The Russian president's remark reminded him of his recent American counterpart

The most striking quote from this year’s Valdai Forum belongs to Vladimir Putin: “Even 50 years ago, Leningrad street taught me one rule: if a fight is inevitable, you must strike first.” Fans of psychoanalysis have perked up - they have long been trying to explain the peculiarities of our foreign policy with that very street. Like, we all “come from childhood.” Meanwhile, if we ignore the metaphor of a yard fight, the statement fits perfectly into an approach that is well known and not only tested here. Ironically, quite recently it was guided by a man who in Russia (and not only) is branded for undermining world foundations - US President George W. Bush.

In a 2004 book, two prominent American experts and diplomats, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, detailed what they called the Bush foreign policy revolution. The authors emphasized that it was not the goals of foreign policy that underwent changes, but the methods. The Republican administration had no illusions about international law and institutions, relying on the unilateral use of force. The concept of preventive war has replaced what were considered outdated doctrines of deterrence and deterrence. Thus, in order to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, preemptive strikes and missile defense programs were considered the most effective. “Regime change” is preferable to negotiations with undesirable leaders. In addition, the administration relied on ad hoc coalitions, ignoring traditional alliances.

“Bush is a doer, not a thinker,” Daalder and Lindsay wrote. “Instinct plays a great role in his foreign policy. And the fact that Bush cannot express his instinctive ideas in a form that would satisfy political scientists means absolutely nothing.” A familiar image...

The book was written at the breaking point of trends - Bush’s incredible popularity at home and outward envy of America’s reckless power gradually turned into disappointment, rejection and even gloating. Thus, Daalder and Lindsay, already aware of the terrible chaos in post-Saddam Iraq, where the notorious weapons of mass destruction were never found, state: the success of preventive actions depends entirely on the accuracy of intelligence. And the miscalculations made on the eve of the war demonstrate that America is simply not ready for the mission that the neoconservative administration imposed on it.

Bush left the political arena with a bold minus sign, giving way to his antipode Barack Obama. He did the opposite, and seven years later, many commentators are wondering: maybe Bush wasn’t so bad, at least he had the will...

In Russia during this time the president did not change, but everything else changed.

And now in the current policies of Moscow and those of Washington at that time, one can notice a lot of similarities. Actually, the preemptive use of force is by no means an innovation; without it, there is no military art at all. But disbelief in the effectiveness of institutions, the ability to only instinctively understand when to take a step, the habit of acting alone because allies are unreliable - all this is common between the Kremlin of the mid-2010s and the White House of the early 2000s.

True, Bush and his neocon comrades sought to firmly consolidate American hegemony in the world; in the Russian case, this is, of course, out of the question. But the motivation is comparable. In the United States, the terrorist attacks of September 11 served as a trigger. Then it became clear that national security measures must be taken on a global scale, because the threat can come from anywhere. Russian actions in Ukraine and the Middle East are also a product of the belief that a restrained, proportionate response only leads to a tightening of the ring.

There is an important difference. American neoconservatism has an integral ideological component, while its Russian variety is essentially devoid of it. True, they made an application in the form of a “Russian world”, but it almost never came to practical implementation - everything quickly gave way to positional maneuvering. America's "democracy promotion" has lasted much longer and is only now seemingly fading away.

There is no point in trying to predict the scenario of Russian behavior based on parallels with the American one - the specificity of the subject and the moment is great. But three assumptions can be made. The changing global environment forces us to change our line all the time, and quickly. Bush backed down long before the end of his presidency. The phase of “premonition of an inevitable fight” is natural, but also transitory, since the limit of the effectiveness of preemption soon becomes clear. And Obama's experience shows that simply abandoning a wrong line does not guarantee the correctness of the new course.

Beat first: how Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush are alike