Altruists are thoughtless

People play economic games. These researchers force them to identify people's tendency to different types of social behavior. They collect small groups of subjects and give them conditional money, which can be invested in joint projects per realistic profit or save, while receiving income from investments of other members of the group. In such games, cooperators are always much larger than the one -man, and about half of the players, making deposits, focus on how many other participants invest, and only a quarter of participants never gives a penny for joint projects. Analyzing these results, sociologists, psychologists and economists come to the conclusion that honest people who are baking about common welfare and justice and penetrated by the spirit of cooperation, and egoists seeking to cash in the expense of someone else's expense, a minority prevail. In these conclusions, experts of the University of Oxford, under the guidance of a professor of evolutionary biology, Stuart A. West) doubted. According to scientists, people are not cooperated from altruistic considerations, they simply do not understand the conditions of the game and unite, believing that this is how they will receive more money. The researchers traditionally checked their hypothesis: they gained volunteers and sat down to play economic games.

The studies were attended by 72 people, of which 38 women, from 18 to 74 years old, the average age of about 40. All participants received the instructions standard for such experiments, and then answered control questions confirming that the instructions were understood. The conditions of the game are as follows. Participants are divided into groups of 4 people, each receives 20 conventional monetary units (de), which can either be preserved or partially or partially invest in the general project. The profit from the project equal to the total amount of investment multiplied by 0.4 receives each member of the group, regardless of whether he invested money or not. For example, if the total amount of investments was 60 units, each participant will receive 24 units. Thus, the final income of each participant is the amount lying on his account (20 de - the amount invested in the project) + profit from the project (the total amount of investment × 0.4). One de was equal to three pence, and at the end of the experiment, people immediately received all the money earned. During the game, the participants did not communicate, everyone was sitting in front of the monitor. Clarifying questions to the experimenters could only be asked face to face.

At first, each participant played with a computer who randomly generated the solutions of three virtual players and informed them to the person, and in accordance with this information he determined whether to invest in the project and, if so, how much. At the same time, the participant was warned that he plays with the computer and his decision would not affect the income of real people.

Based on the results of this game, participants were divided into four categories. The most large group was made up of people who make bets depending on the bets of other participants: the more partners invest, the more they introduce. These people were called Conditional Cooprators, and we will call this group “like everyone else”. There were people who contributed money as if the Humped, and Free Riders, who never invested anything. There was also a group of “other”, which included five people who made constant rates regardless of investment of other participants (Unaconditional Cooperators), and three “Negative Cooperators” (Negative Cooperators): These invested the less money, the more other members of the group were carried. All types of players identified by Oxford scientists and their ratio coincide with the results that other researchers received in similar experiments.

Then people were offered to play, again with a computer, in a game of creating public goods (Public-Hoods Game). It also needs to be invested, but, unlike the previous game, its participants did not know how much virtual partners were invested, they could only suggest, and during the game they asked how, in their opinion, other players invested. And finally, the experiment participants played six rounds with each other, without receiving information about the contributions of other players and the state of their own finances.

Stuart West and his colleagues compared the behavior of people in different situations. Playing with a computer, they could focus on making a maximum profit, not worrying about justice and public good. Nevertheless, it turned out that the behavior of people in the first game, where they received information about the contributions of virtual partners, allows you to predict the type of interaction with real players. The participants in the experiment were distributed according to the same behavioral classes: who did not give anything to the computer and did not share with people; Who made investments continued to do them (Fig. a), at the same time focusing on his assumptions about the sizes of deposits of other players.

Since the players behaved equally in such different conditions, Oxford researchers doubted that their behavior was dictated by concern for the well -being of other members of the group or the desire for justice. Rather, the players misunderstood something.

Understanding the conditions of the game is mandatory in every economic experiment, for which the participants are offered control tasks: if everything correctly solved, then I understood. This standard check was also held by Professor Vesta's wards. In the first task, the participant had to answer how much he and other members of the group would receive personally, if no one has invested money in the project, in the second - calculate the profit if everyone invests 20 de. Under the terms of the third task, three participants were invested 30 de and it is necessary to calculate what the subject of the subject will be if he invests 0, 10 or 15 de. In the fourth task, the subject invested 8 de and had to calculate his income if the rest of the players add to his investments 7, 12 or 22 de. These are simple calculations, but only 16 out of 72 people did not make a single mistake.

After that, the scientists asked the participants the main control question: “If the participant wants to receive the maximum income in one round of the game, does the amount that he must make depends on the contribution of other participants?” Players could answer “yes”, “sometimes”, “no” or “not sure”. 33 people replied that their maximum income depends on others, 11 decided that sometimes. 7 were not sure, and only 21 players out of 72 answered correctly: the profitability of the game does not depend on the action of other players. With one invested monetary unit, a person will receive only 0.4 back. The investor can get both more and less invested, which is easy to verify by solving control problems. But since he does not know how many other members of the group invested, it is more reasonable for him not to invest in general projects, then in the worst case he will remain with his own. People who answered “no” to the control question understand this, they, as a rule, did not invest anything. Those who answered otherwise participated in general projects, and the more they invested, the higher among them the share of incorrectly answered the control question. There is an unconditional correlation between the answer and the type of behavior, and there is no reason to consider it random (Fig. B).

The analysis of deposits showed that people who have chosen the correct strategy for making maximum profit do not refuse this strategy, even knowing that their money will go for a common good. If they make investments, then their size in games with people is about the same as in games with a computer. Participants who correctly completed all calculations also do not show sacrifice. However, the correct calculations do not guarantee an understanding of the problem: among people who have overcome control calculations and the mistaken in them, the share of the correctly answered the main question is approximately the same.

In the end, Oxford scientists directly asked their wards, what motives they were guided by betting. Individualists who wanted to earn as much money as possible, and people who are baking about the common good were equally, and there were more players who dreamed of making money than real freeloaders. It turns out that many players from the “Like everyone” group dreamed of personal enrichment.

In general, people want to get maximum profit, but not everyone succeeds, because they do not know how to do it. Why does misunderstanding arise? Perhaps it's about the formulation of instructions. They often meet the word “invest”, which implies risks, and people may think that their income is not fixed and depends on the decision of other participants. Perhaps people in everyday life are used to acting like everyone else, not to stand out and transfer this habit of an economic game. The instruction does not specifically stipulate that, having invested 1 de, people lose 0.6 de. Judging by the results of the calculations, some participants believed that 0.4 de was a net profit and they would receive 1.4 de. In other experiments, when the players specifically explained that, investing money, they lose more than half, the investments were sharply reduced. Standard issues do not prevent this misunderstanding, on the contrary, the first two only confuse people. It follows from them that if no one makes anything, then it will not receive anything additionally and, on the contrary, if all members of the group make tangible investments (10 de), then everyone will receive a lot of money. Only the third task shows that by investing money, you can lose it, and not investing, make a profit. It is significant that the players do not accept this problem, only 32% of the participants correctly solve it, while more than half cope with other tasks.

All these data, as well as the presence of a group of unsystematic players and those who reduce bets, as other members of the group increase them, led Stuart Vesta and his colleagues to the conclusion that there is no need to talk about the predominance of altruists in the society. Differences in the strategy chosen by participants in economic experiments are easier to explain to varying degrees of understanding of the conditions of the game, therefore, such games do not allow you to reveal the true motives for the behavior of its participants.

Researchers do not claim that misunderstanding explains all the results of economic experiments, but it cannot be discounted. And Oxford scientists are the first to set an example: they do not exclude that some participants, answering the main control question, accidentally chose the correct answer. Perhaps they did not understand something.

Burton-Chellew Mn, El Mouden C., West Sa Conditional Cooperation and Confusion in Public-Hoods Experiments // ProC Natl Acad SCI USA, 2016, 113, 1291-1296 , DOI: 10.1073/ pnas.1509740113.