Although the situation in the Russian economy has not yet shown any noticeable signs of improvement, the foreign policy climate around our country seems to be starting to change. Personally, however, this only causes deep and sincere bewilderment for me.

The most notable issue is the sanctions. For several months now, voices have been heard in Europe that their regime should be revised. In the last month alone, this opinion was expressed by the Prime Minister of Bavaria Horst Seehofer , the Vice-Chancellor of Austria Reinhold Mitterlehner , the Prime Ministers of Hungary and Slovakia Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico , not to mention dozens of ministers and MPs. The basis of such sentiments is the thesis that sanctions were an element of support for Ukraine, but it is sinking deeper and deeper into the corruption swamp, and the severing of ties with Moscow causes economic damage to Europe without changing the Kremlin's policies.

Here, however, two questions arise.

The first is about the effectiveness of sanctions. You can repeat as much as you like that they do not produce results, that Russia is not Iran and that it is impossible to talk to it in the “language of sanctions”. But has anyone compared the list of sanctions against these two countries? In the case of Iran, a freeze on foreign assets, a complete cessation of financial transactions, an embargo on oil sales and a host of trade restrictions were applied, including even a ban on servicing American and European passenger aircraft. And who remembers the set of sanctions against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 1998-1999? Or the list of currently effective restrictions against the DPRK? I may be wrong, but if the same sanctions were applied to Russia as to Iran, Crimea would have long ago become Ukrainian again. But to impose extremely soft sanctions and then talk about their ineffectiveness – well, this is difficult to describe within the framework of diplomatic vocabulary.

The second question is much more important – about the downsides of breaking economic ties with Moscow. It seems that Paris, Rome and some other European capitals believe that lifting sanctions will return economic relations between the EU and the Russian Federation to 2013. It will not. On the one hand, the general economic conditions have changed. For example, revising the ban on supplies of equipment for gas and oil production on the shelf and in the Arctic will not change anything, since at a price of $40 per barrel no one will even think of engaging in such projects and, accordingly, buying technology for them. Easing lending will not help either: today Russian banks do not have good projects, and Russia's credit ratings, which have been lowered several times, will keep European financiers from issuing new loans.

On the other hand, Russian trade is shrinking not because of sanctions, but because of a reduction in domestic demand. If in June 2014 Russia imported goods worth $27.4 billion, then in January 2016 it was only $9 billion. In 2015, Russia’s imports from the EU fell by 40.8%, but imports from Kazakhstan fell by 35.5%, from Turkey, which was still friendly for most of last year, by 39.4%, and from South Korea by 49.4%. The counter-sanctions do not do much harm to Europe either (agricultural exports from Lithuania in 2015 fell by 41%, from Finland, Estonia and Poland by 18-20%, in total for Eastern Europe by 2.5 billion euros, but Germany and France increased exports by 5.6% to 23.6 billion euros and by 6.3% to 15.7 billion, respectively; agricultural exports from the EU as a whole also grew). But the main thing is that the lifting of sanctions will not return European products to their previous market share: it is occupied by competitors, and the solvent demand of the population, which saves on everything, is no longer the same. If the sanctions are lifted, one can expect an increase in EU exports to Russia by 4-6 billion euros per year, i.e. by 0.3-0.4% of total EU exports. And even if we ignore whether Ukraine is important to the West or not, is this a worthy price for European principles?

Accordingly, even I, who have never been known to be interested in conspiracy theories, have a question: to what extent is the change in European attitudes toward Russia a consequence of the spread of illusions and to what extent is it a product of direct material interest (coming from Russian partners or individual European businesses connected to Moscow)? Because if this is banal stupidity, then where are its limits?

However, the topic is not limited to economics. In the geopolitical solitaire, Russia's role seems to be growing. And now the German Foreign Minister has declared that he "would like the G7 format not to be long-term and that we would create conditions for a return to the G8." The reason for this is formulated very elegantly: "It seems that not a single major international conflict can be resolved without Russia's participation." I would like to ask the esteemed Minister what exactly he means? Does this list, if compiled, include the conflicts in Georgia or Moldova, where Russia has been supporting separatist regions for decades (I am not talking about Ukraine)? Does the politician believe that the conflict in Syria was "resolved" with Moscow's participation, or are we rather seeing only the creation of conditions for it to continue in one form or another for decades to come? And, of course, I would like to know how the esteemed Minister assesses the main success of Russian diplomacy in recent decades - the creation of "strong conditions for peace in Nagorno-Karabakh"? Russia is a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, but under the guise of peacekeeping, it has sold $4 billion worth of weapons to Baku in recent years, and almost $1.5 billion worth to Yerevan. Is it worth hoping that Moscow will now be able to reconcile the “unfrozen” parties in this confrontation?

Yes, Russia's role in resolving many conflicts can be enormous. However, we should not forget that it created a significant number of such conflicts itself (I am not saying that the roots of all confrontations in the post-Soviet territory go back to the Soviet national/territorial policy) - both by supporting dictatorial regimes, like in Syria, and by its post-imperial ambitions, like in Georgia and Ukraine. And we should keep in mind that Russia has not yet resolved a single conflict (with the exception, perhaps, of Tajikistan, which, however, constantly threatens to flare up again). Therefore, the great role that the world is talking about today should not be confused with great merits - which, alas, do not exist and never did. And to once again engage in "pacifying" Moscow at the expense of Russia's neighbors means indulging Vladimir Putin and all conservative forces in the country and preparing the ground for the emergence of new problems that will not allow Europe and the world to sleep peacefully.

Today, Russia is a great power that is clearly declining. Having used its momentary success, which was due to the favorable situation with raw materials, for an illusory build-up of military power and provoking conflicts, it is trying to prove to the West its geopolitical and economic viability. But one would have to be completely naive (to say the least) to compare the Russian operation in Syria, for example, with the American presence in Iraq or to assume that the opening of certain segments of the Russian market could change the economic dynamics in Europe. Russia's accidental "geopolitical moment" will soon become a thing of the past, as will its short-lived financial prosperity, and European politicians will have to regret their unprincipled position. Unless, of course, it was stupid or there was no concern for not only national but also personal interests behind it.

The author is the director of the Center for Post-Industrial Society Studies

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