"They are both confident in their power"

Russian-Turkish relations-on the verge of gap. How it turned out to be possible and what is fraught with - for the answers The New Times turned to experts

1. How justified are the actions of the Turkish Air Force regarding the Russian Su-24 bomber? 2. What does the transfer of the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system mean to the Russian military base in Latakia?

3. Why did Putin not agree with Erdogan on military coordination in the airspace on the border between Turkey and Syria at a meeting in Moscow on September 23 or at the “twenty” meeting in Antalya on November 14-15?

4. What can the escalation of the conflict Putin - Erdogan and Russia - Turkey lead to?

Pavel Baev, professor-research institute of research of peace in Oslo (Norway):

1. Formally - fully justified, all the necessary warnings were made, and repeatedly, NATO allies in this situation, which is why Turkey cannot but support. But from the point of view of a reasonable policy aimed at resolving and Syria and the destruction of IG * , these actions are excessively risky and extremely untimely.

2. Security of the Russian group, the deployment of this system - powerful, but inexperienced and irreplaceable - clearly will not strengthen. Any attempt to “capture” the radar of American planes is fraught with an incident. For Israel, which continues to strike from the air at the Hezbollah detachments near Damascus, such air defense is a direct threat of security. In general, only a deepening of problems in the implementation of the Russian intervention, which was originally built on purely low risk assessments.

3. The lack of coordination was the essential characteristic of the operation - the goal was to force the United States and everyone else to accept Russian rules. The United States went to minimal coordination for the risk of random combat clash (De-Conflicting), and Türkiye very rigidly designated its own rules. Russia considered these rules unacceptable and optional for execution, but if the US issue was only in flight safety, then for Turkey to ensure sovereignty. And this is a completely different level of sensitivity to threats.

4. Partnership with Turkey was an important resource of foreign policy for Russia, and the personal relations of leaders served as the key to this partnership. I do not see a big risk of escalation of the conflict - ambitions cannot be above common sense. But the loss for the Russian policy of the Turkish direction is irreparable. Türkiye may lose - in such situations, as a rule, there are no winners - but at the same time with new compensatory capabilities.

Angela Stent, Director of the Center for the Study of Eurasia, Russia and Eastern Europe University Georgetown (Washington, USA):

1. The downed Russian aircraft became the culmination of a series of incidents between Russia and Turkey related to violation of the Turkish airspace. Su-24 was inside the Turkish airspace for only 17 seconds, and Türkiye, as is usually done, should have warned the Russian pilot and escort the plane to its borders. However, as we see, this time the Turkish government at the highest level set the goal of teaching the Russian lesson.

2. By posting the S-400 system, Russia gives a signal about the readiness to take a military action against Turkey in case of repeating such incidents, but first of all this is done in order to warn Turkey from any shares.

3. Since Russia began surgery in Syria, Russian-Turkish relations began to deteriorate. Türkiye is especially angry with the fact that the Russians are bombing in the Syrian territory of Turkoman and support the Kurds. And this, in turn, explains why Russia and Türkiye could not agree on measures to prevent “random” clashes, while the United States and Israel maintain regular contacts with Moscow on this issue.

4. There is a threat of serious military escalation between Russia and Turkey. However, both the USA and NATO in every possible way push Turkey to de -escalation. Yes, and Russia, although she is now taking all possible measures to punish Turkey, are actually other priorities. Russia is fully aware of the consequences of a large -scale confrontation with Turkey.

"The incident on November 24 pushed two authoritarian leaders from each other, who previously connected friendly relations"

Ahmet Kasim Khan, Associate Professor of the Department of International Relations University Kadir Has (Istanbul, Turkey):

1. The Turkish Air Force released the map of the radar trace of the Russian Su-24. It can be seen on it: your plane violated the air boundaries of Turkey. It is important to note that this is not the first incident of this kind. For the first time, Ankara protested on October 3, 2015, three days after the start of the Russian operation in Syria, we also warned about all the risks.

2. Three years ago, NATO at the request of Ankara deployed the Patriot Earth-Air Defense System-in order to protect against probable attacks from the Syria Air Force. The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov then recalled the “Chekhov rifle”, which should shoot. Now Russia acts in the same spirit: after all, the S-400 is a similar system, and it is not clear what threat it should protect the Russian base in Latakia. Neither the Islamic State * nor other groups have their aviation. The Turkish Air Force never invaded the airspace of Syria. One option remains: the S-400 are designed for purposes outside the airspace of Syria. Well then, this is the same “Chekhovsky gun”.

3. The lack of agreement on coordination of actions was facilitated by the confidence of Putin and Erdogan in his power, a mutual desire to maintain the image of a “strong leader”. It seems that each of them had a very weak idea of ​​what the other intends to do ... Most likely, both Russia and Türkiye considered that the agreements between the United States and Russia are quite enough. But now it’s clear: Russia and Türkiye did not in advance in advance with each other its own interests in the region.

4. Further escalation will threaten the life interests of both countries. Türkiye and Russia are strongly dependent on each other, and over the past 25 years, this interdependence has launched very deep roots. Türkiye and Russia can only mitigate the tension on a bilateral basis, no intermediary here will help, on the contrary, some third countries under the guise of mediation can implicitly encourage further disagreement between us.

* IG, or ISIS ("Islamic state") is a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation.