could demand that it belongs to you by right, and knew how to order where it is necessary. .

"Refrain from attempting to cause rebellion against the Turkish government"