The Church of the Empire

The other day, Patriarch Kirill personally ordered Sergei Chapnin to dismiss the responsible editor of the “Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate” . At the same time, Chapnin left his other posts in the Patriarchate, where he worked for almost 15 years. The media connect this with the recent report by Sergey Chapnin in the Moscow Center of Carnegie. However, Chapnin himself believes that the reason could be a much more acute text, published by him recently in the American Christian magazine First Things . Today, Colta.ru first publishes him in the copyright translation into Russian.

I came to church at the end of 1989 and actively joined in church life in early 1990. There were two more years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it was a difficult time: inflation, a deep economic crisis, empty store shelves. Our parish community received the ruins of the temple in the center of the city of Klin, located 85 km from Moscow. An abandoned and decapitated temple in a city dump, which was to be displayed, became for us a symbol of a new era. This was the first temple in the suburbs, which was returned to the church and which was consecrated in the name of the confessor of the times of persecution of the Church - St. Tikhon, the Patriarch of All -Russian.

Around the abbot, a young, energetic priest, a youth community gathered, which lived with a hope for the revival of Russia. The priest managed to experience the pressure of the Soviet special services - he was kept "in control" for the fact that he dared to create at the church where he had previously served, the children's church choir.

Then, in the early 90s, it was obvious to everyone that the movement forward, the development of the country and the successes of the “church revival” were directly related to the relieved of the Soviet past. We did not know and did not understand much, but we clearly felt: in order to change the country, we must change ourselves and, above all, stop being “Soviet”. The task of the “change in the mind” (metaoi) was key and at the same time inexpressibly difficult. But we - at that time students and senior schoolchildren - lived hope.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia entered a protracted crisis of identity. Russia had two ways - either European democracy, or Eurasian autocracy. Obviously, in the early 90s, the choice was made in favor of democracy. The society moved "from" the Soviet empire, repelled from it.

In those years, the “church revival” took from an external point of view democratic, and essentially truly canonical forms. There was a wide movement of the laity, which united numerous initiatives in different regions of the then Soviet Union. Already in the fall of 1990, this movement took shape in the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods. A number of dioceses in states that have received independence after the collapse of the USSR received the status of autonomous churches. The glorification of the new martyrs and confessors of Russian who suffered during the years of persecution began. Just a few years earlier, the mention of persecution and names of the victims was unsafe. Slowly, “to the touch”, a parish life was revived. And the living church sermon was turned to the heart of man, was a call for life in Christ.

The church received a huge credit of trust from society, and then the state for a long time persecuted, but surviving and preserved contrary to the brutal persecution of the community. Not only the Orthodox Church as a whole, but also literally every priest, every person in the cassock received a huge credit of trust.

And after the fall of the Soviet Union, the state of the "Soviet mothbaliner" of the church arranged many.

So at the first stage, the concept of “church revival” - we will call it “church revival 1.0” - became an important part of the process by ideological and cultural liberation from the Soviet past. Many people drew attention to the fact that, it seemed, the Church was able to preserve: it was a Russian traditional culture, another, not the one that was known to everyone - not Soviet. The church attracted the attention of even those who were not interested in the creed and worship. And everyone wanted to somehow join this culture, but the vast majority did not understand how to do it. It is in this confusion of the majority that the reasons for completely unprecedented respect for the Orthodox clergy should be sought. For many, the priests became guides into the unknown world of “other Russia”.

However, the desired and real varied. The church by that time was already quite Soviet . The highest episcopate was part of the Soviet establishment, and priests, if they agreed to strictly limit their activities only by the commission of worship, received huge financial resources at their disposal. And after the fall of the Soviet Union, the state of the "Soviet mothbaliner" of the church arranged many. By the mid-90s, the first signs appeared that the episcopate decided not to experiment with new trends-and returning church life to the usual Soviet direction. In 1994, the Synod decided to limit the growth of laying organizations (fraternities), harshly subjugating them to the rectors of the parishes. Many fraternities had to be disbanded.

At the same time, the search for enemies within the Church, characteristic of the Soviet ideologized consciousness, began. The first to hit the parish and catechism practices of the community (and fraternity) of the priest George Kochetkov. His opponents, demonstrating ignorance in matters of church history, called this movement “inappropriate” and tried to brand it as an anti -church. The official conviction of the church was not able to achieve - the episcopate decided to keep silent, but from that time on the open division within the church into the “liberals” and “conservatives” is being counted.

For all the conventions of these concepts in the church context, the “liberals” reflected on the practice of catechization, the role of worship in the life of the community, and the “conservatives” considered the prevailing practices unshakable, not subject to discussion, and therefore saw their main task to the socio-political space and the formation of “Orthodox ideology”.

For some time, the balance of power was preserved. The episcopate in general in this dispute tried not to occupy any distinct position. The “conservatives” thought themselves “guardians of faith” and harshly criticized not only laity and priests, but also bishops (one of the first - the current Patriarch, and then Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Cyril) for “evasion of Orthodoxy” until they were accused of heresy.

The situation began to gradually change after 2000, when the state was increasingly moving away from the democratic model and first acquired autocratic and then authoritarian features. As this reversal in the concept of “church revival”, priorities have radically changed in the concept of “church revival”. The first stage of the “church revival” ended when work with people faded into the background, and the tasks of interaction with the state became the main ones:

1) the formation of new identity through the preaching of patriotism and traditional values ​​in complete agreement with the domestic and foreign policy of the state;

2) the ownership and management of real estate and the receipt of state funds for construction and restoration.

At the same time, the processes of bureaucratization of the church, the creation of new church institutions, a sharp increase in document management and the number of church officials were underway.

A new stage has come - “Church Renaissance 2.0”. I must say that the “Church of the Empire” is a powerful and intelligible archetype that directly refers to Byzantium and the entire complex of views related to the “Orthodox Empire”, “Third Rome”. On the one hand, this concept has a great mobilization potential and conveniently enters the Orthodox Church into the system of the post -Soviet public administration for the only “free place” that the Communist Party previously occupied. This was clear to everyone, even to officials far from the church. On the other hand, this archetype is emotionally and ideologically very attractive to many members of the Church, both laity and people in the Holy San, who are fond of literal interpretations of the ideas of “Holy Rus'” and “Moscow - the Third Rome”.

And the “New Empire” is equally necessary for religion - as a form of legitimization of non -hemocratic power, and the Soviet past - as the mythological time of the great heroes (that is why the country's main holiday in recent years has become Victory Day). And the church at this stage also does not evade the expression of sympathy for the Soviet. On the one hand, this is an expression of solidarity with state power, and on the other, this is the recognition that pro -Soviet sentiments are very strong in the church itself. The latter is understandable.

The current baggage of Russia - cultural, historical, social, philosophical and religious - is not a variety, but only one living tradition that everyone knows, remember and can convey to their children. This is a Soviet tradition. And her triumphal return in recent years is the recognition that there is nothing else left in Russia.

“Church Renaissance 1.0” could not solve primary church problems: the mass baptism of the 90s practically did not prepare people for conscious participation in church life. This is evidenced not only by sociological surveys, but also by the priests themselves. The observations of the bishop of Smolensky and Vyazemsky (now Orekhovo-Zuevsky) Panteleimon are indicative: “In the early 1990s, there were some kind of influx of parishioners to temples ... people did not come to church then, but“ broke ”to it. Unfortunately, few lingered in it, and the period of active attention to church life and churching ended relatively quickly ... The percentage of people who come to the temple, according to my estimates, no more than 1% of the population of our country. ”

It is necessary to mention other important consequences in addition to visiting temples: Soviet people received baptism, but did not receive knowledge about the foundations of faith. The church accepted them as it is, hoping that they are churching themselves, in some kind of "natural" way. But in the vast majority, Soviet people did not feel any need to change, they remained the same as they were ... But the changes still occurred: these “new believers” changed the church for themselves.

And in this situation, a very significant mutation unnoticed. The main call, which the Church turned to both a separate person and society as a whole, sounded attractive for a long time: “Let's keep traditions!”, “Neglect of traditions is very dangerous.” It seems to be a healthy Christian conservatism, however, in the Russian context, you need to make a significant reservation: what traditions do we mean?

Today in Russia, huge moral and intellectual efforts requires a real desire to look deep into history - during the October Revolution, in 1917, in the history of the Russian Empire. Too much time has passed, too many generations have changed, too many carriers of the traditions of pre -revolutionary Russia were deliberately destroyed. And the appeal to the church traditions of the XIX - the beginning of the twentieth centuries inevitably turns into a historical reconstruction, into an amateur performance.

From the statement that Christian traditions in Russia left folk life, were in oblivion, we can draw two practical conclusions:

1) it is worth starting the search for preserved living tradition;

2) It is necessary to lay the foundations for the formation of new traditions corresponding to those political, economic, social and cultural conditions in which we live.

As a Christian to me, it is especially bitter to recognize this to me, but on behalf of the living tradition in Russia only those who speak of "Soviet" speak. This is the main secret of the attractiveness of everything that is connected with the Soviet Union and the communist past, not only for pensioners, but also for young people. The current baggage of Russia - cultural, historical, social, philosophical and religious - is not a variety, but only one living tradition that everyone knows, remember and can convey to their children. This is a Soviet tradition . And her triumphal return in recent years is the recognition that there is nothing else left in Russia.

Thus, “Church Renaissance 2.0” has become one of the most important elements of the formation of the post -Soviet civil religion, which ensures ideological support to the state. And this largely predetermined the forms and ideological constructions that are supportive in the prevailing model of the development of the state and society.

However, despite the fact that the church did not emphasize the creative effort on the development of modern culture, but on appeal to the past, the reconstruction of practices of the XVIII -XIX centuries, much has been done for moving forward. The historian Alexei Beglov admits : “We are not dealing with the mechanical restoration of once lost, but with the process of inculturation, with the creative process of the church entering into modern-modern and postmodern-the culture of Russia and all countries of the post-Soviet space.” Another thing is that the Church could not find true words to explain this.

Why, then, the “church revival” ended? “Church Renaissance” is a marker of the transition period, the time of uncertainty. The choice in favor of the "Church of the Empire" has already been made, and church forms and institutions corresponding to this model have been formed. Perhaps the new stage in the history of Orthodoxy in Russia can be called - neoimpersky - or, quite possibly, non -Soviet .